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I Introduction
With the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007, a rather long period of growth in global
financial markets came to a hold. While foreign claims of banks from countries reporting to
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) increased by almost 40% between 2003 and 2007,
they declined by more than 10% in 2008 alone and have stagnated since then. One key factor
which promoted this boom was financial innovation such as the securitization of assets and
the trading of financial derivatives. These new financial products facilitated the transfer of risk
underlying, for instance, a loan contract, to a third party. This fostered liquidity creation within
banks and financial firms and opened up further leeway for investments in financial markets and
for issuing loans to the real sector. Besides, many emerging countries accelerated the opening
of their markets to foreign banks, in order to increase domestic competition and subsequently
efficiency of their local financial system.
While financial markets became more and more global, market participants as well as regu-
lators, such as banking supervisors, underestimated the risk associated with the new forms of
international financial intermediation. The repackaging and reselling of assets, such as subprime
mortgage contracts of house owners in the United States, had become highly complex, which
suppressed the risk contained in holding this type of asset-backed commercial paper. Besides,
banks carried out many investments via financial firms, whose risk exposure was in general
not subject to banking supervision. Banks also conducted international lending and trading
on financial markets via affiliates established in financial centers, such as the Cayman Islands or
Luxembourg. The favorable legal and tax environment in these locations accelerated the growth
of international banks and most likely encouraged risk-taking as well.
Not only in financial centers, the risk management of many financial players turned out to be
insufficient as the financial crisis started to unfold. When the loans underlying many securitized
assets defaulted, this triggered a wave of loss in value of many related securities, which was un-
expected in its size and its potential to propagate quickly across asset types and country borders.
This systemic crisis was possible because financial markets across the globe had become highly
interconnected. Subsequently, increasing uncertainty about the value of financial assets, as well
as growing mistrust among market participants, froze the banks’ international funding markets.
Thus, interbank lending, for example, was impeded, in particular across country borders. De-
spite the extensive liquidity support from central banks, banks retreated to a large scale from
financial markets and cut back their international lending portfolio.
Against the background of this experience, banks as well as regulators are currently reshaping
global finance. Banks that have established dependencies world-wide are reassessing the organi-
zation and the management of their banking conglomerates, after they have incurred substantial
losses and are preparing for new regulatory rules. In order to foster financial stability, regulators
have put more attention on systemic stability. Even small financial institutions can challenge this
stability, if they play a key role in the global financial network. On this basis, regulators have,
within a very short period of time, developed plans to limit the growth of large global banks
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and demand much higher equity capital buffers from individual banks, in particular if they
are important counterparties for other financial institutions. However, the regulator faces the
challenge that global banks have become highly complex. Besides, regulation has to perform a
delicate balancing act. While global financial stability has to be secured, the advantages of inter-
nationally integrated financial markets for the global economy, such as better access to finance
and lower interest rates on loans, should be preserved. It is therefore of particular importance to
understand how global banks are organized, how they make strategic decisions, and how they
cope with financial stress.
This dissertation provides four empirical research papers, which contribute to a more thorough
understanding of the determinants of international bank lending, on the organization of multi-
national banks, and on these banks’ potential to transmit financial shocks within their organiza-
tion and across country borders. The task requires a rather deep insight into the structure and
development of individual banks’ balance sheets over time, which becomes even more important
as the group of internationally active banks is rather heterogeneous. This applies to the distribu-
tion of lending activity across foreign countries as well as to the modes of operation. While part
of a banks’ business with foreign counterparties is carried out by the headquarter on a cross-
border basis, banks can also lend via affiliates which they establish abroad. Data, which allows
analyzing these patterns on the level of the individual bank, is available within central banks,
which collect these statistics for oversight purposes. This dissertation relies on the monthly data
collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank from all banks registered in Germany. These banks report
on a mandatory basis their domestic as well as their foreign business, carried out in part by their
foreign affiliates. Next to individual balance sheet positions of all these bank entities, it is pos-
sible to identify counterparties by sector and country. This provides a particularly rich basis for
the analysis of determinants that drive the banks’ decisions, using panel regression techniques.
In the first paper of this thesis, entitled “Foreign lending, risk aversion and the financial crisis”,
which is coauthored with Rainer Frey and Alexander Lipponer from the Deutsche Bundesbank,
we investigate how German banks adjusted their long-term lending to firms located in more than
60 foreign countries in response to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Long-term lending, hence
lending with an original maturity of more than one year, reflects the strategic commitment of
banks to certain markets particularly well. After the US subprime market collapsed in mid-2007,
banks started to reassess their investment strategies and to adjust their portfolios. For German
banks, we can observe rather stable long-term lending abroad until the investment bank Lehman
Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008, which led to increasing mistrust among participants
of funding markets. Thereafter, German banks started to reduce their long-term lending to
foreign firms.
Unlike earlier research in this field, we are able to address lending by German parent banks
across borders and lending by these banks’ affiliates established abroad at the same time. Be-
sides, we are able to identify changes in the stock figures collected which arise from loan deci-
sions of banks and not from valuation effects such as exchange rate movements. This allows a
more accurate assessment of banks’ portfolio adjustments. Key questions addressed in this pa-
per include whether supply-side (bank-related) factors or demand-side (country-related) factors
determined the decline in long-term lending to foreign firms. Besides, we analyze the role of
local affiliates for the stabilization of loan supply to the real sector in foreign countries.
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We find that supply-side factors, relative to demand-side factors, played a more important role
regarding the adjustment of the loan portfolio after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In par-
ticular, banks whose risk aversion increased in response to the crisis events reduced their for-
eign lending more. This increase in risk aversion is reflected by growing core capital ratios
and tightening credit standards reported by German banks, as well as rising loan interest mar-
gins between firm and interbank lending rates on the home market. Overall, lending abroad
decreased more than domestic lending, which reflects a certain refocus on the home market,
possibly because informational asymmetries grew larger outside the domestic market. Foreign
affiliates of German banks, which are a means of reducing this lack of local information, do not
per se stabilize lending to foreign countries. However, if foreign affiliates are more involved
in issuing loans abroad, then the lending is more sensible to local demand. This could be an
argument for host countries to encourage the establishment of affiliates by foreign banks, rather
than to receive only cross-border loans from these institutions. Supporting this, we find that
banks actively managed their loan portfolios during the crisis. They redirected the cross-border
part of the lending away from markets that experienced larger declines in GDP growth.
The second paper in this thesis carries the title “Intra-bank flows as a mirror of multinational
banks’ priorities and resources in the crisis”, and is coauthored with Rainer Frey. We focus on lend-
ing by foreign affiliates of German banks, and analyze the relevance of different funding sources
for the stabilization of loan supply during the period of financial stress after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. One key contribution of this paper to the existing literature consists of mea-
suring to which extent each individual foreign affiliate relies on funds provided by the German
parent bank. We then assess how the reliance of an affiliate on intra-bank funding affects its
lending behavior during the crisis. Besides, we are able to evaluate whether competition for
these internally provided funds has increased between different affiliates of a parent bank, as
overall available funds within the banking group became more scarce due to incurred losses on
financial markets.
The evaluation of this competition effect is strongly influenced by the specific lending portfolio of
different affiliates. We analyze to which extent lending to foreign firms is carried out by German
banks’ local affiliates or by affiliates lending across borders. By pointing to the existence of
these “hub affiliates”, and by assessing their role within the banking conglomerate, we provide
another contribution to this field of research. We find that competition for internal funds within
multinational banks has indeed increased in the course of the financial crisis, but this was not
the case if local and hub affiliates joined their efforts in providing loans to firms of a specific
country.
Furthermore, affiliates that relied to a large extent on parent bank funding experienced a decline
in lending during the financial crisis. This can be interpreted as a sign of parental support
for affiliates which had to cover large losses, and had to partly downsize or reorganize their
lending activity despite of support received from the parent bank. It fits into that picture, that
more profitable affiliates and those relying to a greater extent on deposit funding, hence on
funds collected from firms and private individuals, were better able to keep their lending to
foreign firms stable. A larger reliance on parent bank funding also renders foreign affiliates
more dependent on the stability of the parent banks’ funding portfolio as well as on the parent
banks’ decision on whether to prioritize domestic lending over foreign lending. Hence, in stress
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periods, lending by foreign affiliates of German banks is influenced by increasing competition
for internal funds within the banking group, as well as by priorities set by the parent bank.
Information on how the structure of global banks may impact loan supply of individual foreign
affiliates is of particular importance to countries in which firms rely heavily on financing via
foreign owned banks. This is for example the case in many of the emerging economies of
Central and Eastern Europe.
The third paper in this dissertation, entitled “Repo funding and internal capital markets in the
financial crisis” draws attention to the different roles of branches and subsidiaries within multi-
national banks. While branches are affiliates which are consolidated into their parent banks’
balance sheet for regulatory purposes, subsidiaries are own legal entities and fulfill regulatory
requirements in their host countries. My paper draws on previous research by CETORELLI AND
GOLDBERG (2012)1, who demonstrate that US global banks distinguish in their liquidity man-
agement between affiliates functioning as "core investment" locations, and those representing
"core funding" locations. In times of distress, core investment locations, meaning affiliates which
play an important role for a bank’s foreign lending, are more sheltered from the withdrawal of
liquidity by their parent banks. Core funding locations refer to those affiliates which are strong
in funding their operations locally. In the study on US banks being hit by a funding shock, these
are urged to provide additional funds to the rest of the banking organization via internal capital
markets.
In my study, I show that the probability of belonging to the one or the other group of affiliates
largely depends on whether an affiliate operates as a branch or a subsidiary. Within German
banking groups, branches are more likely to be protected from liquidity shocks hitting the parent
bank, which reflects their important role within the banking organization in distributing loans to
foreign firms. Subsidiaries, on the contrary, are rather used as core funding locations, probably
because they dispose of a larger network of depositors and investors, from which they can obtain
additional funds in times of distress.
Furthermore, this study shows that the allocation of the core funding and core investment roles
to foreign affiliates of German banks changed in the course of the financial crisis, which was, for
banks, mainly a crisis in funding markets. I investigate crisis events which limited German banks’
use of one of their most important short-term funding sources, namely the sale and repurchase
(repo) market. During the crisis, particular concern arose regarding the value of securities used
as collateral in these secured short-term funding contracts. While earlier in the financial crisis,
banks with a particularly high exposure on repo markets were protecting their foreign branches
from this funding shock the more they represented core investment markets, the banks were
no longer able to shelter these branches from a withdrawal of liquidity as the crisis progressed.
By contrast, the use of subsidiaries as core funding markets lasted longer. This insight into the
different roles of branches and subsidiaries within global banks may influence the discussion
on whether host countries profit from encouraging foreign banks to establish subsidiaries rather
than branches in their jurisdictions.
The longer the crisis lasted, the less German multinational banks withdrew funds from their for-
eign affiliates. This may have been due to central banks’ rescue measures such as the expansion
1 Cetorelli, N. and L. Goldberg (2012). Liquidity management of U.S. global banks: Internal capital markets in
the great recession. Journal of International Economics, 88, 299–311.
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of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. These interventions eased the pressure on banks that
were strongly affected by the unexpected drying up of short-term funding via repo markets.
The dissertation is completed by the paper entitled “German banks in financial centers: How
risky is their business?”. This descriptive study makes an important contribution to the analysis
of German banks’ foreign activities carried out via affiliates. While the other papers in this thesis
concentrate mainly on the relevance of affiliates as lenders to the foreign real sector, this paper
puts a spotlight on affiliates located in financial centers, such as the Cayman Islands or Luxem-
bourg, where business is concentrated on the financial sector. The role of financial centers in
global banking sharply increased before the financial crisis. Claims of BIS reporting banks on
these countries, which are often called "offshore" financial centers due to their large degree of
interaction with non-residents, grew by around 60% between 2003 and 2007. The favorable
tax and legal system of financial center countries allowed global banks to establish very large
and complex organizational structures. These conglomerates made, in part via their affiliates
in financial centers, large off-balance sheet investments in US subprime assets. Many empiri-
cal studies include lump-sum control variables for characteristics of banks located in financial
centers, but do not address these attributes in more detail.
In this study, the balance sheet structure of financial-center affiliates is compared to that of af-
filiates located outside financial centers, with the aim of determining the role of these affiliates
for German multinational banks. Furthermore, first steps are provided towards assessing the
risk incorporated in these affiliates’ business models. Financial center affiliates are particularly
exposed to disruptions on short-term funding markets, as they constantly have to roll over large
amounts of short-term debt. As a consequence, they required larger support from their par-
ent banks during the financial crisis compared with affiliates located outside financial centers.
Besides, affiliates in financial centers are more likely to spread distress arising from financial
markets, as they mainly interact with other financial centers.
Branches as opposed to subsidiaries in financial centers represent the highest balance sheet risk
for parent banks among all types of foreign affiliates. In view of the fact that they dispose of
the thinnest buffers of equity capital among all types of affiliates, their consolidation into the
parent banks’ balance sheet for regulatory purposes makes parent banks more susceptible to
financial stress stemming from these entities. At the same time, financial center branches are,
compared to the other types of affiliates, more likely to suffer from, for example, shortfalls in
funding. This is due to the fact that they are highly involved in the trading of financial products,
a business that is generally much more volatile than traditional bank lending. New accounting
rules implemented at the end of 2010 reveal the large extent to which financial center branches
in particular had been involved in off-balance sheet investments, which are not overseen by
banking supervision. The risk taken by both financial center branches and subsidiaries should
be of even greater interest to both parent banks and supervisors, as German banks’ financial
center affiliates are, on aggregate, four times as large as their non-financial center affiliates.
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapters II to V represent the four research
papers, whose contents were outlined in this introductory chapter, and which constitute this dis-
sertation. All four papers are individual contributions to the existing literature on international
banking, and are therefore presented as such. Chapter VI concludes.
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II Foreign lending, risk aversion
and the financial crisis
This paper is based on:
Düwel, C., R. Frey, and A. Lipponer (2011). Cross-border bank lending, risk aversion and the
financial crisis. Discussion Paper, Series 1, Economic Studies, No 29/2011, Economic Research
Centre, Deutsche Bundesbank.
It is submitted to the Review of International Economics.
The paper was presented at the following refereed conferences:
• 26th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, University of Oslo, Oslo (Nor-
way), August 25-29, 2011.
• Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011, University of Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main,
September 04-07, 2011.
The paper was furthermore presented at the following non-refereed workshops:
• FMI Doctoral Seminar, University of Giessen, Giessen, June 21, 2011.
• 9th Bundesbank MiDi-Workshop, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main,
November 17, 2011.
• Bundesbank Conference on “The costs and benefits of international banking”, Eltville,
October 18, 2011.
(presented by co-author)
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Abstract
This study investigates the determinants of the provision of foreign loans by internationally
active German banks. For the period from 2002 to 2010, we look at quarterly long-term
lending based on transactions (excluding valuation effects) by the largest 69 German bank-
ing groups to the non-bank private sector of 66 countries. We show that lending by parent
banks is based almost exclusively on supply-side determinants, in particular on bank-specific
factors. However, foreign countries’ demand and risk characteristics become more relevant
when loans are granted by banks’ affiliates located abroad. Focusing on risk measures such
as the parent bank’s ratio of Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets, we find that rising risk
aversion among banks curbed foreign lending during the financial crisis, especially at a later
stage following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, we find a threshold at around
11% of the Tier I capital ratio above which an increase in the ratio does not curb lending
anymore.
Keywords: foreign lending, banks, financial crisis.
JEL Classification: G21, F23, F34
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1 Introduction
During the financial crisis, the stability of the banking system and the provision of bank loans
to the real economy attracted the particular attention of policymakers and banking supervisors.
Increases in risk positions and banks’ risk perception, which were triggered by the crisis, led to a
change in the behavior of banks. A deleveraging process was initiated and internationally active
banks increasingly cut back their foreign activities in particular. Banks’ business models abroad
may differ from those at home, may have other goals and a narrower scope, and may follow a
global lending strategy rather than put the financing needs of the local economy first.
The drivers of the foreign lending behavior of the banks are various and complex against the
background of the crisis and it is a challenge to draw a comprehensive picture. This paper aims
at filling a gap in the analysis of strategies and adjustments in bank lending beyond the home
market. We add to the literature by analyzing different patterns in foreign lending by both
the parent banks and their foreign affiliates using confidential micro data on German banking
groups. In order to avoid valuation effects, which were especially large during the crisis and have
nothing to do with the banks’ strategical decisions, we are the first to consider only transaction-
based changes in lending. Before and during the financial crisis, we identify the most relevant
determinants for lending abroad. We weigh the importance of supply factors predominantly
at the bank level against the macroecomic situation in the host countries. Compared to other
studies, we put more emphasis on analyzing the impact of risk stemming from both the bank’s
balance sheet and the general economic conditions, and on disentangling these effects.
The question of the riskiness of a bank points to its solvency, which we measure in line with
a large part of the literature by the bank’s capitalization. Assessing the banks’ risk positions
through capital ratios, our study ultimately asks whether relatively low capitalized banks which
operate across borders came under pressure due to funding difficulties and responded to this
with accelerated deleveraging of loans abroad in the crisis.1 Capital markets attributed some
risk to large banks even before the financial crisis, which was reflected in bank-specific sub-
ordinated debt spreads (see SIRONI (2003) who addresses large European banks). However,
before the financial crisis, a below average capitalization limited the fundraising possibilities
mainly for small banks. KISHAN AND OPIELA (2000) found for the US that the small, rather
weakly capitalized banks had to reduce their lending upon restrictive monetary policy shocks.
In a broader context, HEMPELL AND SORENSEN (2010) analyze different components of the Eu-
rosystem’s bank lending survey and also provide evidence that banks’ ability and willingness to
supply loans is a crucial determinant for lending in the euro area. ATLUNBAS ET AL. (2009) men-
tion that a bank’s ability to supply loans depends on its risk position in the context of financial
innovation and market funding becoming more important. Besides, during the financial crisis, a
limited number of German banks took recourse to rescue measures of the German government
and to liquidity support of the US Federal Reserve Bank. BUCH ET AL. (2011) show that these
1 DE HAAS AND VAN HOREN (2012) provide empirical evidence for this relationship in the case of syndicated
lending. AIYAR (2012) finds that funding difficulties abroad feed back on domestic lending.
II-3
measures had a dampening effect on banks’ deleveraging in foreign assets in a related research
project (see also ROSE AND WIELADEK (2011) for the UK).
Earlier research has identified several macro- and microeconomic determinants of foreign bank
lending. In our study, we put a special focus on the bank-specific supply factors for parent and
affiliate lending. We concentrate on parent banks’ characteristics as determinants for lending
abroad of both the parent bank and of its foreign affiliates.2 Although affiliates partly refinance
themselves on the local market (MCGUIRE AND TARASHEV (2008)), German banks’ foreign of-
fices tend to rely to a great extent on intra-group funding, when compared with foreign affiliates
of other nationalities (MCCAULEY ET AL. (2010)). In the literature, characteristics of parent
banks mostly appear as control variables for parent bank health, which influences affiliate lend-
ing via the internal capital market.3 DE HAAS AND VAN LELYFELD (2006) and (2010) find that
eg lower solvency, liquidity and profitability of parent banks can lead to lower credit growth of
multinational banks’ subsidiaries located in Central and Eastern European countries.4 However,
these studies focused on either parent bank foreign lending or affiliate in-country lending in
order to avoid the bias produced by financial intra-bank relations. Such an approach neglects
the crucial role of the lending channel - cross-border or local, which is linked to the question
whether the existence of a local affiliate extends the information stance on a local market (DE
HAAS AND VAN HOREN (2013)).
We capture all channels of loan provision abroad by considering parent as well as affiliate lend-
ing. The influence of local macroeconomic developments may depend on the way banks operate.
If banks do not serve foreign economies by any in-country presence, overall local demand factors
may not be very relevant and the loan allocation may depend more on deal/borrower-specific
factors. This may apply, for instance, to syndicated loans or loans to multinational compa-
nies (see PEEK AND ROSENGREN (2000) and BUCH (2000), who also points out that regulatory
changes at the EU level have rendered banks’ foreign country presence within the EU obsolete
in many cases). On an aggregate level, BUCH (2000) empirically investigates the relevance
of macroeconomic factors of destination countries for German banks’ foreign lending and con-
firms that the impact of these variables depends on the bank group entity, which may either
be the banks’ headquarters or the banks’ subsidiaries and branches located abroad. PEEK AND
ROSENGREN (2000) descriptively demonstrate that in Latin American countries, growth of loans
directly provided by foreign parent banks is reduced in times of crisis, while foreign bank sub-
sidiaries have a stabilizing impact. Considering only one part of the banking group, JEANNEAU
AND MICU (2002) on the aggregate level and DE HAAS AND VAN LELYFELD (2006) and (2010)
on the bank level identify a number of pull factors (local country characteristics) and push
factors (banks’ home country characteristics) which impact on lending by banks’ subsidiaries
abroad. Using quarterly bilateral BIS data, which is aggregated on the country level, BLANK
AND BUCH (2010) find that banks foreign assets are positively influenced by trade linkages but
2 In a study on lending by affiliates of multinational banks from the EU, NAVARETTI ET AL. (2010) find that the
internal capital market at least complements external sources of funding. In financially integrated areas such as
the EU, internal capital markets are particularly active.
3 See, for example, HOUSTON AND JAMES (1998) for US banks and their national affiliates, BUCH ET AL. (2009)
for identifying a productivity pecking order among German banks’ foreign offices, and CAMPELLO (2002) and
CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012) for demonstrating monetary policy transmission channels.
4 CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2011) find that the larger the pre crisis dollar-vulnerability of a country’s aggregate
banking system, the lower was its post crisis lending growth to emerging economies by parent banks and (to
a lesser extent) by affiliates. However, the authors cannot analyze different reactions of banks from the same
country, as they use aggregate data from BIS reporting countries.
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are reduced upon increasing interest differentials between the home and the foreign economy.
In a panel framework, BUCH ET AL. (2010) conclude that macroeconomic shocks influence the
development of bilateral cross-border bank assets. This strand of literature was based on re-
search by CALVO ET AL. (1993) and CHUHAN ET AL. (1998), who investigated the vulnerability
of emerging countries arising from international financing. On the macro level, they contrast
supply-side factors with demand variables abroad.5
Overall, our findings reveal that bank-specific supply-side factors are the key determinants of
foreign lending, while local macroeconomic characteristics are less important. Better perform-
ing and more diversified banks are more likely to extend credit abroad. Rising levels of risk
aversion among parent banks - measured in several ways - play a crucial role for downward ad-
justments in long-term loans abroad, both by the parent bank itself and by its affiliates. Higher
risk aversion has a negative impact on lending to foreign firms, which came to light during the
financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In addition, cross-border lending car-
ried out directly by the parent bank was shifted away from countries whose economic growth
suffered most during the crisis. Macroeconomic characteristics of potential destination countries
become more relevant if, in addition to direct credit allocation by the German parent bank itself,
the bank carries out a significant part of its business through the channel of affiliates located
abroad. If this is the case, external financing needs and general economic risk in destination
countries are both relevant for loan adjustments. The financing of an economy by loans from
multinational banks’ local affiliates may thus be more favorable for the economy than financing
from a foreign parent bank far away. This might be an argument for the countries’ governments
to foster direct investment by foreign banks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 describes our empirical
model. In section 4 we discuss the results, section 5 provides several robustness checks for data
selection and regression analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Sample definition
We base our analysis on data that combine several micro and macro datasets in a unique way.
To identify the various possible factors influencing German banks’ foreign lending, we include
four basic sets of variables: first, bank-specific micro data describing supply-side issues; second,
general supply-side factors relying on German macroeconomic variables; third, macroeconomic
variables capturing primarily the foreign demand side; and, fourth, foreign country risk factors.
We restrict our loan transaction data at the bank level to long-term loans to the non-bank private
sector (henceforth “private sector”), ie loans with an original maturity of more than one year.
Long-term loans account for more that 85% of German banks’ total foreign lending and hence
represent a major part of their foreign lending activity. This strong strategic focus parallels
German banks’ business in their home market. They play the predominant role in the financing
5 Based on empirical analysis, HAOUAT ET AL. (2012) argue that foreign bank penetration of Latin American
countries has had the positive effect of reducing real credit volatility, thus stabilizing loan provision to the real
sector.
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of firms, as capital market funding of enterprises in Germany is less widespread than in Anglo-
Saxon countries. 6
Starting with the largest 100 German banks and then selecting a subsample by excluding pro-
motional banks and foreign-owned banks produces a sample of 69 banks. Owing to a number of
bank mergers in the period under review, which we handle by backward integration, we have to
include figures for 140 banks overall.7 Figure 2 in the appendix depicts the dynamics between
2002 and 2010 of total and long-term foreign loans vis-à-vis the foreign private sector, which
we cover by our selection of banks.
As a further reduction of complexity - partly driven by the availability of macroeconomic data
- we selected 100 countries with the largest amounts of German foreign loans outstanding.
This selection of banks and countries still covers roughly 90% with regard to German banks’
total foreign lending to the non-bank private sector. Hence, the complexity of the analysis is
reduced without any loss of generality of the results.8 Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to
foreign private-sector loans to countries that do not host important financial centers. This type
of business is widely driven by financial deals with special purpose entities as well as by banks’
proprietary trading in portfolio instruments, which is why we exclude it from our analysis. For
the classification of offshore financial centers we make use of the definition of the Financial
Stability Forum, the predecessor of today’s Financial Stability Board, published in 2000 and
in addition we exclude the UK and the US from our sample since they represent large financial
hubs for German banks.9 This reduces the number of countries in our sample to 66. Overall, our
sample then covers close to 40% of total German bank lending to the foreign non-bank private
sector. Table 1 in the appendix contains the list of selected countries, the number of German
banks in our sample which supply foreign loans to these countries (as of December 2009) as
well as the total volume of their exposure.
2.2 Micro data
Micro data on German banks’ foreign lending transactions stem from monthly statistics on the
external positions of German banks.10 All German parent banks, their affiliates (subsidiaries
and branches) abroad as well as subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Germany are covered
in the statistics.11 The data allow us to analyze German banks’ foreign assets and liabilities by
asset category, maturity, country, sector and currency. The dataset also enables us to separate
6 An important reason to exclude short-term lending is that it includes trade financing, for which the determinants
are different and cannot be accurately explained with our approach. See Figure 1 for the development of overall
private sector loans of German banks and Figure 2 for the development of long-term versus total foreign loans
to the foreign private sector by the German banks used in this study.
7 For specific banks that transferred a large proportion of their foreign business to another bank within the same
group but outside Germany, all subsequent observations following such an event were dropped in order to handle
these drastic changes in the reports on foreign operations, which cannot be explained by our general model.
8 As for Serbia and Montenegro, which split in 2006, most explanatory variables only exist for the former union,
we take these countries as one for the purpose of this analysis.
9 However, we conduct a robustness check in section 5 of the paper, which includes the two countries in the
analysis. For the complete list of countries defined as financial centers, see Table 1.
10 For a detailed description, see FIORENTINO ET AL. (2010).
11 In contrast to branches, subsidiaries have their own legal status. The activities of subsidiaries located abroad
are reported by the German parent bank if it is the majority shareholder. There are no exemption limits for the
reports.
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transaction-based changes from price or exchange rate-related changes of the stock figures col-
lected. Therefore, we can draw on effective transaction changes of long-term loans to the private
sector on the parent level, on the affiliate level, and for the level of the consolidated group. The
study aims at explaining changes in the consolidated foreign private lending activities of the
banking groups (henceforth German banks). These figures therefore do not include inter- or
intra-bank loans. Since we can calculate the importance of loans distributed by affiliates abroad
relative to loans supplied directly from Germany, we can additionally work out the relevance of
the funding channel for firms abroad (directly by the parent bank vs. via affiliates). In this way,
we also obtain a measure of the relative intensity of a German bank’s presence abroad and its
impact on lending to the respective foreign country.12
In Figure 2 in the appendix, we plot the development of standard stock data for foreign private-
sector loans issued by German banks versus the development of the series solely based on trans-
actions. Most of the pre crisis gap between the actual stock data and the transaction-based data
can be explained by the appreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis foreign currencies over this period of
time. While the purely transaction-induced dynamics are still roughly similar to those of the ac-
tual stock series until 2009, we observe a considerable devaluation of loans since then. This can
be attributed to the financial crisis: While the Euro depreciated slightly, especially write-downs
on loans increased. As we exclude these effects, our approach allows a more accurate assess-
ment of the impact of the financial crisis on the strategical changes of German banks’ lending
behavior abroad.
This data set has been supplemented by information on the German parent banks from the
monthly balance sheet statistics and the yearly profit and loss account statements. For the risk
assessment of individual parent banks, our data set has been augmented using non-official,
confidential banking supervision data. All micro data used in this analysis are collected by the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
2.3 Macro data
For the macro variables, we have added data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO). Additional data come from the German balance of
payments statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank). Market data are from Bloomberg and Datastream.
Aggregate data on the general perception of credit standards for long-term private-sector loans
by German banks are taken from the German part of the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) to complete
the picture. All variables are quarterly data expressed in real terms. For more details on specific
variables, especially their original frequency and some summary statistics, see Tables 2 and 3 in
the appendix.
12 We only observe the overall volume of loans issued in a country by all German banks’ foreign affiliates. The data
on the consolidated group do not allow us to distinguish between affiliates located in the destination country
itself and affiliates which supply loans to a country but are located in a different (possibly adjacent) foreign
country. This view on the data, however, accounts for the fact that banks often create an affiliate “hub” in one
country and then serve customers in surrounding countries from there, instead of opening up affiliates in every
single market of interest. These “hubs” are then specialized for monitoring markets and issuing loans in a certain
region, such as Latin America or Eastern Europe.
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3 Empirical model
3.1 Estimation approach
German banks’ activities in foreign countries have become quite substantial and now account
for nearly one-third of total loans to the non-bank private sector (see Figure 1 in the appendix).
Owing to its scale, we hence study a banking system for which foreign private-sector lending is
highly relevant, not only to the banks’ profits and their risk positions but also to the funding of
foreign economies to which these banks - alongside multinational banks from other countries -
supply credit. In one out of five observations in which a German bank holds a positive stock of
foreign private-sector loans, lending is carried out by both the parent bank and foreign affiliates
simultaneously.13 It is hence important to study both channels through which loans may be
supplied. Focusing on only one of the two may lead to an inadequate assessment of the relevance
of micro- and macroeconomic determinants of foreign lending.
In focusing on the realized volume of private-sector long-term loans, we observe an equilibrium
of supply and demand for this type of lending or we observe demand or supply if rationing
occurs on one side. We therefore evaluate the relevance of both supply and demand-side factors
to determine the driving forces behind foreign lending.
As explained above, supply and demand-side factors are best described by four sets of variables
which are illustrated in Figure 3 in the appendix. Supply-side determinants rely on bank-specific
micro data and on macroeconomic data related to the bank’s home country. On the demand side,
we have to rely on macro data, as no information on the loan recipient is available. We distin-
guish between variables which indicate the foreign country’s demand for bank loans, and factors
representing macroeconomic risk abroad. If a German bank is present abroad via affiliates, the
activity level in the respective countries is probably greater and may be based on more detailed
information on local conditions. We then expect that the country’s demand and risk factors play
a larger role. In case of no local presence and thus less country-specific information, risk factors
like stock market volatility may also be relevant for the parent banks.
The complexity of the issue requires the estimation of at least three equations to isolate the
effects of the different factors. First, we concentrate on the impact of all variables on the loans
granted by the bank as a whole and account for presence in foreign countries in the form of
affiliates. Thus, we can write the following equation:
∆likt = α0 + α1Bankit−1 + α2GenHomet−1 + α3FrgnDemandkt−1 + α4FrgnRiskkt−1 +
α5Affiliateikt−1 + ηi + γk + εikt (1)
with
• i = 1, ..., N . N being the number of banks in the sample, k = 1, ...,K , K the number of
foreign countries, and t = 1, ..., T the time period covered,
• ∆likt are the real volumes of transaction-induced changes in long-term lending to the
private sector from bank i to country k at time t,
13 The correlation between the amount of foreign lending and having an affiliate in the same country amounts to
26%.
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• Bankit−1 is a vector of bank (i)-specific supply factors,
• GenHomet−1 are general macroeconomic supply factors related to the home country,
• FrgnDemandkt−1 are demand factors in foreign country k,
• FrgnRiskkt−1are risk factors in foreign country k,
• Affiliateikt−1 is the amount of business carried out in country k by affiliates located abroad
as a share of total long-term loan allocation of bank i to country k at time t − 1. This
Affiliate relevance variable can vary between 0 and 1,14
• ηi stands for bank fixed effects,
• γk are country fixed effects, and
• εikt is the idiosyncratic error.
In our second specification, we focus on the two different channels through which a foreign
country’s demand and risk may affect foreign lending. For this purpose, we interact the macroe-
conomic demand and risk variables with our variable representing the relevance of affiliates in
granting loans to the private sector of a certain country. This leads to the following equation:
∆likt = α0 + α1Bankit−1 + α2GenHomet−1 + α3FrgnDemandkt−1 + α4FrgnRiskkt−1 +
α5Affiliateikt−1 + α6FrgnDemandkt−1 xAffiliateikt−1 +
α7FrgnRiskkt−1 xAffiliateikt−1 + ηi + γk + εikt (2)
The estimated coefficients α3 and α4 measure the impact of foreign demand and risk factors on
lending via the direct lending channel from the parent bank to the foreign private sector, while
α6 and α7 indicate the differing relevance of the foreign country’s macroeconomic determinants
for the indirect lending channel via affiliates (under consideration of their relative importance).
In our third specification, we try to capture the impact of the financial crisis on the adjustment of
long-term loans abroad. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the crisis on bank-specific
factors as well as on the relevance of demand and risk factors in the destination countries. We
interact all regressors from the second specification with a crisis dummy (Crisist−1) which
equals 1 if t ≥ 2007Q3, and 0 otherwise. Within the financial crisis, we additionally distinguish
time periods before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers as this event marks a turning
point in banks’ positions and strategies. Thus for a final specification, we shall split the crisis
dummy variable into two, one shall equal 1 if 2007Q3 ≤ t ≤ 2008Q2 and the other shall equal 1
if t ≥ 2008Q3.
All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter in order to avoid simultaneity problems.
We do not include the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. In spite of many other studies
which aim at explaining loan provision, we do not operate with stock or growth data which
would require including the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. Instead, we
explain the amount of transaction-based changes in long-term loans, for which there is no reason
14 It also equals 0 if bank i does not supply any loans at all to country k (either by the parent bank or by affiliates
located abroad). The quality of the results remains unchanged in a robustness check which, for the assessment
of the affiliate relevance, excludes banks that do not supply any loans at all to country k.
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why, a priori, it should depend on the amount of transaction-based changes realized in previous
periods. We confirmed this fact by testing the relevance of the lagged dependent variable as a
regressor: It turns out to be insignificant. All regressions cover the time period from 2003Q1 to
2010Q4 (32 quarters).15 For each bank-country combination, we observe, on average, a period
of 27 quarters in which a bank held a positive stock of long-term loans vis-à-vis firms in that
country.16
3.2 Explanatory variables
3.2.1 Bank-specific and general supply-side determinants
Our vector of bank-specific supply factors, Bank, consists of five variables: the parent bank’s
Change in core capital ratio, the parent bank’s Interest income over equity, its Capital market
activity, Bank size, and its long-term lending to the domestic private sector (Lending at home).
Table 4 provides an overview of the expected signs of the regression variables presented in this
section.
With respect to risk aspects, we assume that an increase in the level of risk aversion of a parent
bank, measured by a positive Change in core capital ratio, goes hand in hand with reduced
lending to foreign firms. The core capital ratio which we use here is calculated by setting a bank’s
Tier I capital in relation to its risk-weighted assets.17 The minimum regulatory requirement for
the core capital ratio is 4%. The mean ratio reported by the banks in our sample amounts to 9%,
which is clearly above a critical value (see Table 3 in the appendix for summary statistics). There
are only three observational points in our sample where banks have reported a core capital ratio
below 5%, and there is no observation below the minimum ratio of 4%. All banks in our sample
are thus sufficiently capitalized, which makes it possible to interpret upward changes in the core
capital ratio as driven by banks’ risk aversion. The core capital ratio can be used to measure the
level of capitalization of a bank within the CAMEL profile applied in banking supervision.18
A bank with relatively high Interest income over equity may have an efficient system of screening
firms and assessing other markets and may hence look for additional opportunities like lending
abroad.19 Moreover, these banks have a larger financial scope and can therefore afford to take
more risks. We evaluate the role of parent banks’ interest generating performance not only for
lending which is done by the parent bank itself, but also for lending carried out by its affiliates,
as we look at the change in loans granted by both.20
15 According to the F-tests, all groups of variables are, in their respective specifications, jointly significant.
16 As mentioned in footnote 14, in a robustness check, we exclude banks that do not supply any loans at all to a
country. The quality of the results remains unchanged.
17 We specifically rely on risk-weighted assets as in our opinion they best mirror the risk incorporated in a parent
bank’s balance sheet total. In a study on the implications of monetary policy on German bank lending, EHRMANN
ET AL. (2001) also points this out.
18 CAMEL stands for Capitalization, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. Other measures not in-
cluding risk-weighted assets (Tier I capital to total assets, equity to total assets, etc.) are also being used in the
literature to assess capitalization (see the discussion by KICK ET AL. (2010)). For example, BUCH ET AL. (2009)
find that banks with a higher ratio of Tier I capital to total assets are less likely to open up affiliates in foreign
countries. Once abroad however, their activities seem to be more stable.
19 In earlier studies, several measures for the profitability of a parent bank were found to have a positive impact on
loan growth of affiliates abroad (BUCH ET AL. (2009), DE HAAS AND VAN LELYFELD (2006) and (2010)).
20 We use the average ratio of interest income to equity over the past four quarters in order to assess the perfor-
mance of a bank over a longer period of time, and thus avoid issues of reverse causality.
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Diversification of strategic activities reduces banks’ dependency on specific types of business. We
therefore suspect that banks with more diversified portfolios and a strategy that goes beyond
traditional lending on the home market are more stable in their provision of loans. Therefore,
we include Capital market activity as a regressor, which is defined as the amount of security
claims to total assets of the parent bank.21
We use two variables to measure the information stance and a bank’s possibilities of gathering
information about foreign markets. First, we include Bank size for which an increase proxies for
a reduction in relative information costs. In line with OLIVERO ET AL. (2011), we measure the
size of a bank as the amount of total assets of the bank which exceeds the average balance sheet
total of all banks at the respective observational point in time.22 In addition, more information
about a foreign market can also be acquired by the local presence of affiliates. We therefore con-
sider the Affiliate relevance to distributing loans to a certain country. We calculate this variable
as the percentage of loans granted by affiliates located abroad in total long-term loans provided
by a bank to a certain country. By empirical checks, we can rule out that affiliates are per se
more relevant in large foreign countries.23
Our bank-specific supply factors include a measure of real change in long-term lending by the
parent bank to the bank’s home country private sector, Lending at home. The relationship be-
tween lending to the foreign private sector and Lending at home is a priori unclear. From earlier
studies on bank lending to the German private sector, we know that real lending growth is pos-
itively related to stronger economic activity at home (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (2009)). Banks
could then either, at least partly, trade-off lending abroad against lending at home, and seek in-
vestment opportunities outside their home country only if economic activity at home is weak.24
Or, banks could extend their credit allocation simultaneously at home and abroad following in-
creasing demand for loans at home and, possibly, increasing profits on banks’ balance sheets
which allow the banks to take more risks abroad.
In addition to bank-specific supply-side variables, we consider two general supply factors related
to the bank’s home country, here Germany, denoted by the vector GenHome in the regression
specification. First, we calculate the Home interest margin as the average bank-wide interest
margin of the lending rate over interbank refinancing costs in Germany (for details, see Table 2);
hence it is a measure of the banks’ perceived lending risk on the home market. Second, we
add a direct measure of broad risk perception present within the German banking sector to
complete this picture. Assessments of credit standards which are set for long-term loans by
German banks are reported to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS). A rising indicator means that
credit standards have been tightened, ie there is a lower willingness to lend, eg because banks
require more collateral when issuing loans or are concerned about their refinancing costs. We
therefore include the BLS sub-category of Tightening credit standards as a result of a worsening
of the bank’s liquidity position as an additional measure of the bank’s risk position.
21 We take the average capital market activity over the past four quarters to better assess the bank’s strategy.
22 Thus, it can be avoided that the results are distorted by a pure scale effect, since it might be the case that large
banks in general carry out large loan transactions.
23 The correlation between foreign country real GDP and affiliate relevance amounts to no more than about 7%.
24 GIANNETTI AND LAEVEN (2012) investigate international syndicated lending during the financial crisis and find
an increasing home bias of lenders’ loan origination.
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3.2.2 Foreign country demand and risk
The vector FrgnDemand combines three variables which measure the demand for bank loans in
potential destination countries and the attractiveness for foreign banks to provide loans abroad.
First, we use Fixed capital formation relative to a destination country’s GDP to proxy for changes
in the demand for bank loans. As firms expand their business to make additional profits, they
require funding for their investments.25 Second, internationally active banks have the possibility
of directing their supply of loans to especially promising markets. We therefore assume that the
provision of loans to one country suffers if its economic development lags behind the economic
growth experienced in other countries to which the respective bank supplies loans (Other coun-
tries’ real GDP growth relative to local, which is bank-, country- and time-specific). On the basis
of a similar approach by DE HAAS AND VAN LELYFELD (2010), we compute this regressor as the
weighted average of real GDP growth measures found in all countries (except the country in
question) to which the respective bank supplies loans, relative to real GDP growth observed in
the respective country. As weights, we use the volume of lending to a country relative to the
bank’s total foreign loans.
Third, with Bilateral trade openness (share of imports from Germany in total imports of a coun-
try), we address the effect of international trade on foreign lending, for which we expect a
positive effect.26 Trade relationships can reduce potential informational asymmetries between
the lending and borrowing countries and can encourage the provision of loans.27
However, the attractiveness of foreign markets for German banks does not only depend on the
market potential but also on related risks. We combine country-risk factors in the vector of
regressors FrgnRisk. Business cycle risk, or the instability of the financial market, is reflected, for
instance, in the national Stock market volatility. We expect higher volatility to have a negative
impact on lending to the local private sector. In addition, the stability of a country and its
economy may also be assessed by the sustainability of its government borrowing, an aspect
which has received growing attention during the financial crisis. Therefore, we include in our
estimations a rough proxy for this aspect in the form of the ratio of general government Liabilities
over GDP.28
Beyond these indicators for macroeconomic risk, Exchange rate volatility can hint to additional
risk on the macro-level, even though the signal can be blurred by the maintenance of exchange
rate regimes (JEANNEAU AND MICU (2002)). However, as foreign lending is partially under-
taken in local currency in the absence of a complete currency hedge, there is a direct risk to
25 We believe that fixed capital formation is a better way to capture loan demand, especially from non-bank firms,
than GDP growth. A four-quarter average of fixed capital formation over GDP is used in order to better assess
market potential. We also do not rely on lending by domestic banks (line 22d of the IFS statistics) as a proxy for
loan demand. First, this variable does not capture any lending activities by other foreign banks. Second, likely
competition in lending between local and foreign banks could distort the accuracy of the variable as a proxy for
demand.
26 Many studies include Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows as explanatory variables for foreign lending (eg
BUCH (2000)). We find that FDI is highly correlated with bilateral trade. We therefore agree with JEANNEAU
AND MICU (2002) and do not include both factors in the regressions. As a large part of bilateral trade is closely
related to FDI, because it stems from intra-firm trade of multinational firms, we decided to concentrate on
bilateral trade figures as an explanatory variable.
27 This interpretation of the variable Bilateral trade openness is supported by the fact that short-term loans and thus
trade credit are excluded from the analysis.
28 The variable is averaged over four quarters in order to match the dimension in which we proxy for demand.
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a creditor stemming from exchange rate volatility. On the aggregate level, BUCH (2000) has
already found a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on cross-border lending by German
banks’ headquarters. We shall test this result with our disaggregate data. Table 4 summarizes
the expected impact on foreign lending of the variables presented.
4 Results
We present the regression results of our analysis in Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. Columns
(1a) and (1b) of Table 5 represent the baseline model. It assesses the overall relevance of micro-
and macroeconomic factors to banks’ decisions to adjust long-term loans to firms abroad. In
column (2) of Table 5, we take into account that the impact of macroeconomic developments
of destination countries on lending depends on the channel of loan provision (via the parent
bank or via affiliates located abroad). In Table 6, the regression specification in column (3)
investigates how the financial crisis influences the effects of supply- and demand-side factors
on foreign lending. Finally, column (4) in Table 6 divides the effects of the financial crisis into
before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
4.1 Predominant role of supply-side factors
Our estimation results suggest that supply-side factors are the crucial determinants of the real-
ized variation in long-term loans. Our baseline regression, reported in columns (1a) and (1b)
of Table 5 reveals that, overall, German banks’ adjustment of long-term loans to firms abroad
barely responds to credit demand conditions in the destination countries.
Supply-side factors play the predominant role in the allocation of long-term loans to firms abroad
and the internal risk position of a parent bank turns out to be highly relevant. All variables
which indicate an increase in the level of a parent bank’s risk aversion are significant and show
the expected signs. We find a negative relationship between rising core capital ratios (Change
in core capital ratio) and credit provided abroad (see column (1a) in Table 5). This is in line
with a large core capital ratio, standing, within the CAMEL profile of the bank, for a high degree
of risk aversion. Furthermore, Tightening credit standards due to the bank’s liquidity position, as
measured by the BLS, lead to a reduction in cross-border lending by German banks.
In column (1b), we enlarge upon the role of the core capital ratio, defined as Tier I capital over
risk-weighted assets, by adding the level of the ratio as well as the interaction term between
change and level to the right-hand side of the regression. The level of the core capital ratio by
itself does not play a significant role in the adjustment of long-term loans. However, the negative
effect of rising core capital ratios on lending becomes smaller, the larger the level of the core
capital ratio is (the interaction term between the change and the level of the ratio is positive and
significant). This supports the idea that a bank with a high level of core capital ratio might rather
conduct a stable loan supply policy and an additional rise in the ratio cannot be interpreted as an
increase in its risk aversion. It is rather the case that banks with large core capital ratios might
increase their ratio to signal stability to the market (KICK AND KOETTER (2007)). Computations
of the average marginal effects at different levels of the core capital ratio (not reported) suggest
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that there is a threshold at around 11% above which an increase in the ratio does not curb
lending anymore (the mean ratio in our sample amounts to about 9%, see Table 3).
Our baseline regression results show, furthermore, that banks which have been generating larger
amounts of Interest income relative to their equity capital, and which therefore have a larger
financial scope, can afford to take more risks and provide more long-term loans to firms abroad.
Moreover, diversified strategic activities of the parent bank have a positive impact on a bank’s
long-term loans to the private sector abroad. Our variable Capital market activity is positive and
significant, as expected.
Furthermore, the variable Home interest margin is negative and significant. We consider two
interpretations for this variable. There could be a certain trade-off between supplying loans to
the home market compared with the foreign market. The other line of argument sees in the
interest margin an overall market perception of the risk incorporated in long-term lending to
the private sector. The larger the interest margin, the higher the premium that banks charge in
a more risky environment. Considering the significantly positive relationship between lending
abroad and Lending at home, the second interpretation turns out to be more accurate, as there
does not seem to be any significant trade-off between banks’ long-term loan allocation abroad
and at home.
Macroeconomic demand and risk in destination countries play only a very small role in the ad-
justments of long-term private sector loans by German banks. Fixed capital formation over GDP,
which indicates the increasing need for external financing of the foreign economy, is insignifi-
cant, just like Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local, other countries being those to
which the respective bank supplies loans as well. Bilateral trade openness has no effect on the
overall lending of a bank. Moreover, an increasing risk in general macroeconomic developments
of the destination country does not negatively affect overall credit supply by German banks:
Stock market volatility is insignificant. The poor performance of the exchange rate volatility as
an indicator of risk might be due to our lack of information on the currency in which loans are
provided, which, in turn, might depend on the way lending activities are distributed between
the parent bank and an affiliate located abroad. Furthermore, we do not detect any negative
impact of a country’s indebtedness on foreign lending (Liabilities over GDP). According to this
finding, increasing external debt is not foremost perceived as an indicator of macroeconomic
risk.
While the bank’s overall lending hardly reacts to macroeconomic conditions in destination coun-
tries, we can detect a fostering impact of presence abroad in the form of affiliates. The estimated
coefficient of the Affiliate relevance variable is positive and significant, while another possible
measure for lower informational asymmetries, the Bank size, is insignificant. Presence abroad
allows local contact with customers and seems to provide the bank with better information than
administrative instruments such as extensive screening routines which large banks often have at
their disposal.
Overall, these results show that German banks’ business model of supplying long-term loans
to firms is different abroad from the situation at home. While higher GDP growth in Germany
is a key signal that banks issue more long-term loans to domestic firms (DEUTSCHE BUNDES-
BANK (2009)), German banks do not seem to react to business cycle developments in other
countries. It is therefore probable that in general the bank’s activities abroad depend more on
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factors linked to a specific borrower and/or deal. Overall, they do not satisfy the financing needs
of a broad range of firms in the foreign country.29
4.2 Demand and country risk impact through foreign affiliates
In the regression reported in column (2) of Table 5, we show that the impact of foreign country-
specific demand and risk on lending gains momentum when we distinguish the two channels
through which the loans are provided to foreign firms. At the same time, supply-side factors
remain important.
The interpretation focuses on the interaction terms between demand as well as risk variables
and the Affiliate relevance. Most foreign country-specific factors become significant when they
are conditioned on the relevance of affiliates in providing loans to the specific country. At the
same time, the remaining coefficient of Affiliate relevance turns out to be insignificant. This
allows us to make the outcome of our baseline estimation more precise. The positive impact of a
larger Affiliate relevance in destination countries, which we detected in the baseline specification,
does not stem from the share of loans per se which is handed out via affiliates, but is linked to
a better perception of local macroeconomic demand and risk in the case of local presence.
More specifically, while local affiliates which serve a certain foreign country react to this coun-
try’s economic development (the overall effect of Fixed capital formation over GDP for increasing
Affiliate relevance is positive), the German parent bank does not adjust loans. The same is true
for Bilateral trade openness. It positively affects foreign lending with the growing importance
of affiliate presence abroad. This result could hint to the fact that affiliates reduce asymmetric
information problems which might otherwise curb lending. Besides, affiliates abroad also take
into account the country’s risk situation to a larger extent than direct lending from the German
parent bank does. This is demonstrated by the outcome of significantly negative coefficients
when the Affiliate relevance variable is interacted with the Stock market volatility.
Conversely, the loan adjustment realized by the German parent bank takes business cycle move-
ments in alternative destination countries into account. The estimated coefficient of the non-
interacted part of Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local is negative and significant.
This result signals that foreign lending can, within the direct channel, be shifted to destinations
in which market developments are most promising. Within the indirect channel (lending via
affiliates), this is not the case (see variable Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local x Af-
filiate relevance). Interestingly, direct lending via the parent bank reacts positively to a country’s
indebtedness (Liabilities over GDP). While this result is, at first glance, surprising, it is possible
that governments stimulate economic growth by extensive spending, inducing an expansion in
production, thereby increasing firms’ demand for loans from both local and foreign banks.
With regard to the parent bank’s supply factors, the results from the baseline specification still
hold: Banks whose degree of risk aversion increases (measured by the Change in core capital
ratio) and which have been less successful in generating interest income in the past (ie have
29 In comparison, we tested in unreported regressions whether lending by local banks in the different countries is,
on aggregate, related to proxies for local demand and risk. We were able to confirm that local banks’ lending to
the private sector across the countries reacts to demand and risk factors similar to those to which domestic bank
lending reacts in Germany. Hence, German bank lending to these countries does indeed differ from the behavior
of local banks.
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lower Interest income over equity) are less likely to extend credit abroad. Banks which have
more diversified strategic activities (ie are more active on capital markets) are more likely to
raise their supply of long-term loans to the foreign private sector. Increasing risk in the German
home economy (indicated by a large Home interest margin) has a negative effect on foreign
lending, while Lending at home and abroad generally go in the same direction.
We thus conclude that German banks satisfy, to some extent, the external financing needs of
those foreign countries’ economies to which they supply a relevant share of their overall loan
volume via affiliates. The more business is conducted through offices in foreign countries, the
more these affiliates behave like local banks in the market in question. Of course, the local
presence of a German bank in the form of affiliates is in itself an indication of its deep interest
in the given market.
4.3 The impact of the financial crisis on determinants of foreign loans
The third and fourth specifications of our model (see Table 6) investigate the impact of the
financial crisis on the relevance of the determinants of foreign lending by interacting with crisis
dummies. The results in Table 6 should be read in the following way: In column bloc (3),
entitled “Crisis”, column (3/1) presents the estimated coefficients for the respective variables
listed, without interaction with the crisis dummy, thus capturing the period before the crisis.
column (3/2) reports the estimated coefficients of the variables interacted with one single crisis
dummy (which equals 1 from 2007Q3 onwards). In column bloc (4) “pre- vs. post-Lehman”,
column (4/1) reports the pre crisis results. Column (4/2) contains the variables interacted with
the pre Lehman crisis dummy (which equals 1 from 2007Q3-2008Q2). Finally, column (4/3)
reports the estimated coefficients of the variables interacted with the post Lehman crisis dummy
(equaling 1 from 2008Q3 onwards).
By interacting the explanatory variables with only one dummy over the crisis period (column
bloc (3)), we are already able to gain some insight into the way the financial crisis changed the
relevance of determinants for foreign lending. However, the bank-specific and macroeconomic
conditions at an early stage of the crisis differed substantially from the situation after the turning
point marked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. By splitting the crisis period into two stages,
one before and one after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we learn that the far-reaching event of
the investment bank’s collapse led to cross-border loan supply suffering from rising levels of risk
aversion among banks. With the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, risk perception changed, since
a major international financial company went into bankruptcy and this had not been prevented
by a government bailout. The event triggered a sharp increase in volatility on the capital markets
as well as a wave of write downs in balance sheets and a deterioration in the parent banks’ risk
positions. Therefore, splitting the crisis into two sub-periods enables us to better assign the
effects to a certain phase of the crisis.
The volume of German banks’ foreign loans shrank significantly during the financial crisis. We
observe a reduction in German banks’ foreign lending activities starting with the third quarter of
2008 (see Figure 1). Our results suggest that both supply and demand factors were responsible
for this development. With respect to the bank-specific supply-side factors, we find that a rising
core capital ratio, implying a parent bank’s stronger risk aversion, impacts negatively on the
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supply of foreign loans, and this effect actually stems from the second crisis period (see column
(4/3), lower part of the table). Further indicators of the banks’ stance vis-à-vis risk do not loose
relevance during the financial crisis. Tightening credit standards due to liquidity position reported
by the banks in the BLS turns out to be negative and significant (columns (3/1) and (4/1)),
while the interactions with all crisis dummies are insignificant. Likewise, banks’ general risk
perception, measured by the Home interest margin, continues to affect foreign lending negatively
throughout the whole crisis period.
There is a mitigating effect of Bank size on the reduction of long-term loans during the crisis.
According to this finding, larger banks were more likely to stabilize their business abroad during
the first stage of the crisis, ie in the run-up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers (see second figure
for Bank size (relative) in column bloc (4)). This might be due to large banks disposing of more
resources to counterbalance growing losses at the time from the subprime crisis.
With regard to local macroeconomic determinants, the interaction with the broader crisis
dummy in column bloc (3) reveals the trade-off which internationally active banks face and
which results in adjustment processes, especially in times of distress. The first set of estimated
coefficients interacted with the crisis dummy may be interpreted as the impact on the par-
ent banks’ cross-border lending (the direct channel). The interaction term between the crisis
dummy and the variable Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local is negative and signif-
icant (column (3/2)). This means that the potential of parent banks to redirect their lending to
the most promising markets or, as during the crisis, to markets in which the economic downturn
is less pronounced, becomes most obvious during the crisis. During this period of distress, credit
allocation to one country suffered increasingly if it grew more slowly than the average of all
other countries to which the bank supplied loans as well. For a better illustration of this out-
come, the stand-alone effect on long-term lending of a high value of Other countries’ real GDP
growth relative to local is compared to the effect stemming from a low value of Other countries’
real GDP growth relative to local.30 The difference between the average impact of a high versus
a low value of the variable can be calculated by multiplying the high and low values with the
estimated coefficient (see Table 6, column (3/2)). We derive the following result: If a country
has a comparably low real GDP growth then the average long-term credit flow to this country is
about 11% lower. This result underlines the significant recourse of the parent bank to redirect
credit flows in the crisis to the most promising markets within its country portfolio.
As the previous results (see section 4.2) already suggested, there are significant differences
in the impact of macroeconomic demand and risk variables on foreign lending via the direct
and the indirect channel. For the indirect channel, Stock market volatility plays a negative role
for lending before and during the crisis (Stock market volatility x Affiliate relevance in column
bloc 3). At the same time, neither the direct nor the indirect channel of foreign loan provision
react negatively to exchange rate fluctuations, another indicator of risk (see column (4/2) Ex-
change rate volatility and Exchange rate volatility x Affiliate relevance). This result is consistent
with the findings of a companion paper. DÜWEL AND FREY (2012) provide evidence that foreign
affiliates of German banks to a substantial portion fund themselves locally, making them, to a
large extend, independent from exchange rate fluctuations vis-à-vis the Euro.
30 A high value is defined as the average value of Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local beyond the 75th
pctl. of the distribution. A low value is defined as the average value of Other countries’ real GDP growth relative
to local below the 25th pctl. of the distribution.
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A final interesting result can be found for the estimated coefficient of Bilateral trade openness
within the indirect channel of foreign lending (ie interacted with the Affiliate relevance variable).
Lending continues to profit from Bilateral trade openness throughout the crisis, the more affili-
ates are involved in providing loans. Hence, tight international links prior to the crisis positively
affect lending also during the financial crisis, when most economies experienced rough distor-
tions. Thus in the crisis, the reduction of loan supply by German banks is less pronounced for
economies which have tight trading links with Germany.
5 Robustness checks
Test on the validity of local demand and risk measures
We perform a robustness check on the validity of the set of macroeconomic variables which as-
sess country specific demand and risk in the regressions. For this purpose, we replace all coun-
try specific macroeconomic variables with country-time fixed effects and rerun the econometric
analysis. The quality of our results regarding the significance of bank-specific determinants of
foreign lending does not change. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: First, the estimations
we provide do not suffer from omitted variable bias as we select local macroeconomic variables
in order to assess the relevance of local demand and local risk which influence foreign lending
decisions. Second, all of the bank-specific determinants which we identify as crucial for the ad-
justment of foreign loans are robust to changes in the set of macroeconomic variables included
in the regressions.
Extension of the country sample by the US and the UK
Our sample of destination countries for German foreign bank lending excludes - among other
countries - the United States as well as the United Kingdom. These two countries host important
financial centers and are therefore classified by the IMF as jurisdictions with offshore financial
centers. Without doubt, both countries are also large retail markets for foreign bank lending to
non-financial firms. Unfortunately, the data does not allow a distinction to be made between
loan recipients who may be part of the respective country’s financial center and those borrowers
who are part of the real economy. Thus, we opted to exclude both countries from our regressions.
However, due to their relevance, we also investigate the impact on the results when both coun-
tries are included (results are reported in Table 7): While bank-specific determinants for foreign
lending, such as the banks’ risk aversion, maintain their relative and absolute importance, the
relevance of macroeconomic developments in destination countries is affected. In the early stage
of the crisis, parent bank lending appears to react more strongly to stock market volatility and
exchange rate volatility (see in Table 7 column bloc (4), column (4/2)). Parent banks’ recourse
to redirect their lending to more promising markets remains significant (signaled by a negative
coefficient of Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local in the crisis period, specifically
post Lehman). The result that affiliate lending reacts more strongly to local demand and risk
throughout the whole sample period continues to hold. Finally, the inclusion of the US and the
UK cancels out the parallel development of Lending at home and foreign lending.
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All these results stress that lending to countries with financial centers is to a large extend dif-
ferent from lending to predominantly real economies. Credit flows to countries with important
financial centers are strongly driven by channeling funds to and from special purpose vehicles,
which may be non-bank parts of the banking group itself. As a consequence, the previous out-
come regarding local demand and risk determinants for foreign bank lending as well as the
relationship between lending at home and foreign lending is blurred when the US and the UK
are included in the regressions.
Loan data based on transactions versus loan stock data
In unreported regressions, we tested the outcome of our analysis if stock data (including valu-
ation effects) rather than transaction-based data for lending abroad are used. The use of stock
data makes supply-side determinants less relevant. Especially some of the key variables of the
bank’s risk assessment in lending activity, like the interest margin on the home market, become
irrelevant for lending. Moreover, the use of stock data affects the results above more strongly
within the crisis period. This supports the presumption that the presence of devaluation effects
related to exchange rate changes and write-downs on loans in the stock data variations leads to
an overestimation of the crisis’ impact on banks’ strategic behavior.
6 Conclusions
The paper addresses the motivation for German banks’ foreign long-term private sector financ-
ing. As our sample also includes a substantial time span of the financial crisis, we are able to
address lending strategies and to assess bank-specific and macroeconomic risk in view of the
current crisis. The management of risks in a severe financial crisis is not only important for the
bank itself, it is also relevant to the macroeconomic stability of countries whose firms rely on
loans from foreign banks. To gain a deeper insight into the adjustment processes during the
crisis, we split this period into two stages with the break marked by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. This allows our analysis to be more flexible with respect to potential discontinuities in
macroeconomic and bank-specific risk conditions over the time horizon of the crisis.
Loans to foreign firms may be granted directly by the German parent bank, whereas large banks,
in particular, keep affiliates in major foreign markets and distribute loans via this channel. We
are able to address both channels of foreign lending. We are the first to work on the bank level
with solely transaction-induced changes in loan provision to the foreign private sector. This data
is combined with other bank-specific variables to test the relevance of supply-side factors for
foreign lending by German parent banks and their foreign affiliates. We add macroeconomic
demand and country risk variables known from the literature. The use of transaction-induced
data on long-term lending is found to be key in revealing the importance of bank-specific de-
terminants on the supply side. This is especially true for the period of the financial crisis when
write downs in banks’ balance sheets as well as exchange rate-related changes drove the stock
data of foreign loans to a large extent and thus obscure the strategic adjustments.
Our findings strongly support the relevance of supply factors for the provision of loans by Ger-
man banks abroad. Bank-specific variables play a crucial role. First and foremost, the parent
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banks’ stance vis-à-vis risk has major implications for their foreign business. An increase in risk
aversion among German banks, which we can observe during the financial crisis - especially
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers - is accompanied by a reduction in the supply of foreign
loans. We show that risk measures applied in this study - increasing core capital ratios, tight-
ened credit standards reported by German banks, and large loan interest margins between firm
and interbank lending rates on the home market - have a negative impact on lending abroad.
However, for the core capital ratio, we find a threshold at around 11% above which an increase
does not curb lending anymore. We also find that expansion of credit abroad and lending to the
home private sector tend to occur in parallel.
Local country variables which include broad demand and risk indicators for the foreign
economies show only limited importance for German banks’ overall foreign lending. However,
if a German bank maintains affiliates abroad which fulfill an important role in channeling funds
to firms in foreign markets, macroeconomic characteristics of these foreign economies become
relevant. In this case, German banks’ lending abroad depends on foreign macroeconomic de-
mand, measured by fixed capital formation relative to GDP. For the cross-border lending carried
out by parent banks directly, we find that during the crisis it suffered in markets which grew
significantly less than the average economy to which the bank supplied loans. Thus the crisis
reveals that this business is redirected to especially promising or, during the financial crisis, less
shrinking markets. The funding of the economy by foreign banks’ local affiliates may thus be
more favorable for a country than the financing by a foreign parent bank from afar. This might
be an argument for the country’s government to foster direct investment by foreign banks.
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Appendix
A Figures
Figure 1: Overall non-bank private sector loans of German banks
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
This graph depicts overall private sector lending to Germany and to all foreign countries by the
German banking system. The series are based on monthly observations reported to the Deutsche
Bundesbank by the German banks and their affiliates located abroad. (See section 2 for details
of the term “affiliates”.)
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Figure 2: Transaction-induced versus stock development in foreign non-bank private sector loans
issued by selected German banks
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
This graph is based on the the sample of 69 banks which are used for the analysis in this paper.
The sample covers 84% of total foreign private sector lending by the German banking system.
(For details of the selection of banks, see section 2.) The underlying monthly series have been
transformed into quarterly series. Dashed series represent our own calculations: Transaction-
induced changes in foreign lending are added to the stock of foreign loans of German banks
vis-à-vis the foreign private sector observed in 2002Q2.
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Figure 3: Variable sets 
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Table 1: List of countries
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Table 2: Data
Variable Remarks Source
Dependent Variable
Real transaction-induced changes in
long-term lending
Real transaction-based changes in foreign
lending vis-à-vis private sector. Long-term
loans only (M⇒Q).
Deutsche Bundesbank: External
Positions
Demand side factors
Fixed capital formation / GDP Fixed capital formation over GDP
(Q⇒ average over last 4Q).
IMF: International Financial
Statistics
Other countries’ real GDP
growth relative to local
Weighted average 4Q real GDP growth of all
other countries to which bank actually
supplies loans (weights are the shares of
countries in the long-term loan portfolio of
the bank), relative to 4Q real GDP growth of
respective country (Q).
IMF: International Financial
Statistics,
World Economic Outlook,
own calculations.
Stock market volatility 12-month volatility of the stock market
index. (M⇒ Q)
Bloomberg, Datastream,
own calculations.
Liabilities / GDP Total government liabilities over GDP
(Q⇒ average over last 4Q).
IMF: World Economic Outlook,
International Financial Statistics
Exchange rate volatility 6-month volatility of end-of-period exchange
rates. (M⇒ Q)
IMF: International Financial
Statistics,
own calculations
Bilateral trade openness Share of imports from Germany in total
imports of a country. (M⇒ Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Balance of Payments Statistics
Supply-side factors
Bank level
Bank size (relative) Balance sheet total minus average balance
sheet total of all banks. (M⇒ Q).
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Bank Balance Sheet Statistics,
own calculations.
Capital market activity Claims from securities over balance sheet
total.
(M⇒ Q⇒ average over last 4Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Bank Balance Sheet Statistics
Interest income / equity Annual interest income (A⇒ Q) over equity
(M⇒ Q).
(⇒ average over last 4Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Profit and loss accounts and
Bank Balance Sheet Statistics
Core capital ratio Tier I capital over risk-weighted assets.
(Since 2004 Q, before A⇒ Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Banking Supervision
Lending at home Real change in long-term loans to German
non-financial firms (M⇒ Q).
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Bank Balance Sheet Statistics
Aggregate level
Tightening of credit standards
due to liquidity position
Change of credit standards due to a
worsening of the bank’s liquidity position as
applied to the approval of loans or credit
lines to enterprises. Tighter standards go
hand in hand with a higher index (Q, since
2003).
Deutsche Bundesbank:
Bank Lending Survey
Home interest margin Spread between the effective rate on new
loans to non-financial corporations > EUR
1mio and the 12-months Euribor (Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank,
own calculations.
Other
Affiliate relevance Fraction of long-term loans to private sector
(stocks) handed out via local affiliates (M ->
Q)
Deutsche Bundesbank
External Positions
Crisis dummy (2007Q3-) Dummy for financial crisis (=1 since 3rd
quarter of 2007) (Q)
Authors’ own definition.
Crisis dummy (2007Q3-2008Q2) Dummy for financial crisis before collapse of
Lehman (=1 between 3rd quarter of 2007
and 2nd quarter of 2008) (Q)
Authors’ own definition.
Crisis dummy (2008Q2-) Dummy for financial crisis after collapse of
Lehman (=1 since 3rd quarter of 2008) (Q)
Authors’ own definition.
M = monthly data, Q = quarterly data, A = annual data,
“⇒” = transformed into. Monthly data quartalized by summing up (flow data) or by taking end-of-period values (stock
data). Yearly data quartalized by linear interpolation
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean StD Min Max
Dependent variable
Real transaction-induced changes in long-term
lending (in EUR bn)
144,659 0.001 0.050 -3.078 5.703
Demand-side factors
Fixed capital formation / GDP 2,079 0.225 0.060 0.073 0.656
Real GDP growth 2,072 0.062 0.089 -0.342 0.607
Other countries’ real GDP growth relative to local 141,935 -2.490 170.784 -11,333.74 2,246.322
Bilateral trade openness 2,104 0.110 0.082 0.009 0.489
Stock market volatility 2,106 23.000 12.608 2.057 125.697
Exchange rate volatility 2,100 5.465 4.366 0.000 34.056
Liabilities / GDP 2,022 0.460 0.328 0.040 2.185
Supply-side factors
Bank level
Relative bank size 2,192 0.772 101.602 ... ...
Capital market activity 2,192 0.230 0.121 ... ...
Interest income / equity 2,192 0.378 0.256 ... ...
Core capital ratio 2,185 0.095 0.061 ... ...
Change in core capital ratio 2,183 0.001 0.011 ... ...
Lending at home (in EUR bn) 2,192 -0.023 0.391 ... ...
Aggregate level
Home interest margin 32 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.030
Tightening of credit standards 32 -0.709 10.228 -20.000 23.077
Other
Affiliate relevance 144,659 0.066 0.226 0 1
Crisis dummy (2007Q3-) 32 0.438 0.504 0 1
Crisis dummy (2007Q3-2008Q2) 32 0.125 0.336 0 1
Crisis dummy (2008Q2-) 32 0.313 0.471 0 1
Maximum number of observations for country-specific variables: 66 countries x 32 quarters = 2,112, for bank-specific
variables: 69 banks x 32 quarters = 2,208, for bank- and country-specific variables: 69x66x32 = 145,728.
(...) stands for data not to be published due to confidentiality rules (single observations).
Table 4: Summary of main variables considered and expected signs
Variable Expected sign
Foreign demand and risk
Foreign demand
Fixed capital formation over GDP +
Other countries’ real GDP
growth relative to local
–
Bilateral trade openness +
Foreign Risk
Stock market volatility –
Exchange rate volatility –
Liabilities over GDP + / –
Supply-side factors
Bank level
Relative bank size +
Capital market activity +
Interest income over equity +
Change in core capital ratio –
Core capital ratio change x level +
Lending at home + / –
Affiliate relevance +
Aggregate level
Home interest margin –
Tightening of credit standards –
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Table 5: Regression results: baseline and affiliate relevance
This table reports robust bank-country fixed-effect regressions of quarterly transaction-induced changes in long-term
lending abroad for a panel of the largest 69 German banking conglomerates from 2003Q3 to 2010Q4. Transaction-
induced changes in long-term lending abroad correspond to the changes in bank’s total long-term loan stock out-
standing vis-à-vis the foreign private sector, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and cleaned from other valuation
effects, like eg write downs. Affiliate relevance is the share of this business done by affiliates in the corresponding
foreign countries. All explanatory variables are lagged one period and seasonal dummies are included.
(1a) (1b)
Dependent variable:
Transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
Foreign country determinants: demand and risk Interactions
Fixed capital formation/GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.055*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.031)
Other countries' real GDP growth relative to local -3.90e-08 -4.02e-08 -8.45e-08* 2.74e-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral trade openess -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 0.147**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.068)
Stock market volatility -1.71e-05 -1.75e-05 1.57e-05* -4.67e-04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exchange rate volatility 6.89e-05** 6.86e-05** 7.70e-05** -2.49e-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Liabilities/GDP 0.001 0.001 0.002** -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Affiliate relevance 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Home country determinants: general and bank-specific supply
Home interest margin -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.176***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Tightening credit standards due to liquidity position -2.82e-05** -2.72e-05** -2.50e-05**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in core capital ratio -0.056** -0.094*** -0.089**
(0.022) (0.035) (0.035)
Core capital ratio 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Core capital ratio: change x level 0.141*** 0.134***
(0.052) (0.052)
Interest income/equity 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital market activity 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bank size (relative) 2.74e-05 2.69e-05 3.67e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lending at home 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 136192 136192 136192
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters) 4484 4484 4484
adj. R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.038
Regressions are cluster-robust OLS with fixed effects for banks and countries. Seasonal dummies included. Time period covered 
by regressions: 2003Q3 to 2010Q4. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Affiliate relevance is the share of affiliate 
business in total long-term credit allocation of a bank to a foreign country's private sector.
(2)
Affiliate relevanceBaseline
                (x Affiliate relevance)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Regression results: financial crisis
This table reports robust bank-country fixed-effect regressions of quarterly transaction-induced changes in long-term
lending abroad for a panel of the largest 69 German banking conglomerates from 2003Q3 to 2010Q4. Transaction-
induced changes in long-term lending abroad correspond to the changes in bank’s total long-term loan stock out-
standing vis-à-vis the foreign private sector, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and cleaned from other valuation
effects, like eg write-downs. Affiliate relevance is the share of this business done by affiliates in the corresponding
foreign countries. All explanatory variables are lagged one period and seasonal dummies are included. The crisis
dummy in column (3) equals 1 from 2007Q3 onwards. In column (4) the pre Lehman crisis dummy equals 1 from
2007Q3-2008Q2. The post Lehman crisis dummy equals 1 from 2008Q3 onwards.
Dependent variable:
Transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
(3/1) (3/2) (4/1) (4/2) (4/3)
Interacted 
terms
Interacted 
terms
Interacted 
terms
(x Crisis) (x Crisis
pre Lehman)
(x Crisis
 post Lehman)
Foreign country determinants: demand and risk
Fixed capital formation/GDP -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Other countries' real GDP growth relative to local -5.92e-08 -3.25e-07** -5.48e-08 -6.29e-05 -2.02e-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral trade openess -0.013 0.004 -0.013 0.009 -0.002
(0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Stock market volatility -3.53e-06 3.21e-05* -4.60e-06 -4.65e-06 3.97e-05**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exchange rate volatility 7.18e-05** 2.66e-05 5.28e-05* -1.11e-04 -2.21e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liabilities/GDP 0.002* 0.001* 0.002** 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
... via Affiliate Relevance
Fixed capital formation/GDP x Affiliate relevance 0.022 0.051 0.023 0.022 0.018
(0.036) (0.062) (0.035) (0.079) (0.079)
Other countries' real GDP growth x Affiliate relevance 0.000 -2.05e-06 1.27e-06 -2.34e-04 -2.21e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral trade openess x Affiliate relevance 0.183** -0.117 0.182** 0.123 -0.276
(0.079) (0.115) (0.079) (0.134) (0.171)
Stock market volatility x Affiliate relevance -4.64e-04* -5.60e-05 -4.66e-04* -1.08e-04 3.58e-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Exchange rate volatility x Affiliate relevance -4.20e-04 1.71e-04 -4.61e-04 1.46e-04 -3.38e-04
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Liabilities/GDP x Affiliate relevance -0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Affiliate relevance -0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.012 0.011
(0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.024) (0.030)
Home country determinants: general and bank-specific supply
Home interest margin -0.149*** -0.066 -0.152*** 0.021 -0.084
(0.030) (0.050) (0.031) (0.178) (0.065)
Tightening credit standards due to liquidity position -4.53e-05** 3.02e-06 -3.84e-05* 6.44e-05 -3.66e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in core capital ratio -0.071 -0.051 -0.066 0.069 -0.259**
(0.046) (0.072) (0.045) (0.065) (0.115)
Core capital ratio 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.011 0.007
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
Core capital ratio: change x level 0.108 0.213 0.105 -0.257 1.304**
(0.067) (0.442) (0.066) (0.430) (0.643)
Interest income/equity 0.006* 0.000 0.005 -0.003* 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Capital market activity 0.005** -0.001 0.005* -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Bank size (relative) 2.72e-05 7.16e-06* 8.09e-06 2.42e-05*** -2.61e-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lending at home 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.005 0.011
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 136192 136192
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters) 4484 4484
adj. R-squared 0.039 0.042
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions are cluster-robust OLS with fixed effects for banks and countries. Seasonal dummies included. Time period covered by regressions: 
2003Q3 to 2010Q4. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Affiliate relevance is the share of affiliate business in total long-term credit 
allocation of a bank to a foreign country's private sector. The crisis dummy in column (3) equals 1 from 2007Q3 onwards. In column (4), the pre-
Lehman crisis dummy equals 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, the post-Lehman crisis dummy is 1 from 2008Q3 onwards.
(3)
Crisis
pre- vs. post-Lehman
Crisis:
(4)
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Table 7: Regression results: robustness test
(extension of the country sample by the US and the UK)
This table reports a robustness test regarding the sample of countries considered for the foreign lending activities
of German banks. In contrast to the previously reported results, these regressions include the US and the UK in the
analysis (they were considered as hosting predominant financial centers and therefore excluded from the previous
regressions). Apart from this, the setup of these regressions is identical to the previously presented ones (see Table 6).
Dependent variable:
Transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
(3/1) (3/2) (4/1) (4/2) (4/3)
Interacted 
terms
Interacted 
terms
Interacted 
terms
(x Crisis) (x Crisis
pre Lehman)
(x Crisis
 post Lehman)
Foreign country determinants: demand and risk
Fixed capital formation/GDP -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Other countries' real GDP growth relative to local -8.20e-08 -7.76e-07** -7.18e-08 -6.72e-05 -5.53e-07*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral trade openess -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
(0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.004)
Stock market volatility -1.65e-05 6.66e-05*** -2.82e-05 -7.65e-05* 7.95e-05***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exchange rate volatility 2.71e-05 -1.24e-05 2.54e-05 -2.95e-04*** -8.11e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liabilities/GDP -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
... via Affiliate Relevance
Fixed capital formation/GDP x Affiliate relevance 0.021 0.214* 0.021 -0.119 0.285
(0.048) (0.125) (0.048) (0.101) (0.177)
Other countries' real GDP growth x Affiliate relevance 0.000 -2.36e-06 2.12e-06 1.23e-04 -5.55e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Bilateral trade openess x Affiliate relevance 0.161* -0.057 0.159* 0.007 -0.086
(0.084) (0.133) (0.084) (0.156) (0.226)
Stock market volatility x Affiliate relevance -1.33e-03** 9.10e-04 -1.34e-03** -7.75e-04 2.02e-03**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange rate volatility x Affiliate relevance -4.92e-04 -2.63e-03 -5.61e-04 -1.23e-03 -2.27e-03
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Liabilities/GDP x Affiliate relevance -0.003 -0.018 -0.003 0.005 -0.026
(0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.021)
Affiliate relevance 0.013 -0.043 0.014 0.061 -0.096
(0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.044) (0.067)
Home country determinants: general and bank-specific supply
Home interest margin -0.199** -0.115 -0.207** -0.065 -0.169
(0.083) (0.116) (0.084) (0.328) (0.109)
Tightening credit standards due to liquidity position 3.29e-05 -8.87e-05 4.45e-05 4.94e-05 -1.83e-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in core capital ratio -0.198 -0.044 -0.189 0.145 -0.369*
(0.165) (0.168) (0.162) (0.173) (0.199)
Core capital ratio 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.035 0.002
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.028) (0.015)
Core capital ratio: change x level 0.302 0.502 0.295 -0.158 2.225**
(0.245) (0.699) (0.242) (0.810) (0.979)
Interest income/equity 0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital market activity 0.016* 0.002 0.015* -0.006 -0.000
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank size (relative) -5.56e-05 5.30e-06 -1.07e-04 5.56e-05*** -2.00e-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lending at home -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.008 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant 0.026 0.043
(0.033) (0.037)
Observations 140554 140554
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters) 4622 4622
R-squared 0.020 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions are cluster-robust OLS with fixed effects for banks and countries. Seasonal dummies included. Time period covered by regressions: 
2003Q3 to 2010Q4. All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Affiliate relevance is the share of affiliate business in total long-term credit 
allocation of a bank to a foreign country's private sector. The crisis dummy in column (3) equals 1 from 2007Q3 onwards. In column (4), the pre-
Lehman crisis dummy equals 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, the post-Lehman crisis dummy is 1 from 2008Q3 onwards.
(3)
Crisis
pre- vs. post-Lehman
Crisis:
(4)
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Abstract
We investigate how the lending activities abroad of a multinational bank’s local and hub
affiliates are being affected by funding difficulties during the financial crisis. We find that
affiliates’ local deposits and profitability have been stabilizing the loan supply. By contrast,
relying on short-term wholesale funding has increasingly proven to be a disadvantage in the
crisis, as inter-bank and capital markets froze. By introducing a liable approximate measure
for intra-bank flows, we detect competition for intra-bank funding between the affiliates
abroad as well as an increasing focus on parent bank’s home market activities. In addition,
the more an affiliate abroad takes recourse to intra-bank funding in the crisis, the more
it becomes dependent on its parent bank having a stable deposit and long-term wholesale
funding position. We consider changes in long-term lending to the non-bank private sectors
of 40 countries by the affiliates of the 68 largest German banks. To obtain a more precise
picture, we clean our lending data from valuation effects.
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1 Introduction
In the ongoing financial crisis, multinational banks’ foreign positions have been declining in the
light of losses in the value of assets, growing funding difficulties and increasing risk aversion.
Lending by multinational banks’ foreign affiliates, which in many economies is a mainstay of
credit provision, has been particularly affected by the cutback. Foreign affiliates’ lending has
been found to develop differently from lending by domestic banks, especially during the recent
financial crisis (see, for example, DE HAAS AND VAN LELYVELD (FORTHCOMING)). A key structural
difference arises in their options to fund lending activities. Domestic banks rely to a great extent
on local funding, whereas the funding by an affiliate is embedded in the financial management
of the banking conglomerate. This may be a source of strength but can also limit the scope of
action of a foreign affiliate as it is dependent on the bank’s decision on how to allocate funds
internally.
In this study, we therefore ask about the relevance of a multinational bank’s funding structure
with regard to foreign affiliate lending during the financial crisis. Within a multinational bank,
funds are distributed through the internal capital market, which creates a link between the
financial resources of the affiliate itself, of the other affiliates and of the parent bank. Using the
example of German banks, we not only assess the impact of various external funding sources
like deposits or wholesale on affiliate activity, but also identify and analyze the role of intra-
bank funding during the crisis. For German banks, intra-bank flows prove to be an important
means of affiliate funding. In the case of substantial intra-bank funding of the affiliate, the
funding structure of the parent bank - where the internal funds are primarily generated - and
its resistance to crisis are of major interest to the affiliate. However, the affiliates’ behavior may
not be determined solely by their funding. For example, it is likely that more profitable units
can keep lending more stable or even expand their activities, while their funding is guaranteed
by the conglomerate. This aspect introduces an element of competition into the relationship
among the affiliates. Moreover, a reduction in foreign affiliates’ activities as a whole may reflect
this business having a lower weighting than the parent bank’s exposure at home.
We are the first to investigate the affiliates’ lending decisions as an outcome of the funding struc-
ture of the affiliate itself, the other affiliates and the parent bank. We introduce an approximate
measure for the internal funding of (German) affiliates at the bank level, and are thus able to
consider the affiliates’ complete funding side. This setting also allows us to address the issue
of competition between affiliates for banks’ internally available funds during the crisis. Here,
we distinguish between affiliates which are active purely locally and affiliates which engage in
cross-border lending, thus serving as lending “hub”. Although such lending hubs which support
or replace local lending have a strong position in the foreign business of German banks, the role
played by this type of affiliate in lending abroad has not been discussed before in the litera-
ture. Furthermore, we analyze whether, during the financial crisis, banks prioritize parent bank
lending to the domestic economy over foreign affiliate lending.
The micro data used in this study are collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. These comprise
information on both lending and other balance sheet characteristics of German parent banks
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and of all their foreign affiliates. Furthermore, we are able to accurately address the bank’s
lending decisions by relying on purely transaction-induced changes in the bank’s loan portfolio
- excluding valuation effects which are commonly present in earlier studies relying on stock
variations.
German banks’ lending to the foreign private sector (henceforth: foreign “private sector lend-
ing” or “lending”) with a prominent share attributable to affiliates declined after the failure of
Lehman Brothers.1 Conversely, lending in Germany remained quite stable (see Figure 1 in the
appendix), which is consistent with UK banks’ focus on the home market during the financial
crisis (ROSE AND WIELADEK (2011)).2 Funding difficulties turned out to be the main cause
of the reduced banking business in some areas. CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2011A) provide
direct evidence that the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market together with
the subsequent breakdown of external funding markets probably played a major role with re-
gard to changes in US banks’ lending activities both at home and abroad.3 DE HAAS AND VAN
HOREN (2012) have recently shown that the curtailment of cross-border syndicated loan pro-
vision was related to shocks to the banks’ capital and access to long-term debt. According to
MCCAULEY ET AL. (2010), who use data from the Bank for International Settlements, German
banks generally fund a substantial part of their lending activity by accessing the internal capital
market, which is different from the affiliates of most other European or US banks as these rely
more on locally generated funds. CREMERS ET AL. (2011) analyze one banking group and find
that the parent bank largely contributes to both its own funding the the funding of affiliates by
tapping the external capital market. Furthermore, in contrast to foreign affiliates of US banks
(see CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2011A)), affiliates of German banks continued, on aggregate,
to be net borrowers from their parent banks during the crisis (see Figure 2), though hetero-
geneity across the affiliates increased. This underlines the strong need for considering affiliates’
internal funds for financing, and supports our approach of defining a proxy for bank internal
funding and including this major source of funding in the analysis.
In general, lending by affiliates located abroad depends on the stability and resources of the
affiliate itself, but it is also influenced by balance sheet characteristics of the parent bank. Evi-
dence of the latter is provided for German banks by BUCH ET AL. (2009), for European banks’
activities in eastern Europe by DE HAAS AND VAN LELYVELD (2006) and (2010), as well as by
POPOV AND UDELL (2012) for the early period of the financial crisis, and for US banks, for
example, by ASHCRAFT (2008). Focusing on liquidity and capital endowment, for US banks
HOUSTON ET AL. (1997) find an influence of both subsidiary and parent bank characteristics
on subsidiary loan growth without measuring intra-bank flows directly. Furthermore, PEEK AND
ROSENGREN (1997), find that Japanese bank branches in the US reduced their credit supply af-
ter their parent banks had been hit by a sharp drop in stock prices in 1990 combined with stricter
capital requirements. Moreover, the literature on the bank lending channel demonstrates the in-
1 For the relevance of risk aversion and other bank-specific factors in the case of German banks, see DÜWEL ET
AL. (2011). Government rescue measures and liquidity support, especially that of the US Federal Reserve, had
some stabilizing impact on German banks’ foreign activities and dampened the deleveraging of foreign assets
(BUCH ET AL. (2011)).
2 In addition, in a study on international syndicated loans, GIANNETTI AND LAEVEN (2012) find that the home
bias of lenders’ loan origination increased in the early stage of the crisis.
3 Furthermore, CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2011B) find that the more a country’s aggregate banking system was
vulnerable to the dollar prior to the crisis, the lower was its post-crisis growth in lending to emerging economies
by parent banks and by affiliates. AIYAR (2012) finds that shocks to international funding dampen domestic
lending.
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fluence of parent banks’ liquidity on the activities of their affiliates (see for the US, for example,
HOUSTON AND JAMES (1998) and KASHYAP AND STEIN (2000) as well as CAMPELLO (2002)
and CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012)). NAVARETTI ET AL. (2010) conclude that, in financially
integrated areas like the EU, banks’ internal capital markets are particularly active. It is likely
that the parent bank’s funding structure becomes especially relevant for an affiliate when the
affiliate relies on internal funds to a large extent. By demonstrating this linkage, we also add
substantially to the literature.
Our results show that locally active affiliates as well as affiliates serving as lending hubs, which
can rely on their own net income and on strong local deposit funding in the period of distress,
have been able to stabilize their loan supply. Furthermore, lending activities abroad increasingly
depend on parent bank characteristics, the more the affiliates rely on funding via the internal
capital market. Parent banks which were able to maintain their deposit funding and long-term
wholesale funding proved to be of particular advantage to their affiliates. In the crisis, we find
evidence of growing competition for internal funds between affiliates and a concentration of
bank resources on parent banks’ lending to the home market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the analysis’s em-
pirical framework as well as estimation equations and variables. Section 3 provides detailed
information on the data sources and the construction of variables. In section 4 we present
our estimation results and discuss their implications. Section 5 provides robustness tests, and
section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical model
2.1 Funding structures of multinational banks
Our model presents a strong simplification of the complex world in which a bank operates.
It tries to capture parts of a bank’s business model and the funding structure. We start with
a multinational bank and focus on the behavior of its affiliates. We reduce the bank’s business
model to long-term lending to non-financial firms, since we consider this business to be strategic
and thus continuous as market entry and exit is costly. The affiliate has different ways of funding
its lending activity and usually relies on a mixture of these (see Figure 3). The affiliate can rely
on market funding, its own generated funds and intra-bank funding. Market funding comprises
local deposits and wholesale funds, which consists in the issuance of bonds and notes (debt
securities) and interbank borrowing as its most prominent components (see section 3 for the
relevance of funding sources over time). Furthermore, if the affiliate borrows on the bank’s
internal capital market, it can be expected that parent bank funding characteristics will also
become more important for affiliate lending. Below, we limit the bank’s internal capital market
to the affiliates’ intra-connections with the parent bank and leave aside the much less relevant
relationships among the affiliates themselves.4
While the affiliates can be active on the capital market and collect deposits locally, intra-bank
funding constitutes an important addition to their funding portfolio. During a period of crisis,
4 This strong financial linkage between an affiliate and its parent bank is also found by CREMERS ET AL. (2011).
Also, data limitations do not allow an exact identification of the inter-affiliate relationships.
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in particular, the external finance premium which market funding requires in order to com-
pensate for informational asymmetries can become so high that it cuts banks off from certain
funding sources. In this case, intra-bank resources provide a vital funding alternative for affili-
ates. However, the bank’s resources are distributed across the parent bank itself and all affiliates,
according to their relevance and needs. Internal capital markets provide the opportunity to al-
locate resources within business conglomerates wherever they are most efficient (GERTNER ET
AL. (1994), STEIN (1997)).5 From the point of view of a specific affiliate, intra-bank funding
is therefore, in most cases, limited (see also the discussion by HOUSTON ET AL. (1997)). This
is especially the case in a crisis period, when the bank’s overall funds become scarce, as in case
of severe funding troubles on the capital and interbank market, for example. Then, the bank’s
internal management of funds becomes even more important.
Our approach includes loan provision abroad not only to a given country by local affiliates
but also by affiliates of the same parent bank which are located in other countries, such as
neighboring countries, and are engaged in cross-border lending to the foreign private sector
(see Figure 3).6 Often, this type of affiliate functions as a lending “hub” and therefore fulfills
a special role in the structure of the multinational bank. In fact, such hub affiliates provide on
average one-third of affiliate lending to the foreign private sector (see also section 3). For this
reason, we classify the affiliates in the other countries into two groups: the hub affiliates and
the non-hub affiliates. Affiliates located in countries with large financial centers are treated as a
separate group, since they have a different business model.7 Characteristics of the group of hub
affiliates become relevant in countries where the hub affiliates conduct a prominent part of the
lending, while local affiliates provide only a small fraction of the lending or are not present at
all. By contrast, the lending of the remaining non-hub affiliates is confined to their respective
local markets and, hence, these affiliates, in particular, are competitors for the bank’s internal
funds.
2.2 Estimation
The identification strategy of our empirical approach relies on the assumption that the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and its direct effects came as a surprise
to banks (we thereby follow CORNETT ET AL. (2011)). This decision is motivated by the ob-
servation that this event ushered in a new funding situation in which market and inter-bank
funding were strongly limited, since investors perceived much higher risks in banks, and a loss
of confidence on the interbank market arose. In line with this, we find that strong support for
this choice is provided in the data on cross-border loans, where the turning point from expan-
sion to deleveraging is 2008Q3 (see Figure 1). We regress the change in lending realized by an
affiliate on its own funding structure as well as on the funding structure of the parent bank and
5 However, efficiency gains might not be fully reached due to misaligned incentives which cause principal-agent
problems (RAJAN ET AL. (2000), SCHARFSTEIN AND STEIN (2000)).
6 Furthermore, the parent bank may also provide cross-border loans, an aspect which is not discussed in this paper
(but is in DÜWEL ET AL. (2011), for example).
7 In countries with financial centers, a major share of corporate loans is given to special purpose vehicles, hedge-
fonds and other financial firms. Especially in a financial crisis, banks treat such loans much differently from
loans given to non-financial firms. Thus, we see a strong reason to exclude lending in financial centers from our
analysis (see also section 3). However, affiliates located in financial centers are taken into account with regard
to their role as competitors for internal funds within the banking conglomerate.
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other parts of the banking group. As we aim to assess the change in the role of certain funding
sources, which was triggered by the Lehman Brothers event, we interact the funding variables
and all other explanatory variables with a crisis dummy and interpret the estimated coefficients
on these interacted terms only.8 In doing so, we can assess how the funding difficulties, in turn,
affected the banks’ and their foreign affiliates lending behavior. In this context, it is important
to recognize that, in most cases, the funding structure does not change abruptly. Deposit and
long-term wholesale funding, in particular, are characterized by a high degree of inertia (for our
sample, see Figure 4 in the appendix). Furthermore, we lag the funding variables.
First, we test how, in terms of the affiliates’ lending abroad, the relevance of the bank’s and the
affiliate’s own funding structures changes after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Second, we
evaluate whether competition for internal funds has increased within the banking conglomerate
in view of the crisis. Third, we investigate whether an affiliate’s strong reliance on intra-bank
funding makes it more dependent on the funding structure and activity of the parent bank during
the crisis.
Thus, we start with the following fixed-effects regression using a panel of the largest 68 German
banks and their foreign affiliates’ lending to the private sectors of 40 countries (for detailed
information on the data, which is collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank, see section 3). We test
how the reliance on a specific funding structure affected lending by affiliates located abroad in
the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse:
∆likt = d_crisis*[α1Local_AﬃliateFundikt−1+α2Hub_AﬃliatesFundikt−1
+α3ParentFundit−1 + α4BankControlsikt-1]
+β1Local_AffiliateFundikt−1 + β2Hub_AffiliatesFundikt−1
+β3ParentFundit−1 + β4BankControlsikt−1 + δ + ηi + γkt + εikt (1)
where i = 1, ..., N , N is the number of banks in the sample, k = 1, ...,K, K the number of
foreign countries, and t = 1, ..., T the time period covered (2002Q4-2010Q4). The crisis dummy
(d_crisis) equals 1 from 2008Q3 onwards. We include a constant (δ) and fixed effects for banks
(ηi). To capture changes in local factors, especially the country-specific demand for credit, we
also include country-time fixed effects (γkt). εikt represents an idiosyncratic error.
The dependent variable ∆likt is the real volume of transaction-induced changes in long-term
lending TO the private sector of country k by ALL affiliates located abroad of bank i at time t
(see also section 3 for information on the structure of the data).
The coefficient vectors α1 − α3 represent changes in the relevance of funding sources for af-
filiate lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. First and foremost, loans to country k
are provided by the local affiliate of bank i, whose funding sources are combined in the vector
Local_AﬃliateFundikt−1. Additionally, lending to country k may be carried out by the group
of affiliates serving as hubs and located outside country k, whose aggregate funding structure is
incorporated into the vector Hub_AﬃliatesFundikt−1. Furthermore, the corresponding par-
ent bank’s characteristics are included in the vector ParentFundit−1.
8 In a robustness check (see section 5), we use a continuous risk indicator for the phase of distress, instead of the
dummy variable. Our key results remain qualitatively unchanged.
III-7
In more detail, the main funding sources in the various parts of the bank are Deposit funding,
Short-term wholesale funding and Long-term wholesale funding. Long-term wholesale funding is,
however, excluded from the main part of the analysis. The reason for this is that the simulta-
neous inclusion of all funding sources in the regression raises concerns about multicollinearity.
Long-term wholesale funding is included in a robustness test only in the estimation entitled ”Ro-
bustness” in the last column of Table 7. The individual Net income (relative to equity capital) is
included in the vector of funding variables, since it describes the ability to generate additional
funds internally. Below, we refer to net income as being primarily a measure of profitability,
which includes the aspect that profitable entities may be of higher strategical relevance for a
bank.9 See Table 1 in the appendix for the definitions of the variables, as well as their expected
impact on affiliate lending. Table 2 provides corresponding summary statistics.
The vector BankControls consists of the general characteristics of the banks. We include Cap-
italization and Size for all three parts of the banking group. Besides this, we control for the
importance of the affiliates’ lending business in the context of the banking group as a whole (Af-
filiate lending share), and do so for both the local affiliate and for hub affiliates. The role played
by one or the other type of affiliate varies substantially across banks and countries. To take this
aspect into account, we attach relative weights to the balance sheet characteristics of both the
local affiliate and the group of hub affiliates. These weights correspond to the shares of the local
and the hub affiliates in lending to a foreign country (see section 3.2). For the definition of these
variables, see also Table 1 in the appendix.
Second, we ask whether competition for internal funds within the banking conglomerate in-
creased during the crisis. Competition might have tightened within the group of affiliates and
between the affiliates and the parent bank due to the external funding contraction in the af-
termath of the Lehman bankruptcy. For this, we additionally include the share of intra-bank
financing of the local affiliate and the other groups of affiliates in our set of regressors in equa-
tion (1); additionally, we add the parent bank’s home activities as a possible competitor for
affiliate lending:
∆likt = (...) +d_crisis*[α5Local_AﬃliateIntraikt−1 + α6Hub_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1
+α7NonHub_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1 + α8Fin_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1
+α9∆ParentHomeLendit−1]
+β5Local_AffiliateIntraikt−1 + β6Hub_AffiliatesIntraikt−1
+β7NonHub_AffiliatesIntraikt−1 + β8Fin_AffiliatesIntraikt−1
+β9∆ParentHomeLendit−1 (2)
where (...) stands for the inclusion of all explanatory variables of equation (1).
Intra-bank funding is, in principle, accessible to all affiliates belonging to a banking conglom-
erate. In the second regression specification, we therefore not only include Intra-bank fund-
ing as a special type of funding source for the local affiliate and for hub affiliates (vectors
9 Similarly, in their pre-crisis analysis, CREMERS ET AL. (2011) use a productivity measure defined as income over
costs and find that affiliates which are more productive receive more intra-bank funding and experience higher
loan growth.
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Local_AﬃliateIntraikt−1 andHub_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1), but also account for possible com-
petition for these funds stemming from the other non-hub affiliates and from affiliates located in
financial centers (vectors NonHub_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1 and Fin_AﬃliatesIntraikt−1). Fur-
thermore, we investigate whether a potential stabilization of lending activities in the home
market on the part of the parent bank was conducted at the expense of foreign affiliate lending
during the crisis. In doing so, we add the parent bank’s change in lending on the home market
(∆ParentHomeLendit−1). Besides this, we account for the relative importance of the non-
hub affiliates for the banking group by including their Affiliate lending share, and we measure
the role of financial center affiliates in the banking group by their size relative to that of the
banking group.
Third, as we expect that the recourse of the affiliate to intra-bank funds causes the affiliate’s
lending activity to be additionally dependent on the funding of the parent bank, we interact
parent bank funding characteristics with the local affiliate’s share of intra-bank funding in total
assets. Additionally, we interact the change in the parent bank’s home lending with the share of
the local affiliate’s intra-bank funding, as affiliate lending is likely to come more into competition
with parent bank home lending, the more the affiliate relies on intra-bank funding:
∆likt = d_crisis*[α1Local_AffiliateFundikt-1+α2Local_AffiliateIntraikt-1
+α3Hub_AffiliatesFundikt-1 + α4Hub_AffiliatesIntraikt-1 + α5BankControlsikt-1
+α6ParentFundit-1 + α7ParentFundit−1*Local_AﬃliateIntraikt−1
+α8∆ParentHomeLendit-1 + α9∆ParentHomeLendit−1*Local_AﬃliateIntraikt−1]
+β1Local_AffiliateFundikt−1 + β2Local_AffiliateIntraikt−1
+β3Hub_AffiliatesFundikt−1 + β4Hub_AffiliatesIntraikt−1 + β5BankControlsikt−1
+β6ParentFundit−1 + β7ParentFundit−1*Local_AffiliateIntraikt−1
+β8∆ParentHomeLendit−1 + β9∆ParentHomeLendit−1*Local_AffiliateIntraikt−1
+δ + ηi + γkt + εikt (3)
3 Data
3.1 Sample
Concerning the business activity of German banks’ affiliates abroad, we concentrate on long-
term lending to the non-bank private sector (in this paper, the non-bank private sector is also
referred to as “private sector”).10 Long-term loans, ie loans with an original maturity of more
than one year, already account for more than 85% of German banks’ total cross-border lending
activities. An additional reason for dropping short-term loans is that they also include trade
financing, a more erratic business which pursues motives and determinants other than those
discussed in this study. As lending to the private sector in a country which hosts a major financial
center is strongly influenced by financial deals with special purpose entities as well as by banks’
10 These figures comprise both lending by subsidiaries as well as by branches. Subsidiaries are reported whenever
a parent bank acts as majority shareholder, and they have an own legal status whereas branches do not. For both
types of affiliates, there are no reporting thresholds.
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proprietary trading in portfolio instruments, we focus on lending to countries which do not host
major financial centers.
Affiliate lending abroad accounts for a large share of German banks’ overall international activ-
ities of German banks.11 Figure 1 in the appendix illustrates that activities by affiliates located
abroad account, on aggregate, for 60% to 70% of total foreign private sector lending by Ger-
man banks over time. Foreign private sector lending by affiliates underwent a steady expansion
between 2004 and 2007, before stagnating and starting to decline after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. For our regression, which covers the period from 2002Q4 to 2010Q4, we use real
transaction-induced changes in lending. These exclude changes in the loan stock due to ex-
change rate fluctuations or other valuation effects and thus give a more precise reflection of the
bank’s strategic decisions. In the aggregate figures, a shift in lending behavior after the failure
of Lehman Brothers is reflected in the transaction-induced variations, although the decline does
not prove to be as drastic as that for changes in the stock data (see Figure 2).
As international activities are, first and foremost, a strategic field of large banks, we selected the
100 German parent banks with the largest balance sheet size, which also account for most of
the cross-border lending. Foreign-owned banks as well as promotional banks, with their (partly)
federal or state government ownership and their role as supporters of specified investment ac-
tivities, are excluded. This drives the number of banks down to 68. Nevertheless, owing to bank
mergers in the period under review, which we handle by backward integration, we consider 140
parent banks overall. For these banks, we collect information on all of their foreign affiliates.
We further focus on the 51 countries with the largest amounts of German cross-border loans
outstanding so that the amount of data on foreign affiliates remains feasible. Having done that,
our sample still covers roughly 80% of German banks’ total lending to the non-bank private
sector abroad. For the reasons mentioned above, we concentrate on the lending activities of
German banks’ foreign affiliates with respect to countries without financial centers. For the
classification of offshore financial centers we make use of the definition applied by the Financial
Stability Forum – the predecessor of the present Financial Stability Board – which was published
in 2000, and additionally exclude the UK and the US from our sample12 since they represent
large financial hubs for German banks. We thus shrink our sample of destination countries from
51 to 40 (see Table 3 in the appendix). Nevertheless, we account for the relevance of affiliates
in countries with major financial centers by including aggregate information on these affiliates
for every bank (see section 2.1).
3.2 Bank data, bank aggregates and grouping of banks
The micro data is collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Parent banks report balance sheet
statistics of affiliates abroad separately for branches and subsidiaries. While each subsidiary
files its own report, the activities of branches are aggregated by foreign country. In order to
gain a clear picture of the relevance of various foreign economies to the banks, we aggregate
balance sheet data from branches and subsidiaries by parent bank and country to produce one
affiliate-per-bank-country pair.
11 There are many more branches than subsidiaries of German banks - a fact that is reflected in the aggregate
volumes, where branches are found to be more significant.
12 This is in line with the practice of the IMF, which also regards the UK and the US as hosting financial centers.
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The statistics on German banks’ external positions allow a breakdown of lending activities by
destination country.13 We use quarterly series, which were calculated from the original monthly
series. For all foreign countries to which German banks supply loans, we observe lending to the
private sector at the parent level, at the affiliate level (subsidiaries and branches combined),
and at the level of the consolidated group, which is cleaned from intra-bank lending positions.
The consolidated lending data consist of the volume of loans distributed to a country aggregated
over all affiliates of one bank, irrespective of whether they are located in the given country or
in other (probably, neighboring) foreign countries. This view on the data has the advantage
that it accounts for the lending of affiliates acting as “hubs” which are located in other foreign
countries. The relevance of the affiliates which lend across borders is captured by the inclusion of
their aggregate funding structure in the regressions. To take into account the relative importance
of local lending vis-à-vis lending from outside, the share of each type of affiliate in lending to
a country is used as a weight on the respective funding structure. On average, local affiliates
account for about two-thirds of affiliate lending to a foreign country, while hub affiliates provide
one-third of the lending (see descriptive statistics in Table 2).
In our study, we address, in particular, the role of affiliates’ intra-bank funding, which requires
that the net borrowing position vis-à-vis their parent banks be identified. While subsidiaries
report this exposure, we have to proxy for the assets and liabilities of branches vis-à-vis their
parent bank. For this, we rely on their positions vis-à-vis the German banking sector (excluding
positions vis-à-vis the central bank). This, in turn, relies on the assumption that the main busi-
ness partner for branches on the home market is their parent bank. As a robustness check for
this assumption, in Figure 5 in the appendix we compare this approximation with the actual data
series which are available as of June 2010 and find very similar dynamics as well as comparable
volumes.
To conclude the data section, we take a look at the funding structure of our sample’s affiliates
located in countries without major financial centers at the aggregate level (in Figure 4 in the
appendix). Wholesale funding accounts, on average, for 40% to 50% of total assets and rep-
resents the major source of funding for these affiliates. In this context, short-term wholesale
funding dominates but has been declining since mid-2007, falling by approximately 10% to
roughly 33% of total assets at the end of 2010. Long-term wholesale funding demonstrates, on
average, greater stability, especially during the crisis, but accounts for no more than around 7%
of total assets. For the average affiliate in our sample, deposits as a share of total assets declined
between 2005 and 2009 from roughly 27% to 17%, before this share started to increase again
to slightly above 20% at the end of 2010. By contrast, intra-bank funding has become relatively
more important since 2005. It rose, on average, to over 30% in 2009Q1 and has since been
fluctuating at around 28% of affiliates’ total assets. The fact that intra-bank funding has such
a relatively high degree of relevance mainly mirrors branches’ dependence on parent banks.14
In turn, subsidiaries rely more strongly on deposit financing. The dynamics with respect to all
funding types, especially during the crisis period, are, however, almost the same for both sub-
sidiaries and branches (outside financial centers), which supports the approach of aggregating
over branches and subsidiaries per bank and country below.
13 For a detailed description, see FIORENTINO ET AL. (2010).
14 Branches of German banks already account for roughly two-thirds of total affiliate lending to the foreign private
sector.
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4 Results
Table 4 shows two columns of results per regression, with the first column reporting estimated
coefficients of the explanatory variables interacted with the crisis dummy. We aim at interpreting
only these coefficients, as they show the crisis-driven changes in affiliate lending abroad in
dependence on the underlying funding sources. The second column of each regression outcome
reports controls for these variables (the estimated coefficients for the variables that are not
interacted with the crisis dummy).
4.1 Stable funding of local and hub affiliates important for loan supply in the
crisis
The outcome of the regression reported in Table 4 demonstrates that local affiliates were more
likely to extend credit to a certain country during the crisis if they relied on stable Deposit fund-
ing and on large Net income. We find the very same effects for the funding variables of the bank’s
affiliates serving as lending hubs, when they complement the lending activities of the local af-
filiate or when they are the sole lender to a certain country. This corroborates IVASHINA AND
SCHARFSTEIN (2010), who suggest that, during the financial crisis, banks with better access to
deposit financing - as the traditional source of loan funding - cut back less of their syndicated
lending with mainly large corporations. In addition, CORNETT ET AL. (2011) stress the impor-
tance of core deposits as a stable source of funding during the crisis. Beyond this main point
of emphasis in the earlier literature, we demonstrate that affiliates which remain successful in
generating income reduce their lending activities to a smaller extent, as they are more profitable
and thus try to keep their activities at least stable in the crisis.
By contrast, local affiliates and hub affiliates which relied more on Short-term wholesale funding
found it increasingly difficult to provide a stable loan supply (the interaction term with the crisis
dummy is negatively significant for both types of affiliates). The degree to which hub affiliates
dampen affiliate lending during the crisis depends on how large their risk aversion, measured
by their Capitalization, is. Leaving the funding side of the affiliates, we even find that the parent
bank’s degree of short-term funding has a negative impact on affiliate lending in the crisis. This
dependency on the parent bank may already point to intra-bank funding linkages, an aspect we
will concentrate on in the next section.
4.2 Intra-bank funding and competition on the internal capital market
The second regression reported in Table 5 includes intra-bank funding at the affiliate level as an
additional source of affiliate funding. Owing to data limitations, this has not been done before
in the literature. We introduce a proxy for internal funding based on reporting of affiliates in
order to consider this highly relevant financial source. The inclusion of such funding allows us
to introduce two further aspects into the analysis. First, the implications of this kind of funding
for the stability of lending in the crisis can be investigated. Second, we are able to consider
competition for internal funds across the bank’s affiliates and with regard to the parent bank.
The local affiliate’s intra-bank net borrowing is found to be a rather limiting factor for the loan
supply abroad in the crisis (the interaction of the local affiliate’s Intra-bank funding with the
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crisis dummy is significantly negative). This could indicate that, as the overall available bank
resources become scarce, internal funds are increasingly used to support strategically important
affiliates as well as the parent banks’ home market activities (see also the results in section 4.3).
Thus, affiliates that were already relying strongly on intra-bank funding before the crisis expe-
rienced growing competition for these internal funds and had to cut back on their lending in
the context of the bank’s overall strategy. In addition, despite parent banks supporting affiliates
which, in some cases, realized large losses during the crisis, a bank-strategic cut back in lending
was inevitable.
With the results of this second regression, we can provide another key insight into the multi-
national bank’s internal fund management. Alongside intra-bank funding, which is provided to
local affiliates and hub affiliates, we also include the reliance on this type of funding by affiliates
with no hub function located in other countries and by financial center affiliates. Such entities
of the bank may be competitor for internal funds. As expected, in the light of increasingly scarce
funding resources during the financial crisis, the estimated coefficient of intra-bank funding pro-
vided to other non-hub affiliates turns out to be negative and significant. From the point of view
of the affiliates involved in lending to a given country, the group of other non-hub affiliates is
a direct competitor for intra-bank funds. In line with this, we find no significant impact on af-
filiate loan supply stemming from the intra-bank funding of the hub affiliates. Similarly, there
seems to be no competition with the group of financial center affiliates: The coefficient is, in
fact, significantly positive but quite small.
In a crisis, intra-bank competition may be a phenomenon not only between a bank’s affiliates
but also between the group of affiliates and the parent bank itself. Probably, home market
lending by the parent bank is a core business and the question arises as to how affiliate lending
behaves vis-à-vis home market lending in the crisis. For this, in the regression outcome reported
in Table 5, we introduce the Change in long-term lending at home by the parent bank, which -
by analogy with our dependent variable, affiliate lending - refers to the variation in long-term
loans provided to corporations. It is lagged one period to reduce simultaneity issues (see also
Table 1 for the definition of variables). We find a highly significant relationship between the
Change in long-term lending at home of the parent bank and transaction-induced changes in
long-term affiliate lending abroad before the financial crisis.15 This finding is consistent with an
earlier study (DÜWEL ET AL. (2011)), in which we demonstrate more generally that this kind of
relationship exists between the lending of the whole banking conglomerates to foreign markets
and the activities of the German parent banks on their home market. The results presented here
show that, during the crisis, the banks’ scarcity of funding sources stops the formerly parallel
expansion of parent banks’ home lending and affiliates’ lending abroad. This can be seen as a
signal of increasing competition between home lending and foreign lending via affiliates.
To conclude this section, we assess the relative magnitude of the pressure on foreign affiliate
lending in the crisis, exerted by the competition for internal funds among the affiliates and
with the parent bank shown above. A marginally larger reliance on intra-bank funding by the
local affiliate has a negative effect on affiliate lending that is five times larger than the pressure
stemming from a marginal increase in competition for intra-bank funds from the group of other
non-hub affiliates (see the estimated coefficients on Intra-bank funding of the local affiliate and
15 As domestic parent bank lending is like the dependent variable, affiliate lending abroad, a flow variable, an
economic interpretation of the coefficient for the pre-crisis period is possible.
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of non-hub affiliates). However, the competition from non-hub affiliates puts much greater
pressure on affiliate lending than on the parent bank’s operations at home: One percentage point
increase in the share of intra-bank funding that is granted to the group of non-hub affiliates has
the same dampening effect on affiliate lending as if the parent bank had doubled the average
amount of new long-term loans to firms on the home market.16
4.3 Parent banks as funders and competitors of affiliates
It seems likely that the funding possibilities and the activities of the parent bank are especially
relevant for affiliates which rely strongly on intra-bank funding. According to the results of
regression (3), reported in Table 6, we find that a larger percentage of intra-bank funding in-
creases the dependence of affiliate lending on the balance sheet characteristics of the parent
bank (as the most important supplier of internal funding). While the parent bank’s Deposit fund-
ing has no impact per se on affiliate lending abroad in the crisis (as we can conclude from the
insignificant coefficient estimated for the interaction of the parent bank’s Deposit funding with
the crisis dummy), its relevance emerges with affiliates taking recourse to intra-bank funding
(see interaction term of parent bank’s Deposit funding with the local affiliate’s intra-bank fund-
ing). In a robustness test, we additionally investigate the impact of the degree to which parent
banks rely on Long-term wholesale funding (see last column in Table 7). The same conclusion
can be drawn from this test. The more local affiliates rely on internal funds, the more we find
that relatively stable Long-term wholesale funding by the parent bank contributes positively to
lending by affiliates abroad in the crisis.
In the competition analysis using equation (2) (see section 4.2), we show that, during the crisis,
the formerly parallel expansion of parent banks’ home lending and affiliates’ lending abroad
ceased to exist. With regression (3), reported in Table 6, we can be more specific about this.
The delinkage of home and foreign activities is driven by the local affiliates abroad, which rely
on intra-bank funding: Before the crisis, the more affiliates abroad borrow from their parent,
the more their lending is expanded in parallel to the activities of the parent bank on the home
market (see the interaction term between Change in long-term lending at home of the parent
bank and Intra-bank funding of local affiliates). However, this parallel movement is lost during
the financial crisis (the interaction of the term with the crisis dummy is significantly negative
and the total effect in the crisis is insignificant). This reflects the competition for internal funds
between the parent bank and its affiliates in foreign countries.
5 Further robustness tests
5.1 Robustness of the distress indicator
Our key results hold when we employ a continuous indicator of the generally perceived risk on
funding markets for German banks instead of a crisis dummy variable. For this, we replace the
crisis dummy marking the period from 2008Q3 onwards with the spread between the three-
month European interbank offered rate (EURIBOR) and the three-month German government
16 The calculation is based on the coefficient estimated for the parent bank’s Change in long-term lending at home
and the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.
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bond rate.17 This spread peaked in 2008Q4 at about 240 basis points. Until the end of our sam-
ple in 2010Q4, the spread was fluctuating at around 50 basis points, which is still well above
the pre-crisis level of less than 10 basis points. With this alternative measure, we can confirm
our above outcome that the net income of the local and the cross-border affiliates becomes in-
creasingly relevant for a stable loan supply in the crisis. Deposit funding of the cross-border
affiliates18 and of the parent banks support affiliate lending abroad. As before, growing compe-
tition among the affiliates for internal funds can be detected during the crisis, and home lending
by the parent bank is given priority over affiliate lending abroad during the time of distress.
5.2 Treatment of “zero” observations
Banks report their foreign activities to the Deutsche Bundesbank on a mandatory basis. There-
fore, the panel of banks with which we operate contains no missing values. Zeros in the dataset
have been reported as such by the banks. We investigate that part in foreign lending which
is conducted by the German banks’ affiliates located abroad. This lending may be undertaken
either by local affiliates or hub affiliates which lend across borders or by both. Furthermore, a
bank may or may not have other non-hub affiliates or affiliates operating in financial centers. If
no business is conducted or no affiliate is present, these positions appear as zeros in our dataset.
They nevertheless have an informational content, namely the decision of the bank not to con-
duct this type of business, which is why we include them in the analysis. It is, however, possible
to carry out a robustness test on a smaller sample which includes only those observations where
either a local or a hub affiliate reports a positive stock of loans outstanding in a country or where
the stock is being built up or dissolved. When using this smaller sample, all our main results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
6 Conclusions
The ongoing financial crisis with its abruptly arising funding difficulties, banks’ increasing risk
aversion and stricter capital requirements has given rise to a growing discussion about delever-
aging by banks. In this context, there seems to be a particularly large degree of uncertainty
about the behavior of banks’ foreign affiliates, as their decisions depend not only on the country-
specific loan demand and their own resources, but also on the strategy of the banking group as
a whole. The ensuing restrictions on some funding instruments in the crisis have also become
highly relevant for banking supervision. By addressing the impact of a global funding structure
on affiliate lending abroad, we are making an explicit connection to the discussion on the inter-
national transmission of financial shocks. The management of this type of shock transmission
is currently a focal point of interest for international organizations and is taking center stage in
the design of the future European banking union.
With the unexpected bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the funding of banks
became more difficult due to the loss of confidence on both the capital and interbank markets.
17 We thereby follow CORNETT ET AL. (2011) who use the difference between the three-month London interbank
offered rate (LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury rate for the US.
18 The estimated coefficient on deposit funding of the local affiliate remains positive but turns out to be insignifi-
cant.
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Against this background, we have investigated the impact of the multinational banks’ funding
structures on the lending of their affiliates located abroad and provided some evidence of in-
creasing competition for internal funds within the banking conglomerates. Our unique data set
allows us to rely on lending and funding balance sheet data of both the affiliates and the par-
ent banks at the micro level and thus to distinguish between market funding, internal funding
(net income) and intra-bank funding. With regard to intra-bank funding, we are the first to
identify the financial intra-bank relationship between German parent banks and their branches
abroad. Thus, we can provide new insight into the competition for internal funds among the
various different parts of the banking group, including locally active affiliates as well as affil-
iates acting as “hubs” which lend across borders or which are hosted in countries with large
financial centers. Furthermore, we assure an accurate assessment of lending strategies by using
transaction-induced changes in the banks’ loan portfolios in real terms, which excludes changes
in loan stocks caused by exchange rate fluctuations and other valuation effects.
First and foremost, we expect the foreign affiliates’ own funding structure to be relevant for
its lending decisions. In fact, we find that their local deposit funding as well as their poten-
tial to generate own funds internally prove to be key in stabilizing the loan supply after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. As the net income can be also interpreted as a measure of prof-
itability, we find that the success of the affiliates’ lending business protects them from sizable
deleveraging within the banking group in the crisis. With respect to the loan provision to a spe-
cific country, these results hold independently of the channel of loan distribution, which is either
lending through a local affiliate or lending on a cross-border basis through affiliates functioning
as lending “hubs” and are located in other, possibly neighboring countries. In contrast, we see
short-term wholesale funding of local affiliates as a destabilizing element in the crisis. This is all
the more troubling as this funding instrument, which is dominated by interbank loans, was by
far the most relevant funding source for the affiliates up to the outbreak of the financial crisis
(above 40 % of total assets), whereas, during the crisis, it has undergone a sharp decline.
The emerging funding gap, which was additionally increased by a temporary reduction in de-
posits, was partly offset by the financial support of the parent banks to their affiliates. Intra-bank
funding as a share of total assets rose to slightly above 30 % in the crisis. Our results show that,
with reliance on intra-bank funding, the funding characteristics of parent banks become relevant
for the affiliates’ lending behavior during the crisis. Affiliate lending abroad receives additional
support from parent banks, which are more successful in collecting deposits and which have a
stronger position in the long-term wholesale funding market. This market represents an impor-
tant funding tool at the parent bank level and has a strong focus on the bonds and notes issued
by the bank.
As banks’ overall funds become scarce in the course of the crisis, we detect growing competition
for funds within the banking organization. Affiliates with local lending activity increasingly
compete with each other for internal funds. Conversely, unified in their aim to provide loans to
a foreign economy, local affiliates and hub affiliates do not compete with each other for intra-
bank funding. In addition, the fact that parent banks give priority to lending on their home
market, as home lending is a core business for German banks, is found to be a further limiting
factor for the affiliates’ business abroad in the crisis. While lending by affiliates to the private
sector in foreign countries used to expand more or less in parallel with lending to the home
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market, this relationship no longer applies from late 2008 onwards. Especially affiliates relying
on intra-bank funding suffer from the shift in funding priorities towards business on the home
market.
We conclude that, in times of crisis, a bank adjusts its strategy, focusing on its most relevant
business fields. Deleveraging as a response to the financial crisis is found to differ strongly across
the various activities of the banks. It is therefore not easy to give a general prediction regarding
the development of the loan supply by foreign affiliates during the crisis in certain regions of the
world, as it is primarily bank-country specific. Western European banks’ foreign affiliate lending,
for example, plays a crucial role in the supply of loans to several Central and Eastern European
countries; withdrawal on a considerable scale would probably have a noticeable effect on real
activity. However, the BIS (2011) assesses a deleveraging of west European banks in this region
as rather unlikely, since most of them operate through their in-country presence, and their claims
are, to a large extent, long-term and are tradable only at relatively high cost. This is consistent
with our outcome, which suggests that the strategic importance of the market combined with
established banking infrastructure in the form of local affiliates which have independent funding
implies significant exit costs. This may result in a rather stable loan provision in such regions,
even during periods of distress.
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Appendix
A Figures
Figure 1: Overall private sector lending by German banks
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
This graph depicts overall private sector lending to the German economy and to all foreign
economies by the German banking system. The series are based on monthly observations re-
ported to the Deutsche Bundesbank by the German banks and their affiliates (subsidiaries and
branches) located abroad.
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Figure 2: Lending and intra-bank funding by affiliates of German banks
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
This graph depicts the aggregate development of transaction-induced long-term foreign private
sector lending and intra-bank funding of affiliates located abroad comprising the largest 68
German banking organizations. These banking organizations account for approximately 84% of
total foreign private sector lending by the German banking system (for details of the selection
of banks and destination countries, see section 3). The underlying monthly series have been
transformed into quarterly series. Transaction-induced changes are variations in loan stock
which are not caused by exchange rate fluctuations or other valuation effects. The transaction-
induced developments in loans outstanding is calculated by adding transaction-induced changes
in loans to the stock of loans outstanding in 2002Q4. Intra-bank funding corresponds to net
liabilities of foreign affiliates vis-à-vis the German parent banks.
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Figure 3: Model of the lending and funding behavior of a multinational bank
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Figure 4: Funding structure of affiliates located abroad
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Based on balance sheet statistics, collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank, on subsidiaries and
branches (together: affiliates) of German banks located abroad, we calculated quarterly mean
shares of funding sources relative to total assets of affiliates over time. The graph is based on
affiliates which appear in the regression sample.
Intra-bank funding corresponds to net borrowing of affiliates abroad vis-à-vis the German parent
bank. Wholesale funding comprises both liabilities of affiliates vis-à-vis foreign banks and the
issuance of bonds and notes.
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Figure 5: Approximation of intra-bank flows for branches
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This graph supports our decision to use net liabilities vis-à-vis banks in Germany as an approxi-
mation of branches’ net intra-bank borrowings. This becomes necessary for our analysis since it
requires data from before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, but the more accurate
information on branches’ net liabilities vis-à-vis banks belonging to the same banking group has
been available only since June 2010. The dynamics between the two series follow a very similar
pattern. The difference in volume might arise from the fact that the new series on net liabilities
of branches vis-à-vis other banks of the same banking group comprise not only borrowing from
the parent bank but also from other affiliates located abroad. Regarding the position vis-à-vis
domestic banks, small inaccuracies may occur if branches abroad borrow from domestic banks
other than their parent bank. However, we consider this to be rather unlikely and suggest that
a branch’s main business partner in the home banking sector is the parent bank.
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B Tables
Table 1: Definition of variables and their expected impact on foreign affiliate lending in the crisis
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Table 1: continued
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the panel of the largest 68 German banking conglomerates
between 2002Q4 and 2010Q4. The data stem from statistics collected on a monthly basis by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. Transaction-induced changes in long-term lending by affiliates abroad correspond to the
variation in these affiliates’ long-term loan stock outstanding vis-à-vis the foreign non-bank private sector,
adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and other valuation effects.
Affiliates comprise both subsidiaries and branches; the data are constructed such that, at most, one Local
affiliate exists per parent bank and destination country (in other words 2,720 local affiliates would exist
in a given quarter if all 68 banks had a local affiliate in each of the 40 destination countries). Balance
sheet data of other affiliates of the same parent bank are, for the purpose of the analysis, aggregated
according to their function in relation to the specific destination country. Hub affiliates=affiliates of the
same parent bank outside the destination country, which are active in cross-border lending, and hence
may also supply loans to this country. Non-hub affiliates=affiliates of the same parent bank outside the
destination country whose lending is focused on their local market. Financial center affiliates=affiliates
which are located in countries with major financial centers (see section 3).
For a better comparison of the different types of affiliates, summary statistics are reported at the level
of the individual affiliate. For example, a hub affiliate in this table is an affiliate which potentially lends
across borders and may therefore be, in the regressions, part of a group of hub affiliates of a specific bank
with regard to its lending via affiliates to a given country. Minima and maxima of bank-specific variables
are not shown here on grounds of confidentiality.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
Transaction-induced changes in long-term lending by affiliates
abroad (in EUR bn) 0.002 0.056 0.002 0.066
Local affiliate
Deposits / total assets 0.237 0.255 0.189 0.234
Short-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.422 0.325 0.338 0.315
Long-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.059 0.121 0.062 0.155
Net income / equity capital 4.552 45.060 8.841 83.342
Intra-bank funding / total assets 0.221 0.449 0.284 0.451
Capitalization (equity capital / loans outstanding) 0.792 14.372 0.131 0.497
Affiliate lending share (within banking group) 0.045 0.120 0.040 0.098
Total assets (in EUR bn) 2.653 4.347 2.998 5.329
Lending share within group of affiliates, used as weight on local lending 0.657 0.393 0.612 0.423
# of local affiliates per quarter 90 2 101 3
Hub affiliate
Deposits / total assets 0.166 0.203 0.146 0.201
Short-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.410 0.322 0.304 0.309
Long-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.069 0.113 0.088 0.190
Net income / equity capital 1.179 5.026 1.680 7.941
Intra-bank funding / total assets 0.343 0.415 0.473 0.395
Capitalization (equity capital / loans outstanding) 0.047 0.053 0.049 0.062
Affiliate lending share (within banking group) 0.063 0.079 0.064 0.073
Total assets (in EUR bn) 3.770 4.251 2.873 3.451
Lending share within group of affiliates, used as weight on cross-border lending 0.477 0.475 0.464 0.479
# of hub affiliates per quarter 25 3 28 2
Other affiliate of the same banking group
Non-hub affiliate: Lending share (within banking group) 0.037 0.132 0.031 0.105
Non-hub affiliate: Intra-bank funding / total assets 0.174 0.453 0.210 0.450
# of non-hub affiliates per quarter 65 2 72 3
Financial center affiliate: Relevance (size rel. to banking group) 0.053 0.064 0.047 0.054
Financial center affiliate: Intra-bank funding / total assets 0.075 0.294 0.193 0.368
# of financial center affiliates per quarter 77 1 77 1
Parent bank
Deposits / total assets 0.466 0.220 0.512 0.222
Short-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.057 0.065 0.054 0.054
Long-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.308 0.183 0.260 0.162
Net income / equity capital 0.192 0.168 0.145 0.181
Capitalization (equity capital / loans outstanding) 0.060 0.042 0.060 0.028
Change in long-term lending at home (in EUR bn) -0.041 0.429 0.012 0.318
Total assets (in EUR bn) 57.030 98.530 63.103 102.454
# of parent banks per quarter 68 0 68 0
Pre crisis Crisis
avg (2002Q4-2008Q2) avg (2008Q3-2010Q4)
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Table 3: List of countries
Numbers refer to the regression sample and provide a snapshot of aggregate lending to the foreign non-
bank private sector by affiliates located abroad of the largest 68 German banking organizations as of
12/2009. Affiliates may be located in or outside the destination country. Lending volumes and number
of active affiliates may include both local affiliates and affiliates situated in other foreign countries. The
data stem from monthly reports to the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Country
Volume of affiliate 
long-term lending 
to private sector
(in Euro Million)
Number of German 
banks with active 
affiliates
Affiliate share in 
total long-term 
lending by 
German banks
1 Italy (IT) 26,091.250 12 0.95
2 Spain (ES) 22,820.940 18 0.73
3 Poland (PL) 13,164.440 12 0.68
4 France (FR) 12,359.650 19 0.41
5 Netherlands (NL) 8,220.244 20 0.30
6 Hungary (HU) 5,991.111 9 0.74
7 Australia (AU) 4,943.627 12 0.84
8 Portugal (PT) 4,410.414 11 0.76
9 Japan (JP) 3,314.444 8 0.56
10 Russian Federation (RU) 3,235.044 8 0.40
11 Sweden (SE) 2,900.897 11 0.31
12 Denmark (DK) 2,627.659 13 0.39
13 Norway (NO) 2,198.446 8 0.39
14 Belgium (BE) 2,109.908 14 0.39
15 United Arab Emirates (AE) 1,910.929 10 0.66
16 India (IN) 1,901.942 9 0.80
17 Canada (CA) 1,766.109 12 0.51
18 Czech Republic (CZ) 1,647.326 10 0.41
19 Mexico (MX) 1,295.724 10 0.51
20 Finland (FI) 1,080.531 9 0.36
21 Chile (CL) 920.475 7 0.69
22 Saudi Arabia (SA) 900.928 5 0.79
23 Brazil (BR) 880.329 8 0.68
24 Turkey (TR) 847.644 9 0.16
25 Ukraine (UA) 834.890 4 0.78
26 South Africa (ZA) 783.251 5 0.85
27 Greece (GR) 623.486 10 0.14
28 Qatar (QA) 570.247 5 0.51
29 Iceland (IS) 523.858 10 0.72
30 China (CN) 505.746 9 0.62
31 Austria (AT) 418.298 11 0.11
32 Romania (RO) 413.421 5 0.28
33 Republic of Korea (KR) 278.359 7 0.69
34 Indonesia (ID) 268.412 7 0.77
35 Slovak Republic (SK) 252.944 6 0.31
36 New Zealand (NZ) 150.493 6 0.79
37 Iran (IR) 103.856 5 0.15
38 Israel (IL) 61.155 6 0.09
39 Slovenia (SI) 39.833 3 0.04
40 Croatia (HR) 36.838 4 0.11
Total 133,405.098
Financial centers* 135,474.400
* Countries hosting major financial centers that were not considered for the analysis. Alongside the
US and the UK, all offshore financial centers as defined by the IMF (2000) were excluded as destina-
tion countries for lending. These are Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malta,
Cyprus, Bahrain, Macao, Mauritius, Liechtenstein, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Netherlands Antilles,
Barbados, Bermuda, Guernsey, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey, Cayman Islands, Liberia, Marshall Islands,
Panama, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Virgin Islands (British), Virgin Islands (US).
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Table 4: Role of affiliates’ funding structures
This table reports fixed-effects regressions of quarterly transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
by affiliates abroad for a panel of the largest 68 German banking conglomerates, 2002Q4 to 2010Q4.
Transaction-induced changes correspond to the affiliates’ variations in the long-term loan stock outstand-
ing vis-à-vis the foreign non-bank private sector, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and other valu-
ation effects. Intra-bank funding corresponds to net liabilities of an affiliate abroad vis-à-vis its German
parent bank (the affiliate variables are the authors’ calculations based on data collected by the Deutsche
Bundesbank such that one affiliate exists per parent bank and country). Local affiliate=local affiliate in
destination country. Hub affiliates=affiliates of the same parent bank outside the destination country,
which are active in cross-border lending, and hence may also supply loans to this country (see section 3).
All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Crisis dummy=1 if t≥2008Q3. Standard errors, clus-
tered by bank-country pairs, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable Change control for
Transaction-induced change in long-term lending by affiliates in crisis pre-crisis
I. Local affiliate:
Deposit funding 0.147** 0.031
(0.070) (0.049)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.072* -0.013
(0.039) (0.025)
Net income 0.005*** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.039 0.029
(0.040) (0.032)
Affiliate lending share -0.114 0.045
(0.077) (0.038)
Size (total assets) -0.005 0.007*
(0.003) (0.004)
II. Hub affiliates:
Deposit funding 0.082*** -0.042***
(0.021) (0.015)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.021* 0.022***
(0.011) (0.009)
Net income 4.74e-04*** -6.07e-04***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.193*** 0.057
(0.062) (0.054)
Affiliate lending share -0.004 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
III. Parent bank:
Deposit funding -0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.035** -0.020***
(0.018) (0.006)
Net income -0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Capitalization -0.012 0.003
(0.021) (0.007)
Size (total assets) -1.26e-05 1.06e-04**
(0.000) (0.000)
Parent bank fixed effects
Country-time fixed effects (demand controls)
Quarterly time dummies
Constant
Observations
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters)
adj. R-squared
Yes
2720
Yes
0.0228
(0.020)
89684
Yes
-0.026
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Table 5: Intra-bank competition with affiliates and parent
This table reports fixed-effects regressions of quarterly transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
by affiliates abroad for a panel of the largest 68 German banking conglomerates, 2002Q4 to 2010Q4.
Transaction-induced changes correspond to the affiliates’ variations in the long-term loan stock outstand-
ing vis-à-vis the foreign non-bank private sector, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and other valu-
ation effects. Intra-bank funding corresponds to net liabilities of an affiliate abroad vis-à-vis its German
parent bank (the affiliate variables are the authors’ calculations based on data collected by the Deutsche
Bundesbank such that one affiliate exists per parent bank and country). Local affiliate=local affiliate in
destination country. Hub affiliates=affiliates of the same parent bank outside the destination country,
which are active in cross-border lending, hence may also supply loans to this country. Non-hub affili-
ates=affiliates of the same parent bank outside the destination country whose lending is focused on their
local market. Financial center affiliates=affiliates which are, in contrast to all other affiliates, located
in countries with important financial centers (see section 3). All explanatory variables are lagged one
period. Crisis dummy=1 if t≥2008Q3. Standard errors, clustered by bank-country pairs, in parentheses
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable Change control for
Transaction-induced change in long-term lending by affiliates in crisis pre-crisis
I. Local affiliate:
Deposit funding 0.116* 0.049
(0.070) (0.048)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.076** -0.003
(0.038) (0.024)
Net income 0.005*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.018 0.008
(0.038) (0.028)
Affiliate lending share -0.026 -0.071
(0.062) (0.051)
Size (total assets) -0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004)
Intra-bank funding -0.057* 0.058**
(0.034) (0.025)
II. Hub affiliates:
Deposit funding 0.061*** -0.044**
(0.023) (0.018)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.018 0.030***
(0.013) (0.010)
Net income 5.40e-04** -5.76e-04**
(0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.137** 0.027
(0.068) (0.067)
Affiliate lending share -0.006 -0.031*
(0.011) (0.016)
Intra-bank funding -0.014 0.010
(0.009) (0.008)
III. Further affiliates of the same parent bank:
Non-hub affiliates: Lending share 0.020 -0.039
(0.012) (0.027)
Non-hub affiliates: Intra-bank funding -0.010** 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
Financial center affiliates: Relevance -0.004 0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
Financial center affiliates: Intra-bank funding 0.003* 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
IV. Parent bank:
Balance sheet controls (as in specification 1)
Change in long-term lending at home -0.007** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Parent bank FE / Country-time FE / Quarter dummies
Constant
Observations
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters)
adj. R-squared
89684
2720
0.0307
Yes
Yes / Yes / Yes
-0.016
(0.026)
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Table 6: Intra-bank relation with the parent
This table reports fixed-effects regressions of quarterly transaction-induced changes in long-term lending
by affiliates abroad for a panel of the largest 68 German banking conglomerates, 2002Q4 to 2010Q4.
Transaction-induced changes correspond to the affiliates’ variations in the long-term loan stock outstand-
ing vis-à-vis the foreign non-bank private sector, adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and other valu-
ation effects. Intra-bank funding corresponds to net liabilities of an affiliate abroad vis-à-vis its German
parent bank (the affiliate variables are the authors’ calculations based on data collected by the Deutsche
Bundesbank such that one affiliate exists per parent bank and country). Local affiliate=local affiliate in
destination country. Hub affiliates=affiliates of the same parent bank outside the destination country,
which are active in cross-border lending, and hence may also supply loans to this country (see section 3).
All explanatory variables are lagged one period. Crisis dummy=1 if t≥2008Q3. Standard errors, clus-
tered by bank-country pairs, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable Change control for
Transaction-induced change in long-term lending by affiliates in crisis pre-crisis
I. Local affiliate:
Deposit funding 0.138** 0.042
(0.069) (0.048)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.076** -0.010
(0.038) (0.024)
Net income 0.004*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.047 0.021
(0.045) (0.031)
Affiliate lending share -0.123 -0.007
(0.083) (0.043)
Size (total assets) -0.004 0.006*
(0.003) (0.004)
Intra-bank funding -0.025 0.046
(0.055) (0.033)
II. Hub affiliates:
Deposit funding 0.063*** -0.039**
(0.022) (0.017)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.021* 0.022***
(0.011) (0.008)
Net income 4.54e-04** -4.75e-04**
(0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.138* 0.038
(0.071) (0.067)
Affiliate lending share -0.003 0.005
(0.010) (0.008)
Intra-bank funding -0.010 0.008
(0.009) (0.008)
III. Parent bank:
Deposit funding -0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Deposit funding * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate 0.135* -0.110**
(0.070) (0.053)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.037** -0.007
(0.017) (0.005)
Short-term wholesale funding * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate -0.620 0.203
(0.393) (0.256)
Net income 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Net income * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate 0.027 0.251***
(0.235) (0.089)
Capitalization -0.019 -0.002
(0.021) (0.005)
Size (total assets) 1.23e-06 6.00e-05
(0.000) (0.000)
Change in long-term lending at home -0.002 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
Change in long-term lending at home * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate -0.101** 0.125***
(0.046) (0.033)
Parent bank FE / Country-time FE / Quarter dummies
Constant
Observations
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters)
adj. R-squared
2720
0.0720
Yes / Yes / Yes
-0.012
(0.017)
89684
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Table 7: All specifications and robustness
This table provides the full specifications of all the regressions reported earlier. The table additionally
contains a robustness test including long-term wholesale funding, which is the funding source that was
previously omitted in order to limit concerns about multicollinearity. The different groups of affiliates
are defined as in section 3 and in the regressions reported in Tables 4 to 6. All explanatory variables are
lagged one period. Crisis dummy=1 if t≥2008Q3. Standard errors, clustered by bank-country pairs, in
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable
Transaction-induced change in long-term lending by affiliates
Change control for Change control for Change control for Change control for
in crisis pre-crisis in crisis pre-crisis in crisis pre-crisis in crisis pre-crisis
I. Local affiliate:
Deposit funding 0.147** 0.031 0.116* 0.049 0.138** 0.042 0.138* 0.043
(0.070) (0.049) (0.070) (0.048) (0.069) (0.048) (0.071) (0.049)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.072* -0.013 -0.076** -0.003 -0.076** -0.010 -0.083** -0.007
(0.039) (0.025) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.023)
Long-term wholesale funding 0.066 -0.034
(0.051) (0.045)
Net income 0.005*** -0.000*** 0.005*** -0.001** 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.039 0.029 -0.018 0.008 -0.047 0.021 -0.045 0.022
(0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.028) (0.045) (0.031) (0.045) (0.033)
Affiliate lending share -0.114 0.045 -0.026 -0.071 -0.123 -0.007 -0.087 -0.014
(0.077) (0.038) (0.062) (0.051) (0.083) (0.043) (0.086) (0.048)
Size (total assets) -0.005 0.007* -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.006* -0.004 0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Intra-bank funding -0.057* 0.058** -0.025 0.046 -0.081 0.057
(0.034) (0.025) (0.055) (0.033) (0.050) (0.037)
II. Hub affiliates:
Deposit funding 0.082*** -0.042*** 0.061*** -0.044** 0.063*** -0.039** 0.067*** -0.039**
(0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.021* 0.022*** -0.018 0.030*** -0.021* 0.022*** -0.020 0.020**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Long-term wholesale funding 0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.010)
Net income 4.74e-04*** -6.07e-04*** 5.40e-04** -5.76e-04** 4.54e-04** -4.75e-04** 4.43e-04** -4.47e-04**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.193*** 0.057 -0.137** 0.027 -0.138* 0.038 -0.165** 0.042
(0.062) (0.054) (0.068) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067) (0.072) (0.068)
Affiliate lending share -0.004 -0.014 -0.006 -0.031* -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Intra-bank funding -0.014 0.010 -0.010 0.008 -0.009 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
III. Further affiliates of the same parent bank:
Non-hub affiliates: Lending share 0.020 -0.039
(0.012) (0.027)
Non-hub affiliates: Intra-bank funding -0.010** 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
Financial center affiliates: Relevance -0.004 0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
Financial center affiliates: Intra-bank funding 0.003* 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
IV. Parent bank:
Deposit funding -0.000 0.005 -0.007** 0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.012 0.007
funding structures with affiliates and parent with the parent long-term wholesale funding
(1) (2) (3) (Robustness)
Role of affiliates' Intra-bank competition Intra-bank relation Including
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.011)
Deposit funding * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate 0.135* -0.110** 0.147* -0.123**
(0.070) (0.053) (0.076) (0.057)
Short-term wholesale funding -0.035** -0.020*** -0.054*** -0.002 -0.037** -0.007 -0.021 -0.005
(0.018) (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.029) (0.015)
-0.620 0.203 -0.882** 0.287
(0.393) (0.256) (0.377) (0.275)
Long-term wholesale funding 0.015 0.005
(0.020) (0.010)
0.231* -0.052
(0.118) (0.078)
Net income -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Net income * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate 0.027 0.251*** -0.092 0.303**
(0.235) (0.089) (0.245) (0.137)
Capitalization -0.012 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019 -0.002 -0.015 0.004
(0.021) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.021) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006)
Size (total assets) -1.26e-05 1.06e-04** -3.50e-06 7.47e-05 1.23e-06 6.00e-05 7.77e-06 8.25e-05**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in long-term lending at home -0.007** 0.010*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.002 0.004***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.101** 0.125*** -0.088* 0.125***
(0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (0.033)
Parent bank fixed effects
Country-time fixed effects (demand controls)
Quarterly time dummies
Constant
Observations
Number of bank-country pairs (clusters)
adj. R-squared
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Short-term wholesale funding * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate
Long-term wholesale funding * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate
Change in long-term lending at home * Intra-bank funding of local affiliate
0.0228 0.0307 0.0720 0.0729
(0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
89684 89684 89684 89684
2720 2720 2720 2720
Yes Yes Yes Yes
-0.026 -0.016 -0.012 -0.020
Yes Yes Yes Yes
III-31
IV Repo funding and internal capital markets
in the financial crisis
This paper is available as:
Düwel, C. (2013). Repo funding and internal capital markets in the financial crisis. Bundesbank
Discussion Paper, No 16/2013, Economic Research Centre, Deutsche Bundesbank.
It is at the stage of “revise & resubmit” to the International Journal of Central Banking.
The paper was presented at the following refereed conference:
• 18th Spring Meeting of Young Economists, University of Aarhus, Aarhus (Denmark),
May 30 - June 01, 2013.
The paper was furthermore presented at the following non-refereed workshops:
• MAGKS Doctoral Seminar, Rauischholzhausen, September 20–21, 2012.
• FMI Doctoral Seminar, University of Giessen, Giessen, December 19, 2012.
• Joint Doctoral Seminar, University of Tübingen / Frankfurt School of Finance and Manage-
ment, Frankfurt am Main, April 10-11, 2013.
IV-1
Repo funding and internal capital markets
in the financial crisis
April 2013
Cornelia Düwel*
University of Giessen
Abstract
This paper examines key events during the financial crisis which called into question the low
risk associated with providing and obtaining secured funding. Domestic parents of German
multinational banks which were more exposed to the runs on the collateralized repo (sale
and repurchase) markets are found to have withdrawn bank-internal funds from their foreign
affiliates to a greater extent. After the collapse of the subprime market, they briefly protected
their branches, which were core investment locations abroad, while subsidiaries were used
as core funding locations up to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The rescue of Bear Stearns
triggered the largest contraction on internal capital markets from the part of the parent
bank. All in all, this study finds that the funding shocks primarily related to the US financial
system were transmitted abroad both through repo financing on capital markets and through
bank-internal capital markets.
Keywords: Repo, funding structure, multinational banks, internal capital market, intra-bank
lending, financial crisis.
JEL Classification: G21, G15, F34, E44
* Licher Str. 66, 35394 Giessen, cornelia.duewel@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
This paper was written during research visits to the Deutsche Bundesbank. I would like to thank the Bundesbank and
its staff for their continuous hospitality and support. The paper has benefited from valuable comments by Claudia
Buch, Jens Conrad, Ben Craig, Falko Fecht, Rainer Frey, Linda Goldberg, Heinz Herrmann, Alexander Lipponer,
Cordula Munzert, Winfried Rudek and Peter Tillmann. All remaining errors and inaccuracies are my own. Financial
support from the University of Giessen is gratefully acknowledged.
IV-2
1 Introduction
In the run-up to the financial crisis, the interconnectedness of financial institutions and ex-
cessive risk-taking worldwide were underestimated (MISHKIN (2011)). Recent literature has
highlighted the role of globally active banks in transmitting the crisis, which began with the
collapse of the US subprime housing market and spread to the global financial system. CE-
TORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012) document that US global banks activated their internal capital
market in order to reallocate liquidity within their banking organizations, putting the needs of
the parent bank first and, in some cases, using their foreign affiliates as sources of funding. In
Europe, it was first believed that the subprime crisis was a market-specific crisis that would be
confined to within the borders of the United States or disappear with the write-down of loans
and the adjustments in the value of the collateral directly linked to the US subprime market,
if not sooner. In stark contrast to such expectations, the disruptions in the US financial system
triggered a worldwide financial crisis that continued to escalate for more than two years follow-
ing the collapse of the subprime market in mid-2007. Such severe consequences would not have
been possible without further transmission channels besides the direct exposure of banks around
the world to the US subprime market. Referring to the interconnectedness of banks, GORTON
AND METRICK (2012) argue that securitized banking was the key financial market instrument
that aggravated the crisis and transmitted it to the rest of the world. This type of short-term
refinancing on capital markets uses securitized assets as collateral in sale and repurchase (repo)
transactions, and was believed to be more stable than unsecured funding. However, during the
crisis, uncertainty about the value of the offered collateral and mistrust among market partici-
pants increased sharply, which severely limited the liquidity of these markets.
Using confidential data on German multinational banks, this paper analyzes to which extent
the exposure of these banks to the disruptions in securitized banking affected their global fund
management. Three key events are analyzed with regard to their role in accelerating the loss
of confidence and the deterioration of collateral value in the repo market: the collapse of the
subprime market, the rescue of Bear Stearns, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The
study tests to what extent the vulnerability of parent banks to the drying-up of repo markets
following these events reduced their support of affiliated banks abroad. Furthermore, this study
tests whether German banks adopted, in this period of distress, a type of pecking order similar
to that of US banks. This puts the needs of the parent bank first and redirects funds internally
in order to protect the most important parts of the banking organization in terms of its lending
business (CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012)). However, the literature has, so far, not compared
the two types of affiliates, branches and subsidiaries, with regard to their role in internal capital
markets. By inspecting the changes on the banks’ internal capital markets, this paper asks
whether the decisions taken by a parent bank regarding its global fund management are related
to the organizational form of the affiliate (branch or subsidiary). The study aims to contributing
to an understanding of global banks’ fund management as well as to assess the role of securitized
banking in the international transmission of a funding crisis.
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Two strands of literature are linked in this study. These assess at different levels how the cri-
sis was transmitted from subprime housing assets to bank refinancing and, ultimately, affected
banks’ lending activities. One strand of literature investigates how the financial crisis spread on
refinancing markets from subprime-related assets to non-subprime related asset classes. KRISH-
NAMURTHY (2010) argues that the financial crisis has been a crisis especially in debt markets,
as participants on these markets were no longer able to raise funds easily and quickly owing to
the separation of fundamental values and market prices for certain assets. As a major source
of funding shuts down, banks that do not have ready alternatives may downsize their lending
activity either domestically or abroad, eventually reducing the financing of the real economy.1
GORTON AND METRICK (2012) find strong correlation of counterparty risk measures with the
spreads for many non-subprime-related asset classes that were used as collateral in refinancing
transactions. They draw the conclusion that concerns about counterparty solvency and uncer-
tainty about the value of the offered collateral led to a run on repo markets by investors, which is
analogous to a run on banks by bank depositors. Since repo markets represented a major source
of funding for financial institutions, the authors argue that this run on repo was the key accel-
erator of the crisis.2 ACHARYA AND ÖNCÜ (2013) conclude from the recent events that financial
distress of individual participants can quickly cause systemic illiquidity on repo markets. They
propose to introduce tighter regulation on repos as systemically important liabilities rather than
on the market participants themselves in order to avoid runs on the markets. These aspects call
for a closer investigation of repo funding as a major short-term funding source of multinational
banks.
HÖRDAHL AND KING (2008) compare developments on the US repo market with refinancing
conditions on the European repo market after the outbreak of the subprime crisis. They find that
the size of the European repo market declined due to growing risk aversion, greater preference
for cash, and the increasing volatility of prices. The findings by MARTIN ET AL. (2012) derived
from a dynamic equilibrium model are consistent with this picture. They illustrate how short-
term collateralized borrowing may become highly unstable in times of crisis. This environment
was responsible for the fact that even large and well-established market participants were hit
by the disruptions and were prompted to downsize their activities related to repo markets.
European banks’ access to this important source of funding consequently became limited. The
present paper links this aspect to the ability of parent banks to provide funds to their foreign
affiliates.
A second strand of literature suggests that the global nature of many large banks is key to the
international transmission of funding shocks (see CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2011) for the
transmission of dollar-funding shocks to emerging markets, PEEK AND ROSENGREN (1997) and
(2000) on the decline in the lending of Japanese bank branches in the US upon funding shocks
to their parent banks, as well as AIYAR (2011) and ROSE AND WIELADEK (2011) for the recent
comparably large decline in lending by foreign-owned banks’ affiliates in the UK). CETORELLI
AND GOLDBERG (2012) show that US global banks reduced their net lending via the internal
1 MISHKIN (2011) alludes to the possibility that increasing uncertainty in a financial crisis also increases asym-
metric information and thus reduces the bank’s ability to distribute credit effectively to firms and households.
DE HAAS AND VAN HOREN (2012A) lend empirical support to this suggestion by showing that foreign lending
remained more stable when banks had close relationships with borrowers.
2 KRISHNAMURTHY ET AL. (2012) observe that US money market funds and security lenders, which were largely
financing the shadow banking system via repos, ran from their investments and thus significantly contributed to
deteriorating lending conditions on repo markets.
IV-4
capital market to affiliates located abroad, the more they were exposed to the collapse of the
asset-backed commercial paper market. DE HAAS AND VAN LELYVELD (2006) and (2010) as
well as POPOV AND UDELL (2012) document that financially strong European parent banks can
stabilize their central and eastern European entities’ loan supply in a local crisis, but that they are
not a source of strength for their subsidiaries in a global, systemic crisis like the recent one which
has negatively affected their own balance sheets.3 The crisis hit the lending business of banks
harder if ex ante they had relied more on short-term funding via interbank markets and less on
deposit funding (see CORNETT ET AL. (2010) and IVASHINA AND SCHARFSTEIN (2010) for US
banks, and DÜWEL AND FREY (2012) for German banks). The present study provides evidence
for the transmission of a repo funding shock via internal capital markets of multinational banks.
This paper shows that German parent banks which were more exposed to the run on repo mar-
kets during the financial crisis were more aggressive in reducing their liquidity provision to for-
eign affiliates, especially after the subprime market collapse and the Bear Stearns rescue. Hence,
funding via repo markets is found to be one channel that transmitted shocks primarily related
to the US financial system abroad. The strongest negative impact on intra-bank lending induced
by the repo funding shock can be observed after the Bear Stearns rescue, the event which raised
even greater concerns about the solvency of potential counterparties in the interbank lending
market. The further decline of the repo market after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy triggered
lower adjustments on internal capital markets, possibly because rescue measures conducted by
central banks provided alternative funding sources. All in all, the distortions related to funding
via repo markets contributed to the continuity and the development of the funding crisis.
The results reveal significant differences between branches and subsidiaries regarding fund man-
agement with these two types of affiliates. German banks restricted their support to foreign
subsidiaries which were strong in raising funds locally, and redirected these funds to the parent
bank. Conversely, branches located abroad were given greater protection, the more important
was their individual lending business compared to the rest of the bank holding company. This
finding reflects the larger role of branches in financing foreign real economies compared with
that of subsidiaries.
However, this clear pattern in fund management can be observed only at the beginning of the
crisis. With increasing disruptions on short-term funding markets and repo markets in particu-
lar, the scope of German parent banks to protect branches with an important lending business
narrowed. However, better capitalized parent banks were able to shelter their foreign affiliates
from the withdrawal of funds after the Bear Stearns rescue. This result supports the view that a
stronger equity capital base can effectively signal stability to the market in times of distress.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the disruptions that
occurred on European repo markets during the financial crisis and the reliance of German banks
on repo financing. Section 3 describes German banks’ movements on internal capital markets in
the crisis. Section 4 outlines the analysis and presents the methodology. Section 5 presents and
discusses regression results, section 6 provides robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
3 Further studies reveal that cross-border lending, either in the form of syndicated lending (IVASHINA AND SCHARF-
STEIN (2010), GIANNETTI AND LAEVEN (2012) or DE HAAS AND VAN HOREN (2012B)) or direct cross-border
lending (SCHNABL (2012)), suffered from crisis-related funding shocks.
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2 Repo funding of German multinational banks
2.1 Key developments on the European repo market in the financial crisis
The declining participation of banks in repo market financing was a central characteristic of the
evolving financial crisis in Europe. In their June and December 2008 surveys among European
financial institutions, the International Capital Market Association states that, for the first time
since the beginning of the biannual survey in 2001, there were more banks with contracting
than with expanding repo books. The market also saw a drastic shortening of maturities and a
total contraction of the volume of repo transactions by 26%, which was the largest fall recorded
since the survey began.
Repurchase agreements are mostly short-term interbank loans (overnight or with a maturity of
less than one month) that are secured or collateralized in most cases with some type of securities.
A bank can lend cash on a short-term basis from another financial player, such as a bank or a
money market fund, in exchange for securities, which the bank agrees to buy back at some time
in the future. The lender provides, for example, C80 by imposing a haircut (eg 20%) on the
security (having a market value of C100) and demands a repo rate (eg 10%) from the borrower,
who than has to pay back C88. This way of obtaining (from the perspective of the borrower)
short-term cash or a specific type of security (from the perspective of the lender) was believed
to be fairly safe before the financial crisis.
However, with the crisis unfolding, uncertainty arose about the value of the collateral provided
in these transactions. Besides, there was growing uncertainty about the liquidity of markets
on which collateral such as asset-backed securities could be sold in the event that the counter-
party defaulted on the repo loan. In general, counterparty risk rose. The spread of the Euribor
to OIS, being an indicator of counterparty risk on European interbank markets, rose consid-
erably in mid-2007 when the subprime market collapsed.4 It increased again after the Bear
Stearns rescue in March 2008 and peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008 (see AIYAR (2011)). These developments led to increasing haircuts and repo rates.
For some asset classes used as collateral, the repo market shut down completely (GORTON AND
METRICK (2012)).
Recent literature has highlighted the role of the events that occured in July/August 2007,
March 2008 and September 2008 in the development of the financial crisis. KACPERCZYK AND
SCHNABL (2010) see the failure of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in July 2007 as the first signal
of the subprime market collapsing and as the starting point of the crisis in debt markets. In
the same month, the German bank IKB became the first European victim of the crisis. Both
institutions had heavily invested in the US subprime mortgage market. On August 7 2007, BNP
Paribas was unable to assess the value of subprime-related assets held in some of its money mar-
ket funds and suspended the redemption of shares. MISHKIN (2011) interprets this event as the
key signal for deteriorating conditions on credit markets. What followed after July/August 2007
was a “fire sale” dynamic (SHLEIFER AND VISHNY (2011)), which led financial institutions to
deleverage because of increasing uncertainty about the value of collateral offered in interbank
4 The conditions attached to an overnight index swap (OIS) result in minimum credit risk associated with this type
of interest rate swaps. The spread against the Libor or Euribor therefore measures credit risk in the interbank
market.
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refinancing transactions. The investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008 due to
its inability to secure funding on repo markets (BRUNNERMEIER (2009)) and was rescued with
the support of the US regulators. This event focused attention on the run on debt markets and
provoked another increase in counterparty and credit risk; MISHKIN (2011) points to the rise
in the spread between interest rates on Baa corporate bonds and US Treasury bonds observed
after the Bear Stearns event. Finally, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008
highlighted the deterioration in interbank lending conditions and the vulnerability of the global
financial system.
Compared to the US market, the European repo market experienced lower distortions regarding
the value of collateral used in repo transactions (HÖRDAHL AND KING (2008)). This was due to
subprime-related asset classes being used to a lesser extent in Europe than in the US. Instead,
there was a greater percentage of government securities used in repo transactions. Nevertheless,
uncertainty about counterparty solvency and the liquidity of markets rose in Europe as well.
Not only did lenders increasingly fear the default of repo loans, but borrowers were less willing
to lend out their high-quality collateral, fearing that the securities would not return upon the
default of the cash lender. It was common practice in both Europe and in the US for collateral
to be “rehypothecated”, meaning that the collateral obtained in a repo agreement could be used
by the lender in another repo transaction. This practice contributed to a multiplier effect when
uncertainty about the value of collateral increased (see GORTON AND METRICK (2012)).
The dominance of bilateral repo agreements is another feature of the European repo market
which might have played a part in growing mistrust among market participants. More than 50%
of repo transactions in Europe are carried out on a bilateral basis (HÖRDAHL AND KING (2008)).
This means that no central clearing party, which in a tri-party repo would keep the deposited
collateral safe, stands between the borrower and the lender. Besides this, there was an increase
in the number of “anonymous” settlements, in which the names of the borrower and the lender
are known only to the central clearing counterparty, which testifies to the fact that many market
participants feared that revealing their identity would worsen the lending conditions offered to
them on repo markets (ICMA (JUNE 2008) and (DECEMBER 2008)).
2.2 Reliance on repo funding by German banks
Monthly balance sheet data collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank from all banks registered in
Germany provides the opportunity to study the individual exposure of each bank to the disrup-
tions observed on repo markets during the financial crisis.5 Next to a detailed reporting of the
asset side of the balance sheet, banks provide, on a mandatory basis, information on the com-
position of their liabilities by counterparty sector and term structure. Besides this, the amount
of funding achieved through repo transactions is reported. From this information, it is possible
to assess the individual bank’s reliance on funding via repo markets, which determines their
vulnerability to shocks on these markets.
As shown in Figure 1, before the outbreak of the subprime crisis, German parent banks funded,
on aggregate, about one-third of their total claims (the total of accounts receivable) on the
5 The bank-level data is confidential but can be accessed for research purposes on the premises of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
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short-term wholesale market (short-term referring to an original maturity of less than one year),
meaning via interbank loans including repo agreements with other monetary and financial insti-
tutions, own bonds and notes issued and repo agreements with non-banks, being, for example,
central clearing counterparties.6 This ratio of short-term funding to total claims remained stable
until the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, when it decreased to less than 1:4. Repo funding as
a share of German parent banks’ short-term wholesale funding on aggregate started to decline
as soon as the outbreak of the subprime crisis occurred. It dropped from a pre-crisis level of al-
most 60% of short-term wholesale funding to 48% just before the Bear Stearns rescue in March
2008 and accounted for no more than 35% of short-term funding after the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy (this is a total decline of almost 25 percentage points during this time span).
These figures point to the fact that repo funding as a short-term funding source became less
accessible as soon as the outbreak of the crisis occurred, and had to be replaced with other
short-term funding sources in order to limit the need to deleverage on the asset side of the
balance sheet. The fact that the share of total claims financed by short-term funding in general
(including repo funding) remained rather stable until the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy suggests
that this replacement of repo funding was, on aggregate, possible at first. The immediate decline
in repo funding compared with overall short-term wholesale funding might have been due to the
fact that the subprime market collapse disproved the relative safety of repo transactions. The
Lehman event severely worsened interbank lending conditions again. Alternative short-term
funding sources (apart from repo funding) then started to dry up on an even broader scale,
which led to a decline in the percentage of overall short-term funding in banks’ total funding.
3 Internal capital markets of German banks
3.1 Movements observed during the financial crisis
Along with increasing difficulties in accessing short-term funding via repo transactions, the effec-
tiveness of the banks’ internal fund management gained relevance. In order to fill funding
gaps, the parent bank of a multinational banking organization can limit or redirect the funds
that flow to affiliated banks abroad via the bank-internal capital market. In June 2007, 60
banks in Germany had affiliates located in foreign markets (domestically-owned or foreign-
owned). In total, the German banking sector had 310 foreign affiliates at that time; 32 of which
belonged to banks in Germany whose headquarters are located abroad. While these banks file
regulatory reports in the same way as domestically based German parent banks do, they are
not the headquarters of the respective multinational banks and might not have the same scope
of action as a German parent bank. The analysis carried out below therefore concentrates on
German parent banks.7
During the core stages of the financial crisis (ie from mid-2007 until the end of 2009), the
German parent banks’ net amount of accounts receivable from their own foreign branches fluc-
tuated between roughly C200 billion and C330 billion (see Figure 2, this is, from the point
6 Up to June 2010, no information was collected regarding the maturity structure of repo funding. When the data
became available, 96% of all repo agreements were short-term. In this study with a sample period that ends
before 2010, it is therefore assumed that all repo funding is short-term funding.
7 A robustness check including foreign-owned banks located in Germany is provided in section 6.
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of view of the branches, equivalent to their net borrowing from the parent bank). This corre-
sponds to a fluctuation in net funds provided to the branches of between 10% and 18% of their
aggregate total assets. Subsidiaries were, on aggregate, providing net funds to the parent banks
before the financial crisis. By the time of the Lehman collapse, their aggregate net borrowing
amounted to roughly C50 billion (or about 10% of subsidiaries’ aggregate total assets). There
is, however, substantial heterogeneity in these figures. While some branches or subsidiaries be-
came net providers of funds to the parent organization during the crisis, others increased their
dependence on the parent bank.
Both branches and subsidiaries of parent banks registered in Germany file monthly balance sheet
reports with the Deutsche Bundesbank.8 Within this report, subsidiaries provide information on
the amount of assets and liabilities that they hold vis-à-vis the German parent bank. From this,
the fluctuations in the net borrowing position of subsidiaries can be calculated. Branches do
not report the position vis-à-vis the parent bank explicitly. Since June 2010, new series on the
internal capital market have been reported, including the position of branches vis-à-vis the rest
of their banking group. From a comparison of these series’ dynamics with the dynamics of the
net borrowing position of branches vis-à-vis the German banking sector (excluding the central
bank), DÜWEL AND FREY (2012) concluded that this position was a fair approximation of the
borrowing of branches from their parent bank. This approximation is used here in order to
follow the fluctuations in the individual branch’s net borrowing from its parent bank during the
financial crisis.
3.2 Branches’ and subsidiaries’ role in internal capital markets
There are major differences between a bank’s branches and its subsidiaries and these differences
are relevant to their role in the bank’s internal fund management. Branches are part of the
parent banks’ balance sheet, while subsidiaries are separate legal entities and fulfill regulatory
capital requirements in the country in which they are located. Conditionally, branches operate
mostly as an extension of the parent bank, and subsidiaries resemble more stand-alone banks.
This is also reflected in the funding structure of branches and subsidiaries. Relative to their size,
subsidiaries fund themselves, on average, to a larger extent locally than branches (see Table 1,
core funding role of branches and subsidiaries). They are also less dependent than branches
on funding received from the parent bank.9 Before the crisis, subsidiaries funded, on average,
17% of their total assets on the internal capital market, while branches’ net borrowing from the
parent bank amounted, on average, to roughly 40% of their total assets.
Branches and subsidiaries of German banks are, on aggregate, quite important in supplying loans
to the real sector of foreign countries: About two-thirds of German banks’ real sector loans to
foreign firms are channeled abroad via branches or subsidiaries (see DÜWEL ET AL. (2011)). Of
these, branches account for the vast majority of the loans, but, on average, are also larger than
subsidiaries in terms of asset size (see again Table 1). As of June 2007, a German domestically-
owned multinational bank (below “German parent bank“) served an average of 5.6 foreign
8 Several branches of one parent bank, which are located in the same foreign country, submit a single joint report.
Subsidiaries of German parents file reports whenever the German bank is the majority shareholder.
9 Compared to other European or US multinational banks, German banks tend to borrow more at home and lend
abroad, hence they fund fewer of their foreign assets in the respective local market (MCCAULEY ET AL. (2010)).
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countries via affiliated banks abroad. The list of countries and the number of parent banks that
had set up affiliates in these countries can be seen in Table 2. The roles of specific branches and
subsidiaries in the lending business of the bank holding company, as well as their ability to fund
themselves locally suggests that, in times of distress, the fund management of the bank via the
internal capital market takes these characteristics into account.
4 Empirical model
4.1 Outline of the analysis
Investigation 1: The first objective is to test whether the exposure of German parent banks
to the distortions on repo markets during the financial crisis activated the banks’ internal fund
management, leading parent banks to withdraw and/or redirect liquidity within the bank hold-
ing company. One key aspect is to investigate whether the fund management was different
depending on whether a foreign affiliate was a branch or a subsidiary.
The run on repo funding markets (as described, for example, by GORTON AND METRICK (2012))
was triggered by increasing concern about the value of collateral used in repo transactions and
growing mistrust among market participants. In this analysis, three key events which raised
these types of risk are considered with regard to their effect on the internal fund management
of German global banks: the outbreak of the subprime crisis in July 2007, the rescue of Bear
Stearns in March 2008, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Figure 1
shows the aggregate decline of repo funding as a short-term funding source of German banks
around these events. For all three events, the amount of the foreign affiliates’ net borrowing
from their respective parent banks before the specific event is compared with the amount of
their net borrowing after the event. If the exposure of parent banks to the disruptions on repo
markets did indeed lead to a shortage of short-term funding sources on the part of the parent
bank, we should then observe a limitation of the amount of funds provided to foreign affiliates,
and hence a reduction in the affiliates’ net borrowing from the parent bank.
Investigation 2: Second, it is investigated whether in times of distress the fund management
within German global banks follows a similar type of locational pecking order as is the case
within US banks (CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012)). This would mean that the parent bank,
while limiting the amount of funds provided to its foreign affiliates, adopts a strategy that dis-
tinguishes between “core investment locations” and “core funding locations”. The larger the
share of an affiliate is in the total volume of foreign lending to firms by the whole bank holding
company, the more this affiliate fulfills the role of a “core investment” location. These affiliates
would then be more sheltered from the withdrawal of funds due to their important role in banks’
lending business to the real sector. Conversely, if parent banks, following a funding shock, with-
draw even more funds from affiliates which are strong in local refinancing (relative to their total
refinancing), then these affiliates fulfill the role of “core funding locations”.
This part of the analysis furthermore addresses the ultimately empirical question of whether the
organizational form (branch or subsidiary) influences the assignment of these roles to the affili-
ates. On the one hand, as subsidiaries are less dependent on the parent bank and resemble more
stand-alone banks (see section 3.2), they should be predestined to be assigned the core funding
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role. Often, subsidiaries are former stand-alone banks which were acquired by the global bank
and possess a large network of depositors and investors. On the other hand, subsidiaries have to
fulfill local regulatory requirements, which limits the possibility of withdrawing funds. Branches
distribute, overall, more loans to foreign firms than subsidiaries, which suggests that they might
rather be sheltered from the withdrawal of funds and be more protected due to their fulfill-
ing a core investment role. However, branches are consolidated into the parent bank’s balance
sheet, which facilitates the withdrawal of funds from these entities, as no strict local regulatory
requirements apply.
The three different events considered also allow to investigate whether the assignment of core
investment and core funding roles was consistent throughout the different episodes of the finan-
cial crisis. With banks facing increasing stress on interbank markets, the ability to protect core
investment locations, for example, might have faded in the course of the crisis.
Investigation 3: Third, it is argued above that increasing uncertainty about the value of colla-
teral and counterparty solvency on repo markets were key in disrupting the short-term funding
possibilities of parent banks during the financial crisis. It should then be the case that parent
banks that were able to signal a high level of solvency (were better capitalized) and/or pos-
sessed greater liquidity were less forced to withdraw funds from their foreign affiliates despite
their exposure to the run on repo markets. Informational advantages and implicit government
guarantees of banks with a large balance sheet size could have facilitated access to short-term
refinancing on capital markets. These aspects are tested here.
Investigation 4: Finally, the regression results can reveal whether, in terms of volume, one of
the three events put particular pressure on parent banks to limit the allocation of funds to their
foreign affiliates. For each event, the degree to which funds were withdrawn from branches and
subsidiaries due to the run-on-repo exposure of the parent bank are quantified. The responses
of banks with high and low exposures to the disruptions are compared with regard to the vol-
umes of funds which the model predicts they will withdraw due to their shock exposure. This
determines in which of the events a relatively large exposure of the parent bank to the run on
repo markets put the most pressure on the net borrowing of branches and subsidiaries from the
parent bank, leaving aside the special treatment of core investment or core funding locations.
Although borrowing conditions on repo markets steadily worsened throughout the crisis (see
description in section 2.1), banks might have sought other funding sources after the first shock
in order to limit their vulnerability to a further deterioration in borrowing conditions. Moreover,
banks might have benefited from rescue measures conducted by central banks. Possibly, this
response reduced the need to withdraw funds from foreign affiliates as the crisis progressed.
4.2 Methodology and variables
The empirical approach is based on the methodology established by CETORELLI AND GOLD-
BERG (2012). For each of the three events, a “pre” and a “post” period is defined. The difference
between average net borrowing of foreign branches or subsidiaries after and before the event
reveals whether the net amount of funds received by a particular branch or subsidiary from the
parent bank subsequently increased or decreased. The time span of the pre and post periods of
each event are marked in the time line of Figure 3.
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For the three events, the dependent variable of the analysis is hence a first-difference variable
defined in the following way, with NetBorrowj corresponding to net liabilities of branch or
subsidiary j vis-à-vis their parent bank:
Subprime market collapse (occurring in 2007m7):
∆NetBorrowj = NetBorrowj | avg(2007m7−2008m2) −NetBorrowj | avg(2007m1−2007m6) (1)
Bear Stearns rescue (occurring in 2008m3):
∆NetBorrowj = NetBorrowj | avg(2008m3−2008m8) −NetBorrowj | avg(2007m8−2008m2) (2)
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (occurring in 2008m9):
∆NetBorrowj = NetBorrowj | avg(2008m9−2009m3) −NetBorrowj | avg(2008m4−2008m8) (3)
The period from 2007m1 to 2007m6 should accurately reflect the average level of net borrowing
of a foreign affiliate before the first repo funding shock, which is the subprime market collapse.
The results are nevertheless robust to extending (up to one year) or shortening (eg to four
months) this time period. Moreover, the results remain unchanged if the collapse of the sub-
prime market is fixed to August instead of July 2007. It is assumed that the level of the affiliate’s
net borrowing from the parent bank after the funding shock manifests itself over the time period
from 2007m7 to 2008m2. The pre and post periods of the second repo funding shock, the Bear
Stearns rescue, are defined by the timing of the other two events, as it is assumed that no other
comparable shock to repo markets occurs during this time period. The post period of the third
event, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, ends in 2009m3. This should exclude direct effects
stemming from central bank measures, such as the covered bond purchase programme (starting
in May 2009), which released the pressure from banks that depended strongly on securitized
banking. The quality of the results remains unchanged if the month in which the respective
event occurred is excluded from the post period.
Note that a reduction in the amount of a branch’s or a subsidiary’s net borrowing from the parent
bank can occur on either the asset side or the liability side of the affiliate’s balance sheet. Either
the parent bank increases the amount of funds previously demanded from the foreign affiliate or
it cuts the provision of funds to the foreign affiliate. It also has to be understood that a negative
outcome of the dependent variable does not necessarily mean that a branch or a subsidiary
becomes a net lender to the parent bank. It can also mean that the support previously given to
the respective entity by the parent bank has been reduced, but that the branch or subsidiary still
remains a net borrower from the parent bank.
The main explanatory variable for the changes in the volumes of funds granted to affiliates is the
exposure of parent banks to the distortions on repo markets just before the respective event (as
defined below). Explanatory variables include further parent-bank specific variables (index i)
from before the respective shock event, variables specific to the foreign affiliate (index j) before
each event, and variables characterizing the host country of the foreign affiliate (index k). The
view on the data yields three cross-sectional datasets, one for each event. Equation (4) is used
to test all three events separately with regard to their effect on the internal fund management of
the bank.
∆NetBorrowj = α0*repo_exposurei + α1*d_sub*repo_exposurei
+β0*Xj + β1*d_sub*Xj + γ*Xi
+η0*Xk + η1*d_sub*Xk + κ*Zk + εj (4)
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where
α0 = A0 +B0*Xj + Γ*Xi +H0*Xk +K*Zk (5)
α1 = A1 +B1*Xj + Γ*Xi +H1*Xk +K*Zk (6)
In order to determine whether the exposure of parent banks to the run on repo had effects on the
net borrowing of subsidiaries that were different than those on net borrowing by branches from
the parent bank, repo_exposurei in equation (4) is interacted with a dummy variable, which
equals one if the affiliate j is a subsidiary (d_sub). Affiliate-specific characteristics and some
characteristics of the host country, which are expected to play different roles for branches and
subsidiaries, are also interacted with this dummy variable.
With equation (5) and (6) plugged into equation (4), the regression equation suggests that
the severance with which the exposure of the parent bank i to the distortions on repo mar-
kets (repo_exposurei) affects changes in the net borrowing position of branches and sub-
sidiaries (∆NetBorrowj) depends on further characteristics of the parent bank (Γ*Xi) as well
as characteristics of the foreign branch j (B0*Xj) or subsidiary j (B1*Xj) and the country k
(H0*Xk orH1*Xk, K*Zk) in which the affiliate is located.
• The repo_exposure of the parent bank is defined as the reliance on repo funding relative
to short-term wholesale funding of the parent bank, in amounts outstanding at the end of
the month prior to the event.10
• Xj are affiliate- (branch- or subsidiary-) specific characteristics, namely the total size of
the affiliate’s balance sheet, the degree to which the affiliate fulfills a core investment role
(share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total lending to the foreign non-
bank private sector, measured in loan stocks outstanding) and the intensity with which
the affiliate takes the core funding role (the affiliate’s local liabilities relative to its total
liabilities). All of these characteristics are calculated as averages over the pre period of the
respective event.11
• Xi is a vector of further parent bank characteristics. It includes the total size of the parent
bank’s balance sheet, parent bank capitalization (equity capital / total assets) and parent
bank liquidity (liquid assets / total assets), all in averages over the pre period of the respective
event.12
• Xk are dummy variables characterizing the host country of the affiliate: d_fin_platform
marks countries which represent financial platforms to German banks. Affiliates which are
located in these countries might have been hit more by the original events, since they were
heavily involved in the trading of securities on international financial markets. Financial
10 Repo funding and short-term wholesale funding of the parent bank exclude positions held vis-à-vis affiliated
banks abroad. Short-term wholesale funding includes interbank liabilities (including repo agreements with
other monetary and financial institutions), own bonds and notes issued and repo agreements with non-banks,
such as central clearing counterparties. Short-term refers to an original maturity of less than one year.
11 The data for calculating these positions are taken from the monthly External Positions Report, which the banks
submitting balance sheet positions fill out as well. It provides a breakdown of banks’ lending and funding abroad
by the different foreign countries (FIORENTINO ET AL. (2010)).
12 Parent banks’ liquid assets are defined as the sum of cash holdings, claims on the central bank, short-term claims
on other (unaffiliated) banks and holdings of short-term securities. Possibly, liquidity is slightly smaller than in
this calculation, because some liquid securities are held on the balance sheet but are in fact lent out, for example,
in a repo and are therefore not immediately available. This should, however, not be the majority of the positions.
The correlation between liquidity and repo exposure is negative and small (-11%), which supports this view.
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platforms are financial centers, mainly offshore (the list is taken from the Financial Sta-
bility Forum (2000)), as well as the UK and the US. These countries are marked with an
asterisk in the list of host countries of German banks’ foreign affiliates (Table 2). Another
dummy is introduced for the euro area, inside which affiliates are geographically close to
the parent bank and operate mainly in the same currency (d_euro_area_no_fin_platform).
Only countries that do not represent major financial platforms are included here in order
to avoid overlapping with the other dummy variable in this category.13
• Zk contains a continuous financial openness indicator (CHINN AND ITO (2008)) for each
country (fin_openness).14 The index increases with the degree of financial openness. As
this indicator is not specific to the mode of operation in these countries (via branches or
subsidiaries), its impact is not estimated separately for the two types of affiliates.
See Tables 1 and 3 for descriptive statistics on the different variables.
4.3 Interpreting the estimated coefficients
If it is true that the exposure of parent banks to the run on repo exerted significant pressure on
the net borrowing of branches from the parent bank, then A0 < 0 (see equation (5)). If the same
applies to subsidiaries, then A0 + A1 < 0 (see equations (5) and (6)). A1 gives the difference
between branches and subsidiaries regarding the change in net borrowing from the parent due
to the parent bank’s run-on-repo exposure. (Investigation 1)
If other affiliate-specific characteristics, such as a core investment or core funding role of a
branch or subsidiary, influenced the degree to which the parent bank’s exposure to the disrup-
tions on repo markets affected net borrowing of this branch or subsidiary, then the corresponding
coefficients estimated within the vector of coefficients B0 (for branches) or B0 + B1 (for sub-
sidiaries) should be significant. A positive sign then means that this particular characteristic (eg
the core investment role of an affiliate) buffers the negative impact on net borrowing stemming
from the parent bank’s exposure to the run on repo. A negative sign means that this character-
istic (eg the core funding role) amplifies the withdrawal of funds from this affiliate in response
to the parent bank’s shock exposure (see equations (5) and (6) as plugged into equation (4)).
(Investigation 2)
In a similar fashion, it is analyzed whether the parent bank having a higher level of capitalization
buffers the impact of the exposure to the run on repo on the internal borrowing of the affiliate.
If the specific coefficient of the vector Γ was estimated to be positive, this would be the case.
(Investigation 3)
13 The quality of the results remains unchanged if, in addition, a dummy variable for emerging markets in Asia
or a dummy variable for eastern European countries is included. Both regions may have been sheltered more
from the withdrawal of funds since they were fairly untouched by the initial shocks and, therefore, represented
important investment markets. However, the dummies turn out insignificant in the regressions.
14 The index is calculated from information given in the Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Export
Restrictions (AREAER) prepared by the International Monetary Fund. It is a de jure financial openness indicator.
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5 Results
Table 4 depicts regression results for the event of the subprime market collapse, Table 5 ad-
dresses the Bear Stearns rescue, and Table 6 reports results for the analysis of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy. Whenever a variable has been interacted with the subsidiary dummy, the
total effect of this variable on a subsidiary (not just the deviation from the effect estimated
for a branch) is reported in the second numerical column of each table. In each regression,
the explanatory variables are jointly significant. Standard errors are clustered by parent bank.
The regression results reported concentrate on the sample of German parent banks and hence
exclude foreign-owned banks, which are likely to fulfill other tasks and have a smaller scope
of action than a parent bank headquartered in Germany. Nevertheless, a robustness check in
section 6 includes foreign-owned banks in the regressions.
5.1 Investigation 1: Transmission of the funding crisis occurs via repo funding
and via bank-internal capital markets
In all three events, it can be shown that the exposure of the parent bank to the distortions
on repo markets (repo_exposure) negatively affected the provision of funds to foreign affiliates
(hence the net borrowing of affiliates from the parent bank, ∆NetBorrow).
After the subprime market collapse (Table 4), the negative impact of the shock hitting short-
term funding possibilities of the parent bank was the same for both branches and subsidiaries.
This can be concluded from the observation that the exposure of the parent to the run on repo
(repo_exposure) is significantly negative for both types of affiliates, and that the two effects
are not statistically different from each other. After the Bear Stearns rescue (Table 5), the
parent bank’s exposure to disruptions on repo markets had a significantly larger impact on
the withdrawal of funds from branches than from subsidiaries. The impact of repo_exposure
on the net borrowing of both types of affiliates is significantly negative (A0 and A0 + A1 are
both significantly negative, see Table 5), and the effect on subsidiaries deviates positively (and
significantly) from that on branches (A1 reported in the last column). Finally, after the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy (Table 6), the repo market exposure of parent banks exerted a negative
pressure on the net borrowing of branches from the parent bank, but not on that of subsidiaries.
Hence, while the parent bank’s exposure to the run on repo had an equally strong impact on
branches’ and subsidiaries’ net borrowing after the subprime market collapse, it had a signifi-
cantly stronger impact on branches after the two subsequent events. In the course of the crisis,
the degree to which funds could be withdrawn from subsidiaries might have declined faster
than from branches because subsidiaries had to continue fulfilling regulatory capital require-
ments, while branches are consolidated into the balance sheet of the parent bank for regulatory
purposes. Especially in the short run, this aspect might have influenced the parent banks’ fund
management decisions. Furthermore, branches had received more support from the parent bank
to begin with, and hence the scope to withdraw funds might have been larger.
In general, after all three events, the internal fund management of the multinational banks
reflects the increasing difficulty experienced by parent banks in rolling over their short-term debt
on repo markets. Their funding difficulties affect, via internal capital markets, the financing of
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their foreign affiliates. This finding supports the idea of the parent bank as the central decision-
making entity of the global bank and reinforces the notion of an organizational pecking order,
which puts the needs of the parent bank first (as described by CETORELLI AND GOLDBERG (2012)
for US banks). Furthermore, the significant impact of the run on repo on bank-internal fund
management provides evidence for the transmission of the funding crisis both through repo
financing on capital markets and through bank-internal capital markets.
5.2 Investigation 2: Fund management pattern dependent on type of affiliate and
crisis episode
According to the results, the fund management of German global banks in the financial crisis
initially followed a pattern of assigning to certain affiliates a core investment role or a core funding
role (as defined in section 4.2). With the parent bank’s increasing exposure to the disruptions
on repo markets, branches with important lending business compared with the rest of the bank
holding company were, at the time of the subprime market collapse, sheltered more from the
withdrawal of funds by the parent bank (see regression results: repo_exposure*core investment
role in Table 4, column “total effect branches”). Subsidiaries which had a greater ability to raise
funds locally fulfilled a core funding role after the subprime market collapse as well as after the
Bear Stearns rescue, the more the parent bank was exposed to the run on repo (see coefficients
for repo_exposure*core funding role in Table 4 and Table 5, column “total effect subsidiaries”).
No effect of either the core investment role or the core funding role can be detected in fund
management following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Table 6).
The results suggest that it was only at the beginning of the financial crisis that parent banks
assigned the core investment role to certain branches, and only branches. The buffering effect
of this role vanishes, however, with the rescue of Bear Stearns. Possibly, this next unexpected
shock to repo funding amplified the parent banks’ needs to limit the provision of funds to foreign
affiliates, resulting in a smaller scope for the stabilization of branches that were important for
lending business abroad. After both the collapse of the subprime market and the rescue of
Bear Stearns, subsidiaries, and only subsidiaries, fulfilled the core funding role the more they
refinanced themselves locally. This may be due to the fact that subsidiaries are more likely to
have a strong standing in the local funding market. When subsidiaries are former stand-alone
banks, which at one point became part of the global bank holding company, they possess a larger
network of depositors and investors than branches, which are often established from scratch.
Branches, on the other hand, have a greater responsibility within the bank holding company for
the provision of loans to the real sector abroad. Moreover, they are more dependent overall on
funding provided by the parent bank (see section 3). These aspects might explain the differences
detected in fund management with regard to branches and subsidiaries.
The pattern followed by the parent banks’ fund management became less clear the longer the
crisis lasted. After the Bear Stearns rescue had taken place, parent banks became less engaged
in protecting core investment locations than they had been after the subprime market collapse.
After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, fund management no longer makes any distinction be-
tween core investment and core funding locations, either for branches or for subsidiaries. Pos-
sibly, the Bear Stearns rescue fomented mistrust in the stability of large global banks, which
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worsened their funding conditions. There was subsequently a decline in the parent banks’ scope
for sheltering affiliates with a more important lending business.
5.3 Investigation 3: Higher parent bank capitalization signals stability after Bear
Stearns rescue
Even if a parent bank’s exposure to the run on repo is large, the bank can avoid losing its counter-
party’s trust if it shows credibly that it is solvent and can withstand shocks to its funding sources.
A bank with a larger share of equity capital in total assets can signal stability to the market in
times of distress (KICK AND KOETTER (2007)). Higher liquidity may help overcome temporary
disruptions to funding sources. Larger banks are more likely to be implicitly guaranteed by the
government (since they are “too big to fail”), which may reduce their probability to default and
thus facilitates the raising of funds from investors. The results show that, after the Bear Stearns
rescue, banks with a higher level of capitalization were better able to buffer the negative impact
on intra-bank borrowing of foreign affiliates, which resulted from their exposure to the run on
repo (see estimated coefficient for repo_exposure*capitalization in Table 5). This is consistent
with the picture that the troubles of Bear Stearns demonstrated for the first time in the financial
crisis that even large banks were seriously vulnerable to the disruptions observed on financial
markets. Therefore, it became more important for these banks to be soundly capitalized, which
signaled high solvency to repo market investors.
5.4 Investigation 4: The repo funding shock’s magnitude compared across events
The negative impact of a high exposure to the disruptions on repo markets on foreign affiliates’
net borrowing from their parent banks was not only significant, but also quite large in scale.
A closer investigation of the repo funding shock across the three different events furthermore
suggests that banks did not react or were unable to react sufficiently to the first event so as to
avoid being notably affected by future repo funding shocks.
The model, as estimated in sections 5.1 to 5.3, predicts that the Bear Stearns rescue was the
event which forced parent banks with a relatively high run-on-repo exposure to conduct the
largest reduction of funds provided to foreign affiliates compared with the other two events. In
order to demonstrate this, for each event the stand-alone effect on net borrowing of affiliates
stemming from a parent bank’s high run-on-repo exposure is compared with the effect stemming
from a low exposure of the parent bank. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 7. The
average exposure of the parent bank to the disruptions on repo markets (hence the average share
of repo funding in overall short-term wholesale funding) is calculated for the group of parent
banks with a high exposure (above the 75th percentile of the distribution) and those with a low
exposure (below the 25th percentile of the distribution) in each of the three events. Then, the
average impact of a high and a low exposure on the net borrowing of branches and subsidiaries is
calculated using the coefficients estimated for the three different events as reported in Tables 4
to 6. As the average parent bank below the 25th percentile of the distribution uses no repo
funding, the impact calculated for an average bank with a high repo exposure signals, at the
same time, the difference between a low and high exposure.
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For both branches and subsidiaries, the average stand-alone effect of a high run-on-repo ex-
posure on the volume of net internal borrowing from the parent bank is predicted to be the
largest after the Bear Stearns rescue (-C2.3 billion or -127% of absolute pre event average net
borrowing for branches, -C1.4 billion or -600% for subsidiaries). The second largest average
withdrawal is predicted for the subprime market collapse (-C1.36 billion or -100% for branches,
-C1.13 billion or -281% for subsidiaries). These figures might appear quite large, but it has to
be kept in mind that they represent the stand-alone effect predicted for a bank with a very high
exposure to disruptions on repo markets, stand-alone meaning that a potential buffering (or
amplifying) effect of other parent or affiliate characteristics is left aside. The short-term whole-
sale funding of this type of bank depended to over 60% on repo financing. While a bank with
a very high exposure to the disruptions is predicted to withdraw larger volumes of funds from
branches than from subsidiaries, the relative impact appears stronger for subsidiaries, since they
were borrowing fewer funds from the parent bank to begin with. After the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, a bank with a high exposure is predicted to having withdrawn C0.72 billion (or
39%) from branches. No significant stand-alone impact can be detected on the net borrowing
of subsidiaries.
These figures suggest that the subprime market collapse had a strong impact on banks’ internal
fund management. However, after this first shock, parent banks did not or were unable to limit
their exposure to future repo funding shocks. The even larger volume of funds that the model
predicts to have been withdrawn after the Bear Stearns rescue suggests that this second shock
severely increased the pressure on parent banks’ short-term refinancing again. After this water-
shed event, parent banks restricted their need to transmit their short-term refinancing problems
via internal capital markets to their foreign affiliates. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, even
though it represented an intensifying shock to confidence on capital markets, was then less
reflected in the movements of funds on internal capital markets.
It is likely that the actions taken by central banks to provide alternative funding possibilities had
an impact as well. The European Central Bank started expanding the Eurosystem’s collateral
framework in October 2008 and lowered the minimum credit rating from A- to BBB- in order to
counter the tensions on interbank markets. Furthermore, the launch of the covered bond pur-
chase programme was announced for May 2009. Covered bonds were widely used as collateral
for obtaining liquidity in the euro area (see FEGATELLI (2010)). These support measures might
have eased the pressure on banks that were strongly dependent on securitized banking.15
6 Robustness of results
6.1 Possible endogeneity of run-on-repo exposure in later events
The main econometric analysis assumes that the ex ante run-on-repo exposure of parent banks is
exogenous to the ex post withdrawal of funds related, respectively, to the subprime market col-
lapse, the Bear Stearns rescue and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Since the three events occurred
15 BUCH ET AL. (2011) show that parts of German bank holding companies also profited via intra-bank spillovers
from the US Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility, which was introduced in June 2008 in response to the Bear
Stearns event.
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successively, this assumption may be very strong. It is conceivable that the amount of funding
provided to a parent bank’s foreign affiliates after the subprime market collapse (on average
during 2007m7-2008m2) is related to the amount of funding which a parent bank obtained via
repo transactions directly before the Bear Stearns rescue (in 2008m2). This could be the case
since a parent bank’s repo funding might be persistent between 2007m7 and 2008m2. Since
the degree to which foreign affiliates were supported via the internal capital market before the
Bear Stearns rescue enters the calculation of the change in net internal borrowing of affiliates in
response to this event, the run-on-repo exposure of the parent bank might be endogenous to the
analysis. Likewise, it is possible that the exposure of parent banks to the repo market distortions
triggered by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is endogenous to the subsequent change in the
provision of funds to foreign affiliates via internal capital markets.
Although the run-on-repo exposure of parent banks is calculated on a different observational
level (the parent bank) than the change in net borrowing of affiliates (the affiliate level), an
instrumental variables approach is conducted as a robustness test. The run-on-repo exposure of
the parent bank at the time of the Bear Stearns rescue and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is
instrumented with its value observed before the subprime market collapse, and hence before the
first event which potentially affected the bank’s repo funding behavior. Due to the time lag, this
instrument can affect the dependent variable in later events only through its own future value,
which is the main explanatory variable in the analysis.
It turns out that the run-on-repo exposure of parent banks from 2007m6 is a valid instrument for
their run-on-repo exposure observed in 2008m2, and thus before the Bear Stearns rescue. This
can be concluded from the first-stage regressions (not reported) of the two-stage-least-squares
estimation as well as from the identification test (see Table 8). Conversely, neither the run-on-
repo exposure of parent banks from before the subprime market collapse nor that from before
the Bear Stearns rescue provide sufficient identification for the exposure of parent banks to the
repo market distortions triggered by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (results not reported).
This finding corroborates the previously stated finding that the exposure of parent banks to
shocks on repo markets was quite persistent throughout the first two episodes of the crisis, but
that it changed after the Bear Stearns rescue as banks adjusted their funding behavior. They
responded to the deterioration of confidence in well-established market participants. As con-
cluded from the main analysis, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy thereafter had a significantly
lower impact on the banks’ internal fund management.
Where the instrumentation of the run-on-repo exposure with an earlier value is valid (in the
event of the Bear Stearns rescue), the regression results are reported in Table 8. The quality of
the results, as obtained from ordinary least squares regression (Table 5), are unchanged in the
instrumental-variables approach. The robustness test thus reinforces the conclusions previously
drawn.
6.2 The branches’ and subsidiaries’ own exposure to short-term funding prob-
lems
Branches and subsidiaries also refinance themselves to some degree on short-term wholesale
funding markets. Following a worldwide shock to these markets, this might have an effect on
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their ability to do without internal support from their parent bank. If, in the course of the
financial crisis, branches and subsidiaries with a greater exposure to shocks to short-term fund-
ing markets were supported to a larger extent by their parent banks, this affiliate characteristic
should then dampen the negative impact of a large run-on-repo exposure of the parent bank.
It is indeed found to be the case that upon the repo funding shock experienced by the parent
after the Bear Stearns rescue, subsidiaries with a larger share of short-term wholesale funding
in total assets were more protected. Possibly, the obligation of subsidiaries to fulfill local regula-
tory capital requirements prompted the need to take the subsidiary’s own short-term refinancing
problems into account with regard to the amount of net borrowing that it was granted.
The main analysis assumes that the deteriorations on repo markets hit, first and foremost, the
parent bank, which then controlled the fund management of the bank. The reliance of affiliates
on repo funding as a specific short-term funding source was presumably very limited in compar-
ison to the parent bank. Branches of German banks have conducted, on average, only 2%-3%
of their short-term wholesale funding via repo markets during the crisis. Parent banks, in con-
trast, have relied, on average, to roughly 20% on this short-term funding source. It is therefore
unlikely that the drying-up of repo markets had large effects on branches. For subsidiaries, no
information on the share of repo funding in short-term wholesale funding is available. Possibly,
it is larger than that of branches, since, in terms of their funding structure, subsidiaries resem-
ble more stand-alone banks. This might be another reason for the observation that subsidiaries
with a greater reliance on short-term wholesale funding, of which repo funding is a part, were
sheltered more from the withdrawal of funds.
6.3 Inclusion of foreign-owned banks in the analysis
Foreign-owned banks were previously excluded from the analysis, as identification relies on the
assumption that the parent bank is the decision-making entity with regard to the fund manage-
ment of the bank. Since foreign-owned banks in Germany (which themselves have branches
and/or subsidiaries) are not the headquarters of bank holding companies, they are very likely to
differ in their operations from German parent banks. When they are included in the regressions,
the quality of the main results (the significant impact of the run-on-repo exposure on the internal
fund management) remains unchanged, except for the event of the subprime market collapse.
Here, the repo exposure of the parent bank is irrelevant. In the other two events, the magnitude
of the effects is slightly smaller. This can result from the fact that foreign-owned banks rely,
on average, less on repo markets than German parent banks (9%-12% for foreign-owned banks
versus 19%-24% for German parent banks, see Table 1).
Regarding the relevance of parent bank characteristics, the regressions which include foreign-
owned banks assign more importance to parent bank liquidity. For foreign-owned banks, which
are not the headquarters of the multinational bank, it might be more important to have liquid
assets available to support own affiliates than to demonstrate solvency to other market partici-
pants. The regressions feature a dummy variable for foreign-owned banks. Upon the shock ex-
perienced due to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, foreign-owned banks withdraw significantly
more funds from their foreign affiliates than domestically-owned banks.
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7 Conclusions
This study uses confidential bank-level data on German parent banks and their foreign branches
and subsidiaries to investigate fund management within the multinational bank upon a shock to
the parent bank’s refinancing possibilities in the course of the financial crisis. It is demonstrated
that the exposure of German parent banks to the disruptions observed on the sale and repurchase
markets (the repo markets) after the subprime market collapse, the Bear Stearns rescue and the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy significantly reduced bank-internal borrowing of funds by foreign
branches and subsidiaries from the parent bank. Hence, the crisis-related shocks to short-term
funding are transmitted via both repo markets and bank-internal capital markets.
In terms of magnitude, the stand-alone effect of the parent banks’ repo market exposure on the
withdrawal of funds from foreign affiliates was strongest, for both branches and subsidiaries,
after the Bear Stearns rescue. Although the collapse of the subprime market in July 2007 rep-
resented a dramatic shock to banks’ short-term refinancing sources, this study finds that banks
did not or were unable to reduce their exposure to these types of disruptions until after the
Bear Stearns failure in March 2008. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008
then triggered less reallocation of funds via bank holding companies’ internal capital markets.
Measures introduced by central banks after the Bear Stearns rescue might also have played a
part in this.
Nevertheless, major differences between the two types of affiliates can be detected regarding
the internal fund management of parent banks. Overall, the empirical analysis predicts fewer
funds to be withdrawn from subsidiaries than from branches due to the parent bank’s run-on-
repo exposure. But these volumes imply a stronger relative effect on subsidiaries, since they
borrowed on a net basis, on average, fewer funds from parent banks to begin with. Subsidiaries
were more likely to be used as “core funding locations” in the early stages of the crisis, while
branches were used more as “core investment locations”; in other words locations within the
bank holding company which were relatively important in delivering credit to the foreign real
sector. Both effects vanish in the course of the crisis, with the use of core funding locations
continuing longer than the protection of core investment locations. This finding suggests that
parent banks’ increasing troubles in rolling-over short-term debt allowed a consistent protection
of major lending markets to an ever decreasing extent, the longer the crisis on debt markets per-
sisted. Better capitalized parent banks felt less impelled to withdraw funds from their foreign
affiliates after the Bear Stearns rescue despite their exposure to the disruptions on repo mar-
kets. All in all, for globally active banks, short-term refinancing aspects at the level of the parent
bank have implications for the whole bank holding company. The difference in the volumes of
funds withdrawn from branches and from subsidiaries might be due not only to different fund-
ing structures, but also to their organizational forms (subsidiaries have to fulfill local regulatory
requirements at all times). This might set incentives to augment the volume of liquidity with-
drawal from branches in times of crisis, and might explain why some global banks have lately
transformed subsidiaries into branches.
It is true that the financial crisis disrupted unsecured funding markets in general, but this study
shows that it also had severe effects on secured funding markets, such as repo markets. The
results presented here furthermore suggest that disruptions to repo markets were already being
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reflected in the internal fund management of multinational banks at the time of the subprime
market collapse. This type of funding was believed to be quite safe before the financial crisis,
but many financial institutions ran from their investments in repo markets when uncertainty
about the value of the collateral and the solvency of the counterparty unexpectedly increased.
Demand for high quality collateral, such as government bonds, rose dramatically in the course
of the crisis. On the European repo market, it is common to use a bundle of government bonds
from euro area countries as collateral in repo transactions. Now that the financial crisis has
triggered a sovereign debt crisis, it has to be asked whether this type of collateral is still of
the high quality that it is believed to be. On aggregate, banks are again increasing the share
of short-term funding carried out via repo transactions, and it has been demonstrated in this
paper that large globally active banks may withdraw funds from their affiliated banks abroad
upon disruptions to these markets. This may affect the efficient allocation of credit to the real
economy. It has to be kept in mind that the next distortion to collateral value might be linked to
the declining creditworthiness of governments.
Another development should be observed closely as well. Growing mistrust among market
participants led to an increase in the percentage of repo transactions settled with central clearing
counterparties (tri-party repo). Although this might help overcome the loss of confidence in repo
markets to some extent, it is leading to large volumes of transactions being concentrated on only
very few institutions. Operational practices within these institutions lead to them providing a
large amount of credit to their borrowers during the day, and settling this position again with
the cash provided by the repo lender at the end of the day (a procedure called “unwinding”).
From their theoretical model, MARTIN ET AL. (2012) draw the conclusion that this creates a
destabilizing effect on the market, and that, on that date, it played a part in the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. The management of liquidity and the administration of collateral deposited
with these institutions should therefore be monitored closely.
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Appendix
A Figures
Figure 1: Aggregate short-term wholesale and repo funding of German parent banks
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
This graph illustrates the dynamics of short-term wholesale funding and repo funding of German
parent banks. It is based on monthly reports of parent banks to the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Repo funding and short-term wholesale funding of the parent bank exclude positions held vis-
à-vis affiliated banks abroad. Short-term wholesale funding comprises funding via interbank
loans (including repo agreements with other monetary and financial institutions), own bonds
and notes issued and repo agreements with non-banks, being, for example, central clearing
counterparties. Short-term refers to an original maturity of less than one year. Foreign-owned
parent banks registered in Germany are not included; however, their influence on the aggregate
is so small that their inclusion would not change the dynamics or the order of magnitude of the
ratios.
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Figure 2: Aggregate net borrowing of branches and subsidiaries from German parent banks
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Source: Own calculations.
The graph depicts aggregate numbers for net borrowing of branches and subsidiaries from Ger-
man parent banks. The series are based on individual reports which each foreign affiliate of a
bank headquartered in Germany reports on a monthly basis to the Deutsche Bundesbank. While
subsidiaries report this position directly, it is approximated for branches to correspond with these
entities’ net borrowing from the German banking sector. For details, see section 4.2 and DÜWEL
AND FREY (2012) who establish this measurement. Affiliates of foreign-owned banks registered
in Germany are not included in the aggregate series. However, their volume of net borrowing is
so small that it does not change the aggregate noticeably.
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Figure 3: Pre and post event periods of intra-bank lending during the financial crisis,
yielding three cross-sectional datasets
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This figure divides the time period of the financial crisis into pre and post periods for the three
events considered in this study as amplifiers of uncertainty on repo markets (the subprime mar-
ket collapse, the Bear Stearns rescue and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). Comparing the post
event and pre event difference of a foreign affiliate’s average net borrowing reveals whether the
level of net amount of funds received from the parent bank increased or decreased in response
to the specific shock. This view of the data yields three cross-sectional datasets, one for each
event. The quality of the regression results for all three events is robust to excluding from the
post period the months in which the shocks occur. The results are also robust to shortening or
extending the pre period of the subprime market collapse.
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B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on German parent banks and their foreign affiliates
Variable Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
Parent bank level
capitalization (equity capital / total assets) 0.042 0.018 0.041 0.019 0.047 0.028
liquidity (liquid assetsa / total assets) 0.036 0.071 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.080
size (total assets) in € billion 85.412 103.884 89.128 108.405 81.989 111.291
repo_exposureb 0.238 0.294 0.229 0.272 0.190 0.265
repo funding / total claims 0.083 0.137 0.086 0.136 0.086 0.187
short-term wholesale funding / total claims 0.223 0.199 0.240 0.215 0.266 0.252
(avg) # of countries served by branches 
and/or subsidiaries 5.6 8.0 5.7 8.3 5.6 8.1
# of parent banks, domestically-owned
# of parent banks, foreign-owned
Affiliate level
Branches
net borrowing from parent bank / total assets 0.392 1.738 -0.006 1.768 0.168 1.387
core investment rolec 0.069 0.134 0.066 0.126 0.067 0.119
core funding roled 0.242 0.258 0.222 0.249 0.231 0.261
size (total assets) in € billion 10.678 50.478 11.188 50.004 9.497 42.432
short-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.306 0.290 0.292 0.294 0.280 0.294
# of branches, domestically-owned
# of branches, foreign-owned
Subsidiaries
net borrowing from parent bank / total assets 0.170 1.169 0.067 0.476 0.257 1.201
core investment rolec 0.044 0.091 0.042 0.088 0.040 0.086
core funding roled 0.351 0.290 0.339 0.284 0.345 0.271
size (total assets) in € billion 5.611 9.658 5.420 9.621 5.449 10.021
short-term wholesale funding / total assets 0.315 0.279 0.283 0.260 0.247 0.237
# of subsidiaries, domestically-owned
# of subsidiaries, foreign-owned 6 3 4
100 101 108
Avg: 2007m1-2007m6 Avg: 2007m8-2008m2 Avg: 2008m4-2008m8
2007m6 2008m2 2008m8
a Sum of cash holdings, claims on the central bank, short-term claims on other (unaffiliated) banks and holdings of short-term securities.
b The repo_exposure of the parent bank is defined as the financing via repurchase agreements relative to overall short-term wholesale 
funding (interbank liabilities, including repo agreements with other monetary and financial institutions, own bonds and notes issued and 
repo liabilities to non-banks). Short-term refers to an original maturity of less than one year.
c Core investment role: share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total lending business to the foreign non-bank private sector 
(measured in loan stock outstanding).
d Core funding role: affiliate’s local liabilities / total liabilities.
Unless otherwise stated, all figures reported refer to domestically-owned banks, hence they exclude foreign-owned banks 
(banks with a foreign majority shareholder). The statistics are based on the regression samples.
Maximums and minimums of bank-specific data are not shown here due to confidentiality.
26 27 28
18 17
178 181 203
Avg: 2007m1-2007m6 Avg: 2007m8-2008m2 Avg: 2008m4-2008m8
2007m6 2008m2 2008m8
42
18
42 48
Avg: 2007m8-2008m2 Avg: 2008m4-2008m8Avg: 2007m1-2007m6
2007m6 2008m2 2008m8
Before Subprime
market collapse
Before Bear Stearns
rescue
Before Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy
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Table 2: List of countries with local presence of German banks
The list contains all countries in which German parent banks have established branches and/or sub-
sidiaries. All figures are listed as of 2007m6.
(*) marks countries which represent financial platforms for German banks (see section 4.2).
(...) stands for data not shown here on grounds of confidentiality.
Country
Aggregate size of 
branches and 
subsidiaries of 
German banks
(in ! billion)
# of parent banks 
operating in this 
country via 
branches and/or 
subsidiaries
Aggregate net 
borrowing of branches 
and subsidiaries from 
German parent banks
(in ! billion)
1 Argentina ! 1 !
2 Australia ! 2 !
3 Austria 1.847 7 -0.797
4 Belgium 9.409 6 -5.476
5 Brazil ! 2 !
6 Canada ! 2 !
7 Cayman Islands * 184.925 10 20.125
8 Chile ! 1 !
9 China 5.327 7 -0.044
10 Czech Republic 3.444 3 -0.509
11 Denmark ! 1 !
12 Finland ! 2 !
13 France 31.625 12 12.004
14 Greece 2.163 3 0.925
15 Guernsey * ! 1 !
16 Hong Kong * 33.837 7 1.193
17 Hungary 10.140 6 0.552
18 India ! 1 !
19 Indonesia ! 1 !
20 Ireland * 64.323 10 8.563
21 Italy 107.590 12 31.687
22 Japan 50.324 6 0.637
23 Jersey * 13.316 3 -0.414
24 Luxembourg * 371.387 23 -19.825
25 Malaysia ! 2 !
26 Mauritius ! 1 !
27 Netherlands 16.187 9 -1.941
28 Netherlands Antilles * ! 1 !
29 New Zealand ! 1 !
30 Pakistan ! 1 !
31 Philippines * ! 1 !
32 Poland 16.711 6 0.136
33 Portugal 6.983 4 -0.776
34 Republic of Korea ! 1 !
35 Russian Federation 3.372 4 1.362
36 Saudi Arabia ! 1 !
37 Singapore * 75.584 10 10.271
38 Slovak Republic ! 1 !
39 South Africa ! 2 !
40 Spain 30.492 9 16.983
41 Sri Lanka (Ceylon) * ! 1 !
42 Sweden 3.072 4 3.023
43 Switzerland * 26.516 11 2.221
44 Taiwan ! 1 !
45 Thailand ! 1 !
46 Turkey ! 2 !
47 United Arab Emirates ! 1 !
48 United Kingdom * 1,097.080 20 100.310
49 United States * 307.444 12 16.704
50 Vietnam ! 1 !
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on host countries of German banks’ affiliates
Country level Obs Mean StD Min Max
Before Subprime market collapse: 2007m6
euro area (excluding financial platforms) 278 0.259 0.439 0 1
financial platform 278 0.518 0.501 0 1
financial openness 278 2.039 1.035 -1.159 2.456
Before Bear Stearns rescue: 2008m2
euro area (excluding financial platforms) 282 0.262 0.441 0 1
financial platform 282 0.511 0.501 0 1
financial openness 282 2.075 0.963 -1.159 2.456
Before Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: 2008m8
euro area (excluding financial platforms) 311 0.283 0.451 0 1
financial platform 311 0.460 0.499 0 1
financial openness 311 2.068 0.963 -1.159 2.456
euro area (excluding financial platforms):
   d_euro_area_no_fin_platform
financial platform:
   d_fin_platform
financial openness:
   fin_openness
De jure financial openness indicator (Chinn and Ito (2008))
Dummy variable: =1 if country is a financial platform for German 
banks (see Table 3 "List of countries")
Dummy variable: =1 if country is a euro area country but no financial 
platform
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Table 4: Regression results: Subprime market collapse
The dependent variable is the change in net borrowing of the affiliate (branch or subsidiary) j from parent bank i
(avg. 2007m8-2008m2 vs. avg. 2007m1-2007m6). The parent bank’s repo_exposure is its share of funding via
repurchase agreements in overall short-term wholesale funding (defined in section 4.2) as of 2007m6. The core
investment role is calculated as the share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total foreign non-bank private
sector lending. The core funding role is the affiliate’s local liabilities relative to total liabilities (all affiliate variables
are avg. 2007m1-2007m6). Financial platforms (dummy variable d_fin_platform) are host countries defined as
important financial centers in section 4.2. The regression sample contains only German domestically-owned banks.
The differentiation of effects between branches and subsidiaries is obtained by interacting with a dummy variable
(d_sub) and by calculating total effects from that.
Standard errors, clustered by parent bank, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable
Change in net borrowing from the parent bank
total effect branches total  effect subsidiaries
Explanatory variables: (d_sub=0) (d_sub=1)
difference:
(Parent bank) repo_exposure -2.091** -1.743* 0.349
(0.860) (0.912) (0.320)
Interaction terms:
Affiliate level:
repo_exposure * core investment role 14.321*** -10.463
(4.393) (11.568)
repo_exposure * core funding role -0.460 -0.718**
(0.443) (0.318)
repo_exposure * size -0.074* 0.057
(0.044) (0.042)
Parent bank level:
repo_exposure * size
repo_exposure * capitalization
repo_exposure * liquidity
Country level:
repo_exposure * d_eurozone_no_fin_platform 0.157 -0.569**
(0.425) (0.043)
repo_exposure * d_fin_platform 0.501 -0.420
(0.355) (0.121)
repo_exposure * fin_openness
Non-interacted terms:
Affiliate level:
core investment role -0.965* -1.065
(0.520) (0.869)
core funding role 0.292 0.106
(0.335) (0.299)
size 0.077 0.048
(0.050) (0.050)
Parent bank level:
size
capitalization
liquidity
Country level:
d_euro_area_no_fin_platform 0.042 -0.118
(0.448) (0.697)
d_fin_platform -0.522* -0.156
(0.295) (0.481)
fin_openness
constant
Observations
Number of parent banks (clusters)
R-squared
42
0.321
(0.365)
0.336
0.017
(0.051)
-0.034
(0.046)
278
(0.002)
-1.130
(1.534)
-0.585
(0.731)
6.182
(7.255)
-0.704
(7.723)
0.001
(shock to funding occurs in 2007m7)
Subprime
 market collapse
0.004
(0.003)
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Table 5: Regression results: Bear Stearns rescue
The dependent variable is the change in net borrowing of the affiliate (branch or subsidiary) j from parent bank i
(avg. 2008m3-2008m8 vs. avg. 2007m8-2008m2). The parent bank’s repo_exposure is its share of funding via
repurchase agreements in overall short-term wholesale funding (defined in section 4.2) as of 2008m2. The core
investment role is calculated as the share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total foreign non-bank private
sector lending. The core funding role is the affiliate’s local liabilities relative to total liabilities (all affiliate variables
are avg. 2007m8-2008m2). Financial platforms (dummy variable d_fin_platform) are host countries defined as
important financial centers in section 4.2. The regression sample contains only German domestically-owned banks.
The differentiation of effects between branches and subsidiaries is obtained by interacting with a dummy variable
(d_sub) and by calculating total effects from that.
Standard errors, clustered by parent bank, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable
Change in net borrowing from the parent bank
total effect branches total  effect subsidiaries
Explanatory variables (d_sub=0) (d_sub=1)
difference:
(Parent bank) repo_exposure -3.714** -2.254* 1.460**
(1.543) (1.219) (0.038)
Interaction terms
Affiliate level
repo_exposure * core investment role 19.711 0.669
(13.022) (13.523)
repo_exposure * core funding role 0.501 -1.802**
(0.659) (0.771)
repo_exposure * size 0.077** -0.074
(0.030) (0.062)
Parent bank level
repo_exposure * size
repo_exposure * capitalization
repo_exposure * liquidity
Country level
repo_exposure * d_eurozone_no_fin_platform 0.055 -0.803**
(0.285) (0.037)
repo_exposure * d_fin_platform -0.294 -0.226
(1.716) (0.463)
repo_exposure * fin_openness
Non-interacted terms
Affiliate level
core investment role -0.437 -1.162
(0.445) (0.855)
core funding role 0.068 0.117
(0.331) (0.377)
size -0.084** 0.052
(0.032) (0.052)
Parent bank level
size
capitalization
liquidity
Country level
d_euro_area_no_fin_platform -0.016 0.168
(0.230) (0.36)
d_fin_platform 0.284 -0.138
(0.498) (0.474)
fin_openness
constant
Observations
Number of parent banks (clusters)
R-squared
282
42
0.155
(0.335)
(0.061)
(1.316)
-0.288
(0.567)
-0.114*
0.532
0.225*
(0.114)
0.000
(0.001)
-1.176
20.128**
(8.653)
0.597
(3.184)
rescue
Bear Stearns
(shock to funding occurs in 2008m3)
0.006**
(0.002)
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Table 6: Regression results: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
The dependent variable is the change in net borrowing of the affiliate (branch or subsidiary) j from parent bank i
(avg. 2008m9-2009m3 vs. avg. 2008m4-2008m8). The parent bank’s repo_exposure is its share of funding via
repurchase agreements in overall short-term wholesale funding (defined in section 4.2) as of 2008m8. The core
investment role is calculated as the share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total foreign non-bank private
sector lending. The core funding role is the affiliate’s local liabilities relative to total liabilities (all affiliate variables
are avg. 2008m4-2008m8). Financial platforms (dummy variable d_fin_platform) are host countries defined as
important financial centers in section 4.2. The regression sample contains only German domestically-owned banks.
The differentiation of effects between branches and subsidiaries is obtained by interacting with a dummy variable
(d_sub) and by calculating total effects from that.
Standard errors, clustered by parent bank, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent variable
Change in net borrowing from the parent bank
total effect branches total  effect subsidiaries
Explanatory variables (d_sub=0) (d_sub=1)
difference:
(Parent bank) repo_exposure -1.224* -0.697 0.526
(0.620) (0.620) (0.206)
Interaction terms
Affiliate level
repo_exposure * core investment role 4.114 -20.744
(2.859) (15.055)
repo_exposure * core funding role 0.055 -0.472
(0.840) (0.921)
repo_exposure * size 0.051 0.025
(0.053) (0.132)
Parent bank level
repo_exposure * size
repo_exposure * capitalization
repo_exposure * liquidity
Country level
repo_exposure * d_eurozone_no_fin_platform -0.772*** -0.978
(0.283) (0.115)
repo_exposure * d_fin_platform 0.134 -1.049**
(0.627) (0.044)
repo_exposure * fin_openness
Non-interacted terms
Affiliate level
core investment role 0.447* 0.830
(0.246) (0.609)
core funding role -0.338* -0.494
(0.175) (0.402)
size -0.044* 0.089
(0.023) (0.061)
Parent bank level
size
capitalization
liquidity
Country level
d_euro_area_no_fin_platform 0.177** -0.204
(0.086) (0.432)
d_fin_platform 0.558** -0.061
(0.208) (0.687)
fin_openness
constant
Observations
Number of parent banks (clusters)
R-squared
(0.164)
311
48
0.409
-0.930***
(0.301)
-0.062
(0.044)
0.204
(0.142)
0.001
(0.001)
-1.679
(1.216)
-5.465
(6.469)
2.922
(6.237)
0.316**
bankruptcy
Lehman Brothers
(shock to funding occurs in 2008m9)
0.003
(0.003)
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Table 7: Stand-alone effect of parent banks’ run-on-repo exposure
This table provides a comparison of the responses of banks with high and low exposures to the disruptions on
repo markets in the three different events. The calculations are based on summary statistics of the branches’
and subsidiaries net borrowing from the parent bank (line a), as well as the parent banks’ repo_exposure (repo
funding/short-term wholesale funding) (line b), and the estimations presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 (line c). The fig-
ures calculated in lines d and e demonstrate in which of the events the model predicts highly exposed parent banks
to withdraw the largest volumes of internal funds from their foreign affiliates, leaving aside the potential buffering
of amplifying effect of other parent or affiliate characteristics.
High repo exposure = above the 75th percentile of the distribution, low repo exposure = below the 25th percentile
of the distribution.
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Table 8: Robustness: Instrumental-variables approach for Bear Stearns rescue
The dependent variable is the change in net borrowing of the affiliate (branch or subsidiary) j from parent bank i
(avg. 2008m3-2008m8 vs. avg. 2007m8-2008m2). The parent bank’s repo_exposure is its share of funding via
repurchase agreements in overall short-term wholesale funding (defined in section 4.2) as of 2008m2.
The regression is estimated using two-stage least squares. The parent bank’s repo_exposure is instrumented with
its repo_exposure as of 2007m6 (before the subprime market collapse). Likewise, other parent bank variables (size,
capitalization, liquidity) are instrumented with earlier values. The model is exactly identified. Statistics on the first
stage regressions (not reported) and the reported Kleinbergen-Paap rank LM-statistic for identification (which is
robust to clustered standard errors) suggest that the instruments are sufficiently strong in explaining the endogenous
regressors. Standard errors, clustered by parent bank, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
The core investment role is calculated as the share of the affiliate in the bank holding company’s total foreign non-
bank private sector lending; the core funding role is the affiliate’s local liabilities relative to total liabilities (all affiliate
variables are avg. 2007m8-2008m2). Financial platforms (dummy variable d_fin_platform) are host countries defined
as important financial centers in section 4.2. The regression sample contains only German domestically-owned banks.
The differentiation of effects between branches and subsidiaries is obtained by interacting with a dummy variable
(d_sub) and by calculating total effects from that.
Dependent variable
Change in net borrowing from the parent bank
total effect branches total  effect subsidiaries
Explanatory variables (d_sub=0) (d_sub=1)
difference:
(Parent bank) repo_exposure -4.749** -3.452** 1.297**
(1.995) (0.037) (0.586)
Interaction terms
Affiliate level
repo_exposure * core investment role 19.112 -12.277
(12.181) (0.455)
repo_exposure * core funding role 0.600 -1.721**
(0.480) (0.013)
repo_exposure * size 0.081* -0.119**
(0.044) (0.027)
Parent bank level
repo_exposure * size
repo_exposure * capitalization
repo_exposure * liquidity
Country level
repo_exposure * d_eurozone_no_fin_platform 0.378 -0.492
(0.350) (0.186)
repo_exposure * d_fin_platform 0.618 0.057
(1.685) (0.872)
repo_exposure * fin_openness
Non-interacted terms
Affiliate level Yes Yes
Parent bank level
Country level Yes Yes
constant
Observations
Number of parent banks (clusters)
R-squared
Underidentification (H0: Not identified)
Kleinbergen-Paap rank LM-statistic
p-value (Chi-sq (1))
Exogeneity of explanatory variables (H0: Exogenous)
Robustified Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic
p-value 0.000
F(19,41) = 170.372
9.661
0.002
0.987**
(0.473)
282
42
0.147
17.342***
Yes
Bear Stearns rescue
- two-stage least squares -
(shock to funding occurs in 2008m3)
0.007***
(0.003)
(6.550)
3.982
(4.100)
0.258**
(0.114)
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V German banks in financial centers:
How risky is their business?
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Abstract
German banks’ financial center affiliates are on aggregate four times as large as the affiliates
located elsewhere, and their balance sheet total is half the size of the German parent banks’
aggregate total assets. Besides, they are strongly connected with financial players in other
financial centers, which makes them susceptible to distress in financial markets. German
banks’ affiliates in financial centers operate predominately as branches as opposed to sub-
sidiaries. This promotes the transmission of shocks to the parent bank due to the balance
sheet consolidation for regulatory purposes. Financial center affiliates constantly have to roll
over large amounts of short-term debt. As a consequence, they required larger injections of
liquidity from their parent banks during the recent financial crisis. Balance sheet risk for
parent banks is most likely to arise from financial center branches, as they are in general
weakly capitalized, and as a change in accounting rules reveals since December 2010 their
strong, formerly off-balance sheet involvement in derivatives trading.
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1 Introduction
While expanding their business internationally during the past decade, many banks established
important affiliates in major financial centers such as Luxembourg or the Cayman Islands. The
financial crisis has revealed the potential of financial shocks being transmitted via international
financial platforms where assets are traded globally and interdependence of financial institutions
is very high. It is therefore of particular importance to understand how banks make use of
international financial centers.
This paper seeks to clarify the role of foreign affiliates of German banks located in financial
centers, and to provide first steps in analyzing whether they represented or still represent a
source of risk to the stability of German multinational banks. For this purpose, a closer look is
taken at the development of the financial center affiliates’ assets and liabilities during the finan-
cial crisis, relative to other affiliates of German banks located outside these centers. Detailed
data on German banks’ foreign branches and subsidiaries reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank
allow a deeper analysis of the affiliates’ individual balance sheets, which is not possible using
reports made to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or data provided by individual host
countries.
Many empirical studies on international banking include a lump-sum control for characteristics
of banks located in financial centers, but do not discuss these differences in more detail. Partly
due to the lack of bank-level data, the literature on the role of foreign banks’ affiliates in financial
centers is rather limited. With a macroeconomic perspective, ERRICO AND MUSALEM (1999)
investigate legal and tax regimes of financial centers and state that greater leeway for balance
sheet management in these centers leads to higher solvency risk for banks. They highlight the
role of financial center affiliates of Asian and Latin American banks in several regional crises
during the 1980s and 1990s. These affiliates had built up unhedged exposures which were
concentrated on very few asset types. Besides, they had provided extensive funding to their
parent banks, which ran into trouble as their financial center affiliates experienced large losses.
WILLIAMS ET AL. (2005) analyze the costs and benefits for countries of becoming an offshore
financial center using data on realized government revenues in existing financial centers. They
point to potential risk stemming from bank affiliates in financial centers as they become even
larger than their parent banks. DIXON (2001) compares consolidated and locational claims of
BIS reporting banks on financial centers in order to determine the intermediation function of
these platforms for several BIS reporting countries. She stresses the potential risk stemming from
unobserved off-balance sheet activity of banks in financial centers, on which no data exist. ROSE
AND SPIEGEL (2007) regard this very aspect as one of the major risks arising from financial
centers. They assess the influence of offshore financial centers on neighboring countries and
come to the conclusion, that loose regulation in financial centers encourages “bad behavior” on
the part of source country banks, eg the building up of large off-balance sheet activity. Focusing
on Chinese direct investment into financial centers, SHARMAN (2012) emphasizes the advantage
of these locations as points of access to international capital markets. Furthermore, he states that
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they are platforms where investors can establish links to profitable investments in, for example,
developing countries.
According to LEWIS (1999), financial centers have either evolved from places which used to
have the largest amount of capital to export (eg New York and London), or which have aimed at
diversifying away from agriculture and tourism (eg the Cayman Islands). With new technology
becoming available, some financial centers have become more and more specialized in providing
international managerial and support services such as clearing (eg Luxembourg). In order to
encourage this development, many financial centers have established favorable fiscal and legal
systems, which render bank business more profitable than elsewhere. In terms of the number of
financial centers that have evolved over time and the volume of transactions carried out there,
ERRICO AND MUSALEM (1999) called this a “pervasive practice” early on. The locational claims
of BIS banks on the Cayman Islands, for example, amounted to 600 times its nominal GDP at the
end of 2012. For comparison, BIS banks’ locational claims on Germany were 0.5 times nominal
German GDP.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes financial centers as “jurisdictions whose fi-
nancial sector accounts for a significant - and disproportionate - share of its domestic economy”
(DARBAR (2003)). These jurisdictions are also often called “offshore” financial centers, high-
lighting the fact that the lion’s share of financial interactions of these locations is carried out
with non-residents. Besides, these locations are often said to be “jurisdictions where offshore
banks are exempt from a wide range of regulations which are normally imposed on onshore
institutions” (ERRICO AND MUSALEM (1999)). There exists, however, no clear-cut definition of
financial centers. In 2000, the Financial Stability Forum launched an assessment program in
order to address regulatory deficits in several financial centers, and drew up a list of countries
hosting major financial centers for this purpose, which this study relies on in the main.
The aggregate size of German banks’ financial center affiliates exceeds the size of affiliates out-
side financial centers by a factor of three. Besides, they are about half the aggregate size of
their German headquarters. Both figures highlight the relevance of financial center affiliates
for German banks. Activities in financial centers are mainly carried out via branches, which
do not fulfill local regulatory requirements and therefore allow greater flexibility regarding the
management of balance sheets. This is reflected by low levels of capitalization. In their loan
portfolio, financial center affiliates, and financial center branches in particular (a share of al-
most 90%), focus on lending to banks and firms in financial centers. In doing so, they lend,
however, more across borders than affiliates located outside financial centers. Besides, they are
highly involved in trading securities, which put particular pressure on their stability during the
financial crisis and required increased support from parent banks.
Furthermore, it is striking that financial center affiliates have to constantly roll over large
amounts of short-term debt. During the financial crisis, funding obtained from the parent bank
is found to compensate for difficulties of financial center affiliates in particular to tap short-term
wholesale funding markets. Since December 2010, new accounting rules require banks to report
trading portfolio derivatives as part of the balance sheet position “other assets”. This dramati-
cally increases the share of these assets in the total balance sheets of financial center branches
and likely reveals part of the off-balance sheet risk which these entities have built up.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the group of financial
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center countries and investigates the location and size of German banks’ financial center affili-
ates. Section 3 analyzes in detail the asset structure and the funding sources of branches and
subsidiaries in financial centers and compares them with affiliates outside financial centers. In
section 4, paths for further research and data limitations with regard to the analysis of risk in
financial centers are discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 How large is the German banks’ investment in financial centers?
2.1 Defining financial centers
This paper relies, in principle, on the FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM’s list of financial centers
(2000). First, all “financial centers with significant offshore activities” are included1, as well
as “major financial centers”, which also received the questionnaires for offshore supervisors2.
Furthermore, in this study, the United Kingdom and the Unites States are classified as financial
centers. This decision is based on several considerations. First, ZOROMÉ (2007), following the
initiative of the IMF, developed an identification scheme for offshore financial centers based
on macroeconomic characteristics. His results strengthen the IMF’s definition, but also call for
the UK to be regarded as a financial center. In view of the presence of foreign banks and the
dominance of international banking, CASSIS (2006) sees both the UK and the US as offshore
financial centers. For both countries, BIS consolidated foreign claims are smaller than locational
foreign claims, which hints at a strong presence of foreign banks in both locations transacting
with other countries (MILESI-FERRETTI ET AL. (2010)). Almost all of the existing German banks’
affiliates in the UK are located in London, one of the world’s largest financial centers. Similarly,
with negligible exceptions, the existing German affiliates in the US are located in New York
or Delaware. The US has established the “International Banking Facilities”, a booking concept
which allows banks to conduct international banking under more favorable tax rules. According
to the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (2007A), the majority of International Banking
Facilities are registered in New York, as New York has established laws to facilitate the estab-
lishment of International Banking Facilities and has exempted net income derived from such
facilities from state and local taxes. Delaware has become the most popular state in which to
host holding companies, under which many foreign banks operate, since it has a very favorable
tax and legal environment.
2.2 Location and size of German banks’ financial center affiliates
The data used in this study stem from the reporting of banks to the Deutsche Bundesbank. All
banks registered in Germany report, on a monthly basis, balance sheet characteristics of the Ger-
man part of the bank, as well as of all its foreign affiliates (branches and subsidiaries).3 Branches
1 These are Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Gibraltar, UK Channel Islands (Guernsey, Isle of
Man, Jersey), Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Macau, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands
Antilles, Nevis, Niue, Panama, St Kitts, Saint Lucia, St Vincent, Samoa, Seychelles, Turks & Caicos Islands,
Vanuatu.
2 These include Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland.
3 Reports of subsidiaries are submitted if the German bank is the majority shareholder.
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do not fulfill regulatory capital requirements in their host countries but are consolidated into
the balance sheet of the parent bank, whereas subsidiaries represent own legal entities. While
subsidiaries are covered indiviually in the reports, activities of a bank’s foreign branches are
aggregated by foreign country. In addition to the standard balance sheet positions, all of the
mentioned entities of the bank file an additional “Foreign Positions Report” (see FIORENTINO
ET AL. (2010)). This allows for an identification of foreign activities vis-à-vis individual foreign
countries and sectors within those countries.
Table 1 provides a list of countries with major financial centers in which German banks had
established foreign affiliates by the end of 2006. Table 2 serves to compare the presence of banks
in financial centers with their engagement in other foreign countries. Both the large number of
banks with foreign affiliates in financial centers and the size of these affiliates underline the
importance of the centers for German banks.
By the end of 2006, 39 German banks had established affiliates in 13 financial center countries,
almost as many as across all other 47 countries (42 German banks). The majority of banks
had representations in the financial centers of Luxembourg (26) and the United Kingdom (25),
while Italy and Austria were the most popular among the non-financial center countries (in both
countries, 16 banks had established affiliates by December 2006). The aggregate balance sheet
size of financial center affiliates is roughly four times the aggregate size of non-financial center
affiliates (roughly C2 trillion versus C1/2 trillion). Even if the US and the UK are excluded
from the list of the 13 financial center countries, the remaining financial center affiliates in
11 countries are, on aggregate, larger than the non-financial center affiliates in the 47 other
countries. The distribution of total assets between financial center affiliates and non-financial
center affiliates does not change much between 2006m12 and 2012m12. The same applies to
the number of banks active in the two categories of countries.
Individual financial centers host rather large affiliates. The overall size of affiliates in the Cay-
man Islands, for example, is on its own already larger than the size of all affiliates in Austria
and France taken together. In view of the large balance sheet size of German banks’ financial
center affiliates, it is of particular importance that parent banks control the risk associated with
these affiliates effectively. For this purpose, it is important that supervisors of home and host
country cooperate in order to achieve consolidated supervision of the respective bank holding
companies (FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM (2000)).
In financial centers, aggregate balance sheet size of affiliates splits into 76% to 24% between
branches and subsidiaries, whereas the difference in aggregate size is much smaller in non-
financial center countries. There, branches account for roughly 42% of the aggregate size of all
affiliates. German banks thus operate in financial centers mainly through branches, while sub-
sidiaries are more important outside financial centers. The dominance of branches in financial
centers means that potential risk is more easily transmitted to the parent bank, as the common
balance sheet facilitates transfers between the two entities of the bank holding company.
Furthermore, the aggregate size of all parent banks at that time was around C4 trillion. This
means that all German parent banks together were only twice as large as their financial center
affiliates (C2 trillion, see Table 1). This ratio highlights the relevance of financial center affiliates
for German multinational banks, and the need to control the risk taken by these affiliates.
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3 The role of financial center affiliates for German banks
3.1 Strong focus on financial markets
During the recent financial crisis, the risk associated with some operations in financial mar-
kets was largely underestimated. Banks which were highly active on these markets therefore
had to cope with substantial losses after the collapse of the US subprime market triggered a
world-wide financial crisis and harmed the functioning of financial markets. However, in gen-
eral, investments made on financial markets, in particular the trading of securities, are more
volatile than, for example, bank lending to the real sector. This section analyzes to what extent
German banks’ affiliates in financial centers focus on intermediation on financial markets versus
traditional bank lending.
Securities holdings and portfolio trading characterize financial center affiliates
The four panels in Figure 1 show a breakdown of German banks foreign affiliates’ assets at three
points in time: 2006m12 characterizes the situation before the outbreak of the financial crisis,
2009m12 captures the structure of balance sheets after the first phase of the crisis and before the
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. 2012m12 stands for the situation as it is found today. All
statistics distinguish between branches and subsidiaries and show aggregates of the two types
of affiliates for those located in financial centers and those located elsewhere.
When comparing branches and subsidiaries in financial centers (top row of Figure 1) with their
equivalents outside financial centers (bottom row of Figure 1), it is striking that both types of
affiliates in financial centers hold a larger percentage of their total assets as securities. At the end
of 2006, the share of securities holdings in total assets of branches in financial centers amounted
to 24%, and those of subsidiaries in financial centers to 35%. Their equivalents outside financial
centers held 15% and 16% respectively. This reflects the fact that financial center affiliates
are more heavily invested in securities and probably participate to a greater extent in trading
securities on financial markets. For all categories of affiliates, the share of securities holdings in
total assets shrank during the financial crisis, in particular for financial center subsidiaries. This
is probably the outcome of sales and a loss in value of many securities related to the collapse of
the US subprime market.
The degree to which securities holdings decreased for financial center branches is overshadowed
by a change in the accounting rules which was introduced at the end of 2010. Since then, banks
report trading portfolio derivatives as part of the balance sheet position “other assets”, while
these derivatives were held off-balance sheet before. The dramatic change in balance sheet
compositions, in particular for financial center branches, again reflects, that an important part
of these entities’ business is to trade on financial markets. Since this business is mostly short-
term and generally more volatile than traditional bank lending, the business model of financial
center branches, as it is today, might add to the parent banks’ risk of having to provide rapid
support during market downturns.
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Financial centers mainly lend to each other
The focus of financial center branches’ and subsidiaries’ assets clearly lies on financial markets.
First, in 2006m12, financial center branches and subsidiaries (top row of Figure 1), used only
37% and 16%, respectively, of their balance sheets for lending to foreign firms4. For compari-
son, the lion’s share of the balance sheet of branches and subsidiaries outside financial centers
(bottom row of Figure 1) consisted in lending to foreign firms (almost 50% of the balance sheet
in 2006m12).
Second, according to Figure 2, financial center affiliates hold a very large share of claims vis-à-
vis counterparties to financial centers. Financial center branches direct 85% of their lending to
banks and firms in financial centers. Financial subsidiaries’ loan portfolio is, at 30% to 50% of
lending to financial centers, more balanced between the two categories of destinations. How-
ever, the share of loans that they grant to counterparties in financial centers is still significantly
higher than the proportion of loans given to financial centers by branches and subsidiaries lo-
cated outside those centers (both direct only between 5% and 20% of their total lending to
financial centers).
On the one hand, in the event of a shock hitting first and foremost financial markets, a high
concentration of assets on these markets, as can be found, in particular, in the case of financial
center branches, most certainly limits the affiliates’ ability to compensate possible losses. This, in
turn, increases the risk for parent banks of having to step in and provide emergency assistance.
On the other hand, this focus on financial markets brings about deeper and more liquid markets
with a highly specialized labor force. Parent banks may profit from this, as information on the
development of global credit and funding markets is transmitted faster to the headquarter. It
has to be admitted that affiliates outside financial centers are in a similar situation. Although
they might be more sheltered from shocks hitting financial markets, they are highly exposed to
economic slowdowns hitting the non-bank private sector. At the same time, their specialization
on lending to the real sector of their country of residence might induce the bank’s local success.
A large exposure to financial centers might, however, lead to higher balance sheet risk than a
comparably large exposure to other economies. This arises from the fact that financial markets
are highly connected with each other. As mentioned above, the lion’s share of lending by fi-
nancial center affiliates is directed to financial centers (Figure 2). Furthermore, as shown in
Figure 3, the share of lending to local rather than foreign banks and firms is much smaller for
financial center affiliates than it is for non-financial center affiliates. While financial center sub-
sidiaries have recently lent 60% locally, subsidiaries outside financial centers grant 80%-90% of
their total bank and firm loans to local counterparties. Branches in financial centers lend only
around 40% locally, while their equivalents outside financial centers focus on local lending to the
tune of 80%. A shock hitting one financial center might therefore quickly affect other financial
centers. This risk of contagion is brought forward for example by GARRATT ET AL. (2011). By
contrast, if one affiliate located outside a financial center suffers from a local economic down-
turn, then this will be less likely to drag down other affiliates, as those located outside financial
centers are mostly exposed to their country of residence. This very concentrated exposure cer-
tainly is disadvantageous from a diversification point of view if local problems arise. Still, parent
4 The term “firms” is used to describe lending to the foreign non-bank private sector. The term “foreign” applies
to all countries but Germany, hence it also applies to the affiliate’s country of residence.
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banks then have the chance to isolate and solve the temporary difficulties. By contrast, in the
case of a financial center crisis, necessary support measures for affiliates may soon exceed the
parent banks’ capacity due to the high interconnectedness of financial centers with each other.
3.2 Maturity structure of assets and liabilities
Short-term assets dominate financial center affiliates’ lending portfolio
Figure 4 shows the share of short-term claims in total claims on banks and firms of all four groups
of affiliates. Both branches and subsidiaries in financial centers (top panels) hold relatively
more short-term claims on foreign firms than their equivalents outside financial centers (bottom
panels). For branches, this difference is particularly striking. While branches outside financial
centers grant only around 35% of their loans to foreign firms on a short-term basis, financial
center branches lend roughly 60%-70% on a short-term basis. This higher degree of short-term
lending reflects once more the large interaction of financial centers with each other. Branches
and subsidiaries in financial centers probably lend more to financial firms such as hedge funds
or investment vehicles, which engage more in short-term assets and securities trading activities
and less in longer-term investments in, for example, plant and equipment. These activities in
general increase the default risk of loans, particulary in a financial crisis.
However, due to the shorter-term structure, balance sheets of branches and subsidiaries in fi-
nancial centers seem to be more liquid. This is likely to increase their potential to buffer shocks
to their portfolio and can thus reduce the risk of transmitting disruptions to the parent banks.
After the outbreak of the financial crisis, branches in financial centers, whose balance sheets
were the most liquid before the crisis, seem to have used this buffer the most. They were at the
forefront of letting short-term loans to foreign firms expire, which led to a drop in the share of
short-term lending to foreign firms by 12 percentage points.
When comparing the situations before and after the financial crisis, 2006m12 and 2012m12, the
maturity structure of loans granted to foreign firms lengthened slightly across all four groups of
affiliates. Vis-à-vis foreign banks, financial center affiliates (top panels of Figure 4) reduced or
kept stable their short-term claims relative to longer-term claims. In contrast, affiliates outside
financial centers (bottom panels of Figure 4) increased slightly the share of loans to banks which
are granted on a short-term basis. A possible explanation for this development could be that,
in the light of increasing opacity of risk incorporated in many banks’ balance sheets, branches
and subsidiaries outside financial centers had been downsizing their longer-term investments in
other banks, and instead concentrated on their core business, which is longer-term lending to
firms. Besides, they could have aimed at increasing the liquidity of their asset portfolios after
the financial crisis had rendered the economic environment less predictable. If one assumes that
investments in other banks have become more risky since the financial crisis due to remaining
toxic assets in many banks’ balance sheets, then affiliates outside financial centers have lately
downsized the risk of their lending portfolio by shortening the maturity of loans to foreign banks.
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Large rollover risk in financial centers
Financial center affiliates not only issue relatively more short-term loans - they also finance their
business to a larger extent on short-term wholesale markets. The liability structure of all four
groups of affiliates is depicted in Figure 5 as of 2006m12, 2009m12 and 2012m12. Branches
in financial centers are the group which uses short-term wholesale funding the most, meaning
interbank funding with an original maturity of less than one year as well as own bonds and
notes issued. Before the financial crisis, this group raised 43% of its total funding via short-term
wholesale markets, compared to 25% obtained by branches outside financial centers. When
located in financial centers, subsidiaries used short-term wholesale funding to a similar extent
as branches, but they reduced or had to reduce their funding via this market earlier in the
financial crisis. By the end of 2012, both types of financial center affiliates had raised 25% of
their total funding on short-term wholesale markets.
However, the development of the branches’ liability portfolios is again overshadowed by the
change in the accounting rules implemented in 2010m12. In the liability composition as of
2012m12, liabilities arising from trading portfolio derivatives are reported as other liabilities.
This increases the share of this funding source in total liabilities, and reduces the share of short-
term wholesale funding. Yet, as most of these newly reported liabilities are probably of a short-
term nature as well, the dominance of short-term liabilities of financial center branches is still
striking. In total, over 50% of the liabilities of financial center branches were thus short-term at
2012m12.
Subsidiaries outside financial centers can rely much more, and branches outside financial centers
slightly more, than their financial center equivalents on deposit funding, ie on funding obtained
from non-banks. This funding source adds stability to the liability portfolio of non-financial
center affiliates, as it is less volatile and generally longer-term than wholesale funding. During
the financial crisis, the share of deposits in total liabilities remained rather stable for all types
of affiliates except branches in financial centers. The higher degree of interaction with financial
firms might explain the relatively large decline in deposits as a share of total liabilities. It has
to be kept in mind that, at the time, counterparties like special purpose vehicles were realizing
dramatic losses due to the collapse of the subprime market. Therefore, they might have with-
drawn their deposits from banks. Again, the change in accounting rules might also impact on
the variation in deposits relative to total liabilities.
The comparably larger reliance on short-term funding by affiliates located in financial cen-
ters versus outside financial centers creates greater exposure to rollover risk. Especially when
providers of short-term funds such as other banks lose confidence in market participants, as oc-
curred during the financial crisis, this will hit financial center affiliates sooner and stronger than
other affiliates due to the maturity structure of their liabilities. In a systemic crisis, it has proved
to be advantageous if a bank has access to longer-term deposit funding. Many banks have there-
fore aimed at increasing the share of funding from non-banks in total liabilities. Parent banks
holding affiliates which rely largely on short-term funding have to be prepared to compensate
possible shortfalls during a funding crisis.
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3.3 Capitalization
Branches in general very weakly capitalized
As can be concluded from Figure 5, equity capital represents only a small fraction of total liabil-
ities of all groups of affiliates. Subsidiaries are generally better capitalized than branches, both
in and outside financial centers. Figure 6 traces in more detail the development over time of the
affiliates’ equity capital to total liabilities. The large difference in the level of capitalization be-
tween branches and subsidiaries is striking. While branches have only 1%-2.5% of equity capital
relative to total liabilities, subsidiaries hold roughly between 4% and 7% of equity capital. This
reflects the obligation of subsidiaries to fulfill local regulatory rules, including minimum capital
requirements. However, their stock of equity capital is likely to include buffers. For comparison,
German parent banks hold on aggregate roughly 4% of equity capital relative to total liabili-
ties. Being own legal bank entities themselves, subsidiaries are therefore rather well capitalized.
Branches, by contrast, would be undercapitalized if they did not have unconditional access to
the parent banks’ resources.
When capitalization is low, affiliates are by themselves unable to compensate large losses.
Branches are therefore most likely to need support from the parent bank, in particular when
they are located in financial centers. In the recent financial crisis, due to their exposure to the
disruptions on financial markets, banks located in financial centers registered rather large de-
faults on loans and massive depreciations of securities. Branches in financial centers probably
experienced the largest losses of all groups of affiliates, and were at the same time the least suf-
ficiently capitalized group. To avoid an erosion of their capital base, many foreign affiliates of
multinational bank holding companies most likely tapped the internal capital market organized
by their parent banks.
Financial center subsidiaries increasingly well capitalized
According to Figure 6, financial center branches and subsidiaries dispose of less equity capital
relative to total liabilities than their equivalents outside financial centers. While the difference
between the two types of branches amounts to only half a percentage point on average over
time, financial center subsidiaries had an equity capital ratio of roughly one to one and a half
percentage points below the ratio of subsidiaries outside financial centers. Since mid-2009,
however, financial center subsidiaries have increased their aggregate capital ratio to almost the
level of non-financial center subsidiaries. Both now hold between 6% and 7% of equity capital
relative to total liabilities. This adjustment might be driven by the increasing need for capital
buffers in connection with impending losses in the sovereign debt crisis. Branches, by contrast,
have slightly reduced their capital buffers since 2009, although the changes occurred on a much
smaller scale.
The relevance of the capital ratio, as defined here, will most likely increase in the near future.
US regulators have proposed implementing a stricter leverage rule for bank holding companies
above a certain size. This would entail insured depository institutions such as subsidiaries of
these bank holding companies being considered “well capitalized” only if they had a capital ratio
(also called “leverage ratio”) of around 8% (BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
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SYSTEM (2013), the ratio might be slightly lower if IFRS is used as the reporting standard rather
than US GAAP, on which this figure is based).5
3.4 Reliance on funding provided by the parent bank
The lower level of capitalization of branches compared to subsidiaries, as well as their use of
deposit funding to a lesser degree, suggest that they rely more on parent bank funding. The
liability portfolio compositions in Figure 5 demonstrate this. Irrespective of their country of res-
idence, German banks’ foreign branches generally use more parent bank funding on a regular
basis (accounts payable to the parent bank) than subsidiaries.6 Before the crisis (in 2006m12),
branches in financial centers relied to an extent of 21% on parent bank funding, while sub-
sidiaries in financial centers only received about 14% of total funding from the headquarter (see
top row of Figure 5). The difference between branches and subsidiaries is even more drastic
for entities located outside financial centers (bottom row of Figure 5). Branches outside finan-
cial centers used parent bank funding for 37% of their business in 2006m12, while subsidiaries
outside financial centers only received 9% of their funding from parent banks (bottom row of
Figure 5). A larger reliance on parent bank funding generally increases the responsibility for
parent banks to provide liquidity assistance on a regular basis.
Parent bank funding replaced short-term wholesale funding in the crisis
In the financial crisis, all four groups of affiliates increased the share of parent bank funding
in total liabilities. The increase mirrors the decline in short-term wholesale funding during the
first stage of the financial crisis. This enforces the impression that during the crisis parent bank
funding was used to compensate for the decline in interbank and market funding, not only by
financial center affiliates. The largest increase in parent bank funding in total liabilities occurred
for subsidiaries outside financial centers (+14 percentage points), which had relied the least on
parent bank funding before the crisis. However, they reverted in part the increase in funding
via parent banks between 2009m12 and 2012m12, and instead returned to a higher degree of
short-term wholesale funding.
In contrast to these subsidiaries outside financial centers, subsidiaries in financial centers con-
tinued to expand their borrowing from the parent bank between 2009m12 and 2012m12, too,
and could not return to higher levels of market funding. Those subsidiaries might have been
more deeply involved in the sovereign debt market, which was hit by the subsequent stage of
the crisis when banks had to incur extensive write-downs on sovereign bonds from European
peripheral states.
This development suggests that a high level of borrowing from the parent bank on a regular
basis does not per se increase the risk for parent banks stemming from the affiliates’ balance
5 Most branches of foreign banks in the US are not insured depository institutions (FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK (2007B)). Therefore, this rule will most likely be applied to only the banks’ subsidiaries, for which
deposit insurance is available.
6 While subsidiaries report their assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the parent bank explicitly, it has to be approximated
for branches. DÜWEL AND FREY (2012) find that branches’ claims and liabilities vis-à-vis the German banking
sector (excluding the central bank) provide a fairly well approximation for the position vis-à-vis the parent bank,
as branches rarely interact with domestic banks other than their own headquarter. This approach is implemented
here.
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sheets. During the crisis, affiliates which had the largest difficulties to keep up their short-
term wholesale funding increased the most their reliance on parent bank funding as a share of
total liabilities. This development was not solely linked to affiliates residing in financial centers.
These difficulties arose during the financial crisis from increasing uncertainty about the riskiness
of the affiliates’ asset portfolio as well as from a worsened economic outlook.
Net support by parent banks in the crisis greatest for financial center affiliates
As mentioned above, funds regularly flow between parent banks and affiliates, not only in times
of crisis. Liquidity may be shifted to affiliates for funding purposes, but may also be withdrawn
from affiliates by the parent bank in order to prioritize other activities such as domestic lending.
The net liabilities of affiliates to the parent bank therefore provide another insight into the role
of the different groups of affiliates within the banking organization. Figure 7 shows this net
position, ie the aggregate net borrowing of affiliates from the parent bank, scaled by aggregate
total foreign assets of the affiliates (hence by the volume of the business which these affiliates
carry out abroad).
Before 2007, foreign subsidiaries of German banks, both in and outside financial centers, were
net providers of funds to their parent banks. This means that they were used as net funding
sources by parent banks, possibly due to their greater ability to raise funds locally compared
to branches. Subsidiaries, being own legal entities and often former stand-alone banks, usually
have a greater network in place to attract deposits. This is reflected in their negative net bor-
rowing position vis-à-vis parent banks. The situation changed, however, in the first stage of the
financial crisis. Since mid-2007, subsidiaries have been net borrowers from their parent banks,
as have branches. Compared with net borrowing of non-financial center affiliates, net reliance of
financial center affiliates on their parent banks increased more strongly after the collapse of the
subprime market in mid-2007 and again with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. This development was probably due to losses which financial center affiliates had to re-
alize, as defaults and impairments had to be recognized in relation to receivables and securities
in the aftermath of the crisis events.
Net borrowing from the parent bank relative to total foreign assets seems to have experienced a
downward trend after 2008. At that time, German banks might have started to repatriate funds
in order to stabilize domestic lending after their own access to market funding became more
limited (see DÜWEL (2013)). Branches in financial centers needed increasing net support again
starting in mid-2010, however. This might again signal deeper involvement of financial center
branches in the trading of sovereign debt. Some of these investments had possibly turned risky,
in particular with some European peripheral states struggling against insolvency, as they were
unable to shoulder the support of their over indebted banking systems.
Hence, whereas before the financial crisis, branches and subsidiaries outside financial centers
had relied more on parent bank funding than their respective equivalents in financial centers,
in the course of the crisis, the increase in net borrowing from the headquarter was larger for
financial center affiliates. This possibly reflects the higher risk that was incorporated in their
balance sheets, and which materialized with the disruptions on financial markets.
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4 Paths for further research and data limitations
This paper provides a first insight into the relevance of financial centers to German multinational
banks and potential risk which is associated with affiliates located in these centers. Banks shift
business, such as the intermediation of international bank lending, to financial centers if this
appears to be more profitable than conducting the same business elsewhere within the bank
holding company.
New regulatory approaches, which are being implemented within the framework of the Basel III
accords, aim at strengthening the equity capital base of banks and put new limits to the growth
of multinational bank holding companies. It is however widely unclear how banks will react
to these new rules. Regulators are struggling with the implementation of uniform regulation
across country borders to create a “level playing field”. This opens up leeway for jurisdictions
that refrain from implementing tighter restrictions on financial transactions. Some offshore
financial centers will continue to provide or will enlarge their platforms where regulation is less
strict, so that they will attract bank business from more tightly regulated countries.
It is therefore possible that home countries of multinational banks will experience a further loss
of control over parts of their banks’ balance sheets despite of tighter regulation. As described
in this paper, financial center affiliates of multinational banks can increase to very large sizes
compared to their home institutions. This development will probably continue as restrictions on
home institutions tighten. Further research should therefore analyze to which extent the size of
financial center affiliates actually contributes to the spillover of financial stress to parent banks.
For this purpose, it can be of advantage to model in more detail the relationship between parent
banks and their financial center affiliates, as well as between financial center affiliates and non-
financial center affiliates. For German banks, new data reports since June 2010 provide further
insight into claims and liabilities of German banks’ foreign affiliates vis-à-vis each other. As
longer time series become available, an analysis of this data can refine an assessment on how
stress can be transmitted within banking groups and to other banks. Models which assess the risk
of contagion within and between networks can provide useful tools. GARRATT ET AL. (2011),
for example, conduct such an analysis on the country level.
As is the case with other studies on the role of financial centers, balance sheet data reported to
bank supervisors, though they are very detailed, do not reveal the extent to which banks make
off-balance sheet investments (LANE AND MILESI-FERRETTI (2010)). A change in accounting
rules implemented in Germany in December 2010 offers first insights into this off-balance sheet
activity by requiring the reporting of trading portfolio derivatives. For branches in financial
centers, this has changed the composition of assets dramatically, as this position now accounts
for roughly 40% of the balance sheet (see section 3.1).
Still, the lack of data on activities in financial centers probably leads to an underestimation of the
risk which parent banks ultimately have to bear (DARBAR (2003)). In particular, complex unre-
ported ownership structures of financial firms such as hedge funds and special purpose vehicles
make it even harder to assess the size and the riskiness of banks’ investments in financial cen-
ters. Therefore, more data on relationships between banks and non-banks should be collected
and analyzed by supervisors. ARTETA ET AL. (2013), for instance, assemble data on ownership
and size of special purpose vehicles that had invested in the US subprime market prior to its
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collapse. They find that the building up of too much risk by these vehicles was possible because
of manager agency problems but also because of the lack of government control of ownership
structures. This path of research should be extended in order to assess more accurately the risk
incorporated in financial center investments.
5 Conclusion
Financial centers are often accused of encouraging tax fraud and money laundering (ROSE AND
SPIEGEL (2007)), but many of them have adopted stricter legislative frameworks for their finan-
cial systems in order to address these concerns (WILLIAMS ET AL. (2005)). Nevertheless, these
countries still offer an advantageous tax and legal environment for financial transactions (LANE
AND MILESI-FERRETTI (2010)). Their importance for global banking has continued to increase
in terms of the number of existing financial centers and the volume of financial transactions
intermediated. This study therefore analyzes the role played by financial center affiliates for
German multinational banks and provides first steps towards assessing the risk for parent banks
incorporated in these affiliates’ balance sheets.
Financial center affiliates of German banks are four times as large as their affiliates located
elsewhere. Besides, the German parents of these bank affiliates are on aggregate only twice as
large as the financial center affiliates themselves. Due to their large size and a particularly strong
focus on interacting with each other, financial center affiliates are likely to transmit distress
to their parent banks whenever disruptions to financial markets occur. Furthermore, German
banks operate in financial centers mainly through branches, which are consolidated into the
parent banks’ balance sheets. This promotes the transmission of shocks. When several financial
center affiliates need support from the parent bank at the same time, the latter may quickly
become overtaxed by the support needed, particularly when taking into account the large size
of financial center affiliates.
Branches both in and outside financial centers would be largely undercapitalized if they were not
consolidated into the parent banks’ balance sheets. On the contrary, financial center subsidiaries
have increased capitalization almost to the level of non-financial center subsidiaries, and are
better capitalized than the aggregate of their parent banks. This development reduces the risk
incorporated in their balance sheets.
When the recent crisis unfolded, parent bank funding was used by all types of affiliates to com-
pensate for a loss in short-term wholesale funding. Only subsidiaries outside financial centers
have managed to return to their pre crisis level of market funding. In general, affiliates in fi-
nancial centers, and branches there in particular, constantly need to roll over large amounts
of short-term debt. This increases the risk that parent banks may have to provide financial
assistance during downturns on funding markets. Therefore, it had to be expected that net bor-
rowing of financial center affiliates from their parent banks would increase more sharply after
the collapse of the subprime market in mid-2007.
With the experiences of the financial crisis, regulators in advanced economies are tightening reg-
ulation for large banks and are setting limits to their size. The envisaged introduction of leverage
ratios, for example, compares equity capital to total assets rather than only to risk-weighted as-
sets. In case of a bank defaulting, this is expected to reduce the problem of institutions being
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“too big to fail”. The new rules may however encourage to shift business off the balance sheet.
Besides, the largely unregulated hedge fund industry can pick up investments which are no
longer profitable for banks. Financial centers have hosted mostly banking activity, but the fund
industry has made some ground (MILESI-FERRETTI ET AL. (2010)). Due to lower tax burdens
and their platform character within the global banking network, financial centers represent an
attractive place not only for banks but also for hedge funds and other financial firms. In the
early 2000s, the hedge fund industry grew, for example, in the Cayman Islands by 30% per year
(MCGUIRE (2005)).
The relevance of financial centers as international financial platforms is therefore likely to in-
crease in the near future. In order to avoid excessive risk-taking in these countries, supervisors
should aim at increasing the transparency of local activities and work closely together with
the regulators of international banks’ home countries. Tax regimes and supervisory standards
should be further harmonized (FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM (2000)). Effective supervision of
bank holding companies on a consolidated level may help to avoid the build-up of risk expo-
sures which may threaten the solvency of international banks and ultimately endanger global
financial stability.
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Appendix
A Tables
Table 1: German banks’ affiliates in countries with major financial centers
This table provides a list of countries defined as financial centers (see section 2.1), in which German
banks had established affiliates (branches or subsidiaries) as of 2006m12. (...) stands for data not shown
here on grounds of confidentiality. The UK Channel Islands comprise Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Jersey.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
Country
Aggregate size of 
branches and 
subsidiaries of 
German banks
(in ! billion)
# of parent banks 
operating in this 
country via branches 
or subsidiaries
1 Cayman Islands 178.109 10
2 Hong Kong 31.395 7
3 Ireland 85.537 11
4 Luxembourg 387.167 26
5 Malaysia " ...
6 Mauritius " ...
7 Netherlands Antilles " ...
8 Philippines " ...
9 Singapore 68.725 10
10 Switzerland 24.467 13
11 UK Channel Islands 19.380 3
12 United Kingdom 940.446 25
13 United States 300.966 12
2041.144 39
34
1544.126 31
30Total via subsidiaries in fin. centers                             497.018
Total via branches in fin. centers
Total in financial centers
Total in fin. centers without US and UK                       799.732
Table 2: German banks’ affiliates in non-financial center countries
This table lists all countries not considered to be financial centers (see section 2.1), in which German
banks had established foreign affiliates as of 2006m12. (...) stands for data not shown here on grounds
of confidentiality. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
Country
Aggregate size of 
branches and 
subsidiaries of 
German banks
(in ! billion)
# of parent banks 
operating in this 
country via branches 
or subsidiaries
Country
Aggregate size of 
branches and 
subsidiaries of 
German banks
(in ! billion)
# of parent banks 
operating in this 
country via branches 
or subsidiaries
1 Argentina " ... 26 Netherlands 14.507 10
2 Australia " ... 27 New Zealand " ...
3 Austria 140.233 16 28 Norway " ...
4 Belgium 8.615 6 29 Pakistan " ...
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina " ... 30 Poland 14.479 7
6 Brazil " ... 31 Portugal 6.326 4
7 Bulgaria " ... 32 Republic of Korea " ...
8 Canada 6.046 3 33 Romania " ...
9 Chile " ... 34 Russian Federation 10.119 5
10 China 5.201 7 35 Saudi Arabia " ...
11 Czech Republic 10.804 4 36 Slovak Republic " ...
12 Denmark " ... 37 Slovenia " ...
13 Estonia " ... 38 South Africa " ...
14 Finland " ... 39 Spain 28.515 11
15 Serbia and Montenegro " ... 40 Sri Lanka (Ceylon) " ...
16 France 31.140 14 41 Sweden 2.443 5
17 Greece 2.323 5 42 Taiwan " ...
18 Hungary 15.092 7 43 Thailand " ...
19 India " ... 44 Turkey " ...
20 Indonesia " ... 45 Ukraine " ...
21 Iran " ... 46 United Arab Emirates " ...
22 Italy 50.290 16 47 Vietnam " ...
23 Japan 44.621 6 42
24 Latvia " ... Total via branches outside fin. centers                        195.271 34
25 Lithuania " ... 20
Total outside financial centers                                     459.480
Total via subsidiaries outside fin. centers                    264.209
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B Figures
Figure 1: Asset portfolio of German banks’ foreign affiliates
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The four panels depicted in this figure show the composition of aggregate total assets of German
banks’ foreign branches and subsidiaries located in financial centers as well as outside those
centers. “Claims” refer to accounts receivable. “Firms” stand for the non-bank private sector.
“Foreign” are all countries except Germany. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
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Figure 2: Affiliates’ lending to financial centers
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This figure depicts lending to banks and firms in financial centers relative to total lending to for-
eign banks and foreign firms carried out by the different groups of affiliates. “Firms” stands for
the non-bank private sector. “Foreign” are all counterparties located outside Germany. Source:
Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
Figure 3: Local lending
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This figure demonstrates the extent to which extent the different groups of affiliates lend locally
as a share of their total lending to foreign banks and foreign firms. “Firms” stands for the non-
bank private sector. “Foreign” are all countries except Germany.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
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Figure 4: Maturity structure of claims on foreign firms and foreign banks
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Short-term claims (accounts receivable) are displayed as a share of total claims on foreign banks
and firms by affiliates in and outside financial centers. “Firms” stands for the non-bank private
sector, “foreign” refers to counterparties located outside Germany.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
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Figure 5: Liability portfolio of German banks’ foreign affiliates
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The four panels show the composition of aggregate funding sources of German banks’ foreign
branches and subsidiaries located in and outside financial centers. “Parent bank funding” refers
to liabilities to the German headquarter. “Deposit funding” comprises all liabilities to non-banks.
“Wholesale funding” consists of funding via foreign banks (ie banks outside Germany) and own
bonds and notes issued. “Short-term” refers to original maturities of less than one year.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
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Figure 6: Capitalization
!"
#"
$"
%"
&'()*+,-
.)/.)()*.(0*,)1,'-
2"
3"
-4&-.5.('.,-
.)/.)()*.(0*,)1,'-
&'()*+,-
6"
7"
841-.5,/.)()*.(0*,)1,'-
-4&-.5.('.,-
841-.5,/.)()*.(0*,)1,'-
9"
:"
6 9
9 6
;
$
6 9
9 6
;
: 6
6 9
9 7
;
$
6 9
9 7
;
: 6
6 9
9 2
;
$
6 9
9 2
;
: 6
6 9
9 3
;
$
6 9
9 3
;
: 6
6 9
9 $
;
$
6 9
9 $
;
: 6
6 9
9 %
;
$
6 9
9 %
;
: 6
6 9
9 !
;
$
6 9
9 !
;
: 6
6 9
9 #
;
$
6 9
9 #
;
: 6
6 9
: 9
;
$
6 9
: 9
;
: 6
6 9
: :
;
$
6 9
: :
;
: 6
6 9
: 6
;
$
6 9
: 6
;
: 6
The figure shows ratios of aggregate equity capital to total liabilities of German banks’ foreign
affiliates in and outside financial centers. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
Figure 7: Net borrowing from the parent bank
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Net borrowing from the parent bank is shown relative to total foreign assets of affiliates. Net
borrowing is calculated as aggregate liabilities (accounts payable) of affiliates to their German
parent banks minus aggregate claims (accounts receivable) on parent banks. For branches,
this position is approximated by liabilities and claims vis-à-vis the German banking sector, as
branches interact mostly with their parent banks there (see DÜWEL AND FREY (2012)).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank / own calculations.
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VI Conclusion
The recent financial crisis can be seen as a turning point in the evolution of international bank-
ing. Internationally active banks as well as regulators are currently reshaping the functioning of
global financial markets, after the riskiness of many financial investments had been underesti-
mated in the run-up to the crisis. This dissertation studies how the financial crisis has affected
the foreign activities of German banks conducting loan supply worldwide, by using detailed
information provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The German banking sector had largely expanded its lending to both domestic and foreign coun-
terparties between 2004 and 2007, but reduced its lending abroad relatively stronger during the
financial crisis, in particular after the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. Foreign lending was curtailed in particular by German banks’ affiliates located
abroad. The collapse of Lehman Brothers has demonstrated how unstable even some very large
financial institutions were due to the risk that they had built up in their balance sheets. This
risk manifested itself as the market for asset-backed commercial paper in the United States froze
in mid-2007, in the face of large default rates on subprime mortgages that had been issued to
homeowners in the United States. These investments had partly been made by the banks them-
selves or by their bank affiliates. Besides, banks had established financial firms for this special
purpose, either in the US or in offshore financial centers.
The complexity of operations that global banks had established prior to the crisis had rendered
supervision of these risks nearly impossible. The high level of complexity of global banks was,
next to the high degree of interconnectedness of financial institutions, a key factor for the rapid
spreading of the financial turmoil to markets outside the United States. Depending on the
bank-specific resilience to this crisis and the banks’ business models pursued before the turmoil,
many banks are currently refocusing their business on traditional deposit taking and lending
to the real sector. This development is enforced by governments in and outside of Europe, in
particular with regard to banks that have received state support during the crisis.
In the first paper contributing to this thesis, it is found that German banks’ adjustments in their
risk assessment and their risk aversion largely determined the reduction in long-term loan supply
to foreign firms while domestic lending was sustained after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
This article also adds to the existing literature by recognizing that foreign lending by global
banks is not per se more stable in times of crisis if the bank has established local affiliates in
destination countries. These affiliates are rather more sensible to changes in local risk and
demand. This can be of advantage to host countries in the case of stable or increasing demand,
but can also limit lending by foreign banks when the local environment becomes more risky, for
example, due to an increase in stock market volatility.
For internationally active banks, the financial crisis represented first and foremost a crisis in
funding markets. The second paper in this thesis puts a special focus on the implications which
German banks’ funding had on their portfolio adjustments in response to the financial turmoil.
Extending previous research, this contribution evaluates the relevance of the funding structure
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of an entire multinational bank, on the level of both the parent bank and the different types of
foreign affiliates. For this, a measure of intra-bank funding is developed, which assesses liquidity
support given by German parent banks to their foreign affiliates. As the crisis on funding markets
unfolded, increasing competition can be detected between different affiliates of a multinational
bank. This does, however, not apply to affiliates which carry out cross-border lending and, thus,
replace or support other, local affiliates in lending to their country of residence.
The third paper included in this dissertation finds significant differences in the role of branches
versus subsidiaries with respect to the liquidity management of multinational banks in times
of distress. The roles are determined by the particular strength of branches to conduct foreign
lending operations while subsidiaries usually have better access to local funding sources. Dif-
ferent from what might have been expected, subsidiaries were, despite of their greater legal
independence from the parent bank, used to a larger extent to fill funding gaps of parent banks,
when compared with branches. This finding contributes to the discussion on whether countries
hosting affiliates of foreign banks should encourage subsidiarization in order to make affiliates
of foreign banks more resilient to shocks transmitted within multinational banks.
German banks have, prior to the financial crisis, established large foreign affiliates in financial
centers such as the United Kingdom or the Cayman Islands. In the last part of this dissertation,
it is demonstrated that this business has grown to very large sizes and that it is concentrated on
trading securities and passing on funds to other financial platforms on a short-term basis. The
article highlights that especially German banks’ branches in financial centers are very weakly
capitalized and funded to a large extent by their parent banks. Therefore, the latter have to be
prepared to inject rapid support into financial center branches, whenever short-term funding via
financial markets is impaired. This was for instance the case during the recent financial crisis.
The article also puts forward an analysis of former off-balance sheet risk taken in particular
by financial center affiliates. Still, risks taken in locations hosting large financial centers are
probably underestimated, as information on off-balance sheet activity of banks is limited.
Understanding how multinational banks organize their funding structures, and how they adjust
their internal as well as their external lending in response to funding shocks, is crucial for the
design of new regulation. The findings presented in this dissertation hint at how important
it is that regulators cooperate across country borders in order to enhance financial stability,
as financial intermediation is conducted internationally by banks operating offices around the
globe.
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Eidesstattliche Erklärung
„Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorgelegten und nachfolgend aufgelisteten Aufsätze selbst-
ständig und nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt habe, die im jeweiligen Aufsatz angegeben oder
zusätzlich in der nachfolgenden Liste aufgeführt sind. In der Zusammenarbeit mit den ange-
führten Koautoren war ich mindestens anteilig beteiligt. Bei den von mir durchgeführten und
in den Aufsätzen erwähnten Untersuchungen habe ich die Grundsätze guter wissenschaftlicher
Praxis, wie sie in der Satzung der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen zur Sicherung guter wis-
senschaftlicher Praxis niedergelegt sind, eingehalten.“
Cornelia Kerl geb. Düwel
Gießen, den 18. Januar 2014
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